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PREFACE 
Since its emergence in 1948, Israel's role as a tool to suppress and break 
up the Arab national liberation movement is by now well known. 
The brutal suppression by Israeli Zionists of the Palestinian Arabs and 
their leadership in the occupied territories, the annexation of Arab Jerusalem, its 
blatant threat to the neighboring Arab countries, its continued rejection and 
sabotage of UN resolutions - all this has aroused mounting criticism of Israel's 
policies throughout the world. In deed, Israel's aggressive policies have turned 
West Asia into an area of explosive international tension and serious threat to the 
peace not only of this region but of the entire world. 
This Thesis is divided into 6 chapters including conclusion. The First 
Chapter deals with the setting in which the Jewish State emerged, and the 
motives, conspiracy, attempts and sacrifices before and after its realization. The 
Palestinian refugee phenomenon as a result of Israel's creation is also discussed 
in detail. The last section of the chapter investigates some Arab countries' 
reaction to Israel's foundation, the plight of Palestinians and the breeding of 
Palestinian resistance. 
The Second Chapter highlights the rise and grov\4h of the Palestinian 
resistance movement, the formation of the PLO as a symbol of Palestinian 
nationalism, and Israeli responsive attitude and response towards the Palestinian 
resistance movement. The chapter analyses the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and its 
consequences on the Palestinians in particular and the neighboring Arabs in 
general. 
The Third Chapter discusses the 1973 October war fought between Egypt 
- led Arab coalition and the Jewish State. The Palestinian resistance 
movements' participation in the conflict, Israel's policies towards them in the 
wake of the crisis, and the superpowers' involvement in the reconciliatory 
process are analysed in detail. The Israeli settlement and expansion policy is 
examined in the last section of this chapter. 
The Fourth Chapter focuses on the Israeli-PLO war in Lebanon. Apart 
from crushing the Palestinian leadership, the war was an expected enterprise in 
the century-old struggle being waged by militant Zionists for expansion of the 
VI11 
Jewish State. The war resulted in failure to destroy the Palestinian national 
identity and to realize the Greater Israel dream. The most important result of the 
conflict was the mass disaffection of ordinary Israelis from the policies of their 
government. 
The Fifth Chapter analyses the Palestinian Uprising in the occupied 
territories, its causes and catalysts, and Israeli reactions and policies towards the 
Palestinians, the PLO and other newly emerged Palestinian-Islamic militant 
groups throughout the Uprising period. The chapter emphasized on the 
consequences of the Uprising on both Israel and the Palestinians in all respects. 
In the Sixth Chapter, the Gulf war, PLO's siding with Iraq, Madrid peace 
process and Oslo peace process along with its interim agreements, are 
discussed and analysed in detail. The Chapter covers the period from 1990 to 
the start of the Second Uprising in 2001. 
Finally, the Concluding Section brings together the distinctive aspects of 
Palestine Question and Israel's policy, and predicts the future course of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The section also attempts to propose some seemingly 
appropriate ideas and ways of settling the conflict. 
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CHAPTER - I 
BACKGROUND TO THE FORMATION OF THE PALESTINE 
LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) 
The Creation of Israel 
The twentieth century has witnessed many catastrophic as well as 
constructive events, of which the unleashing of nuclear power, the conquest 
of space, and the two World Wars are but three examples. In either case, the 
establishment of the Jewish State of Israel is certainly one of the most 
unusual events of this century. Unfortunately, the establishment was 
preceded, accompanied, and followed by much bloodshed, destruction, 
misrepresentation, massacres, and terrorism, not to mention five wars. Many 
years will undoubtedly lapse before anyone will be able to say for certain that 
the result was worth all the destruction. 
The modern State of Israel was born with the passing of United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 181^ and implementation of the Partition Plan of 
29 November, 1947, which divided British-Mandated Palestine into two parts, 
one for Jews and the other for Arabs. Jerusalem, its capital city, was to be 
under international (meaning UN) control. Unlike UN Security Council 
resolutions, whose conditions are binding on UN members. Resolution 181 
was only advisory. The British withdrew and the State of Israel was 
proclaimed on 14 May, 1948. At once Israel was at war with the armed forces 
of certain Arab States that rushed in to fill the security and political vacuum 
created by the British withdrawal, and support Arab Palestinians, thousands of 
whom became refugees. The 1948 War was a Zionist success, and after its 
conclusion the new state encompassed more territory than envisaged by UN 
Resolution 181. 
Zionist leaders and organizations had been preparing and planning to 
establish a Jewish state for many years, their aim being to ingather Jews from 
all over the world. The holocaust had brought an upwelling of international 
sympathy and aid, and the Zionist ideal progressed with little regard for the 
displaced Arab Palestinians. Having backed the wrong side in the Second 
World War, the Arab Palestinian leaders were seen as discredited absentees. 
There had been a degree of Palestinian resistance to Zionist and 
Jewish immigration and rural settlement since the first Aliyah (Jewish 
Immigration wave) of 1882 - 1903, which was followed by the second Aliyah 
of 1904-1914. By 1914 there were about 56,000 Jews and 659,000 Arab 
Palestinians living in Palestine^. The First World War brought about the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and in November 1917 the Balfour 
Declaration promised a homeland for Jews in Palestine, although the earlier 
Sykes - Picot treaty of April 1917 had made contrary promises. The mandate 
to prepare Palestine for independence was given to Britain, then the 
occupying power^. In 1920 there were 51 Jewish settlements, Jews then 
forming some 2.5 per cent of the population'*. 
Jewish immigration continued during the 1920s and 1930s, as did Arab 
opposition culminating in the Arab Revolt of 1936-39, which was crushed by 
British mandate forces. Waves of Jewish immigration from Europe after the 
Second World War caused deeper Arab Palestinian bitterness, resentment 
and some resistance activity, until in April 1948 Britain relinquished its 
mandate, unwilling to police the Arab-Jewish struggle any longer^. 
After the official proclamation of Israel on 14 May, 1948, a strange 
mixture of people from various parts of the world came to settle in the land of 
the Palestinian Arabs - immigrants who had never before set eyes on 
Palestine. They claim that an old religious relationship has bound the Jews 
with the country. This relationship, however, is no more than that linking the 
Christians and Muslims of the world with Palestine. 
The process of uprooting and evacuation was accompanied by a 
unique form of settler-colonialism, characterized by racialist, aggressive and 
expansionist features, which manifested themselves in a total denial of 
Palestinian rights to their homeland and in the establishment of a closed 
military society which made use of fascist methods against the Palestinians^. 
It is apparent that the emergence of Israel is a triumph of the policy of 
the World Zionist Organization. Zionism (WZO) thus established its own state 
(i.e. Israel) on the land of the dispersed Palestinians. This state was created 
without any consideration for the reality of forty-five centuries of Palestinian 
history and without reference to the country's Arab history, which stretches 
back thirteen centuries without interruption. It was created in complete 
indifference to the principle of the right to self-determination, in complete 
contradiction to the will of the majority and in blatant challenge to the UN 
which-despite its complete alliance with imperialism and Zionism-approved 
the establishment of the State of Israel on only a part of Palestine'', and made 
its membership in the international body conditional on its fulfillment of the UN 
resolution concerning the return of Arab refugees to Palestine. 
When the Zionist leadership in Palestine proclaimed the new 
independent State of Israel, without mention of boundaries, Immediately upon 
British relinquishment of the mandate and withdrawal of troops on May 14, 
1948, contiguous Arab states and Iraq sent military units into Palestine to aid 
the Palestinian Arabs. Only the British-trained Jordanians and Iraqis held their 
ground in the highlands. After several months of alternating fighting and 
ceasefire other Arab troops were defeated by the better armed and organized 
Israelis. Israel then controlled all of the area allotted to the Jewish State in the 
Partition Plan, plus half of the territory allotted to the Arab State^. 
The Palestinian problem thus has an undeniable fact in the form of 
human sorrow, hostility and destruction. It embodies a tragedy. It is a problem 
of a whole people uprooted by armed force from its homeland and 
condemned to permanent exile. 
In essence, the Palestinian problem stems from the realization of the 
original aims of Zionism yearning for; reviving a national language and culture; 
developing the resources of the national territory; and achieving sovereignty 
for a national state. Unfortunately, the aims were achieved at the cost of the 
Palestinian Arab land, property and life. 
In retrospect, a long series of Israeli military successes meant that 
Israel had not only ignored the UN-Partition Resolution but had also shown by 
refusing to allow Palestinian refugees to return-that it was not prepared to 
tolerate an Arab-Palestinian state in Palestine^. 
[The victory brought Israel more land. But it did not bring peace. On the 
contrary, it laid the foundations for the confrontation that has continued untill 
the present dayj 
The Israeli Terror and the Palestinian Exodus 
The founding of Israel had two direct consequences: it led to the first 
war between Israel and the Arab states and it created the problem of several 
hundred thousand refugees. 
The first phase after the founding of Israel was no different from the 
phase that preceded it. The Jewish underground and terrorist groups now 
formed the regular Israeli army and continued the war with the same means. 
The murder of the people of Deir Yasin^° had merely been a signal for what 
was to come. 
It can be undoubtedly said that from February 1948 onwards, and prior 
to independence, the Zionists undertook a policy "promoting measures 
designed to encourage the Arab flight and forbidding the return of those who 
left"^\ 
After 15 May, 1948, the Israeli army attacked countless defenseless 
Arab villages, blew up houses and entire villages and indiscriminately killed 
men, women and children. The survivors were driven out of the villages. News 
of these appalling massacres spread like wildfire and those who did not 
believe the reports were likely to become the next victims. 
The Israelis' psychological warfare was based on shock tactics. Israeli 
radio was constantly calling on the Palestinians to flee to avoid a bloodbath. 
Israeli army vehicles with loudspeakers drove through the streets of towns 
and villages pointing out escape routes. But rumours and radio reports were 
not the only reasons for panic and headlong flight. The Israeli army 
deliberately and systematically destroyed villages and drove out their 
inhabitants. This happened not only during the first West Asia war in districts 
such as al-Ghazel and Jabba or villages such as Anan and Kafr Bar'am. Even 
after the war, Zionist violence was continually and cruelly directed against 
Palestinians under Israeli control. The massacres and atrocities committed in 
Arab towns and villages such as Igris (December 1951), al-Tirah (July 1953), 
Abu Ghose (September 1953), Akko (June 1956), and Kafr Kassem (October 
1956), are perhaps the only examples of this wave of Israeli violence^^. 
From 1948 to 1956, Israel not only attacked towns and villages directly 
under its control, but also launched rnilitary attacks on neighbouring areas. 
Israel was condemned for such actions by the UN Security Council in 1951, 
1953, 1955 and 1956. 
Yitzhak Rabin, former Chief of Staff and later Prime Minister of Israel, 
summed up this policy with brutal clarity: "By razing villages to the ground and 
driving out the inhabitants we will ensure that there are no villages left for the 
Arabs to return to"^^. 
These tactics nipped resistance in the bud and reduced the Palestinian 
population to helplessness. 
The murder of the UN mediator Count Foike Bernadotte by members of 
the Stern Gang '^^ on 17 September, 1948^^ was a particularly odious crime. 
Bernadotte was killed because of his strict neutrality and his efforts to,help 
Palestinian refugees return to their towns and villages. He was merely 
implementing a UN resolution to this effect. The Israeli government was 
criticized by the UN Security Council in October 1948 for blocking 
investigations into this murder. 
From spring 1948 to sph'ng 1949, the Palestinians saw their villages 
destroyed, they were forced to flee and feave the country as refugees, with 
the Israeli army behind them and uncertain future before them. They were 
hungry, frightened, helpless, weak and despondent, being unable to dispel 
their inner despair and deep sense of humiliation. They were a nation in exile. 
By the time the United Nation Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA)^ ® 
commenced its operation in May 1950, the total number of Palestinian 
refugees was estimated at 774,000. These refugees were mainly 
concentrated in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt". 
The first refugees were forced to live in fields; others lived in mosques, 
churches, monasteries, schools and abandoned buildings. In June 1950, 
29.3% refugees recognized by UNRWA were housed in camps; this estimate 
rose to 38.6% by June 1957 and went on rising slightly^® . Since 1956, tents in 
the 56 UNRWA camps have been replaced by emergency accommodation. 
The refugees' plight was one of poverty and bitter hardship. Those who 
received UNRWA aid were better off than the rest. On account of the UNRWA 
statistic of a 'refugee', 48% of Palestinians received nothing at all. It is no 
exaggeration to say that UNRWA rations were not enough to live on but just 
too much to die on^^. 
The host countries, themselves underdeveloped and unable to provide 
jobs for their own people, simply could not cope with hundreds of thousands 
of refugees. The Palestinians themselves did not wish to assimilate in the host 
countries. Agreements between UNRWA and the Arab host countries could 
not be reached because of objections by the Palestinian refugees. Knowing 
that they were the victims of injustice, they insisted that they wanted to return 
to their country. 
The UN, twice in 1948 and 1953, passed long resolutions on the right 
of the Palestinians either to return home or to receive compensation. But 
Israel refused to recognize these resolutions. 
In retrospect, since its emergence, relations between Israel and Arab 
Nation had been intensively and continually strained. The uneasy situation 
between Israel and the Arab nation resulted in.the exchange of armed 
hostilities in 1956, 1967 and 1973. The Palestinian refugees were the worst 
sufferers because of the outbreak of these wars and their numbers increased 
alarmingly. In the aftermath of the 1967 June war, another 500,000 
Palestinian refugees were forced to flee from West Bank and Gaza. That has 
brought the total number of Palestinians living outside Palestine-including the 
natural growth - to about 2 million. Most of them are in Syria, Jordan, and 
Lebanon and inside Israel, and live in refugee camps subsisting on 
international Charity^°. 
From 1950 to 1988 the Palestinian refugees' "numbers had been on the 
increase. The difference of the outflux refugees' numbers between the two 
periods are shown in the table given below. 
TABLE 1 
The Palestinian Refugees^^ 
Couptfy'^\\ 
G^ga Strip ) 
JoV^n y 
Lebanon 
Syria 
West Bank 
Year 1950 
198,227 
506,194 
127,600 
82,194 
-
Year 1988 
453,000 
862,000 
286,000 
263,000 
381,000 
strictly speaking, the Palestinian refugees' life, in terms of basic 
infrastructure, is hard beyond imagination. Apparently accommodations in the 
camps consisted of huts with clay walls, a mixture of dirt and straw covered 
with tent canvas and - in the more modern camps-buildings made of cement 
and concrete with corrugated iron roofs. Seven to nine people have to live in 
this accommodation, which consists of only one room. Often they have to 
sleep on the floor. There is no water and no electricity. Above all, inadequate 
food supplies inevitably led to disease. Children's bodies were covered in 
sores. Their hair fell out or went white. Tuberculosis was rife. 
Thus it seems obvious that the Israelis themselves sowed the seeds of 
armed resistance in the hearts of the Palestinians. The violent expulsion and 
uprooting of the Palestinian people by the new State of Israel, the theft of their 
homes and the refusal to allow them to return — all this contained the seeds 
of a new confrontation. A new generation was growing up in the camps, the 
generation f resistance. Many acts by the Palestinians which world opinion 
would later condemn as terrorism can better be understood in the light of this 
historical background. 
The Fedayeen^^ Action after the 1948 War 
It should be mentioned that the Partition Resolution was passed by the 
UN on 29 November, 1947. In the same year the Arab League took over 
political responsibility for Palestine. The Partition of Palestine not only led to 
the Arab-Israeli war in 1948 but also laid the foundation of a new Palestinian 
movement which was primarily based upon the use of violence as a political 
weapon. 
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In 1948, the resistance was carried on by the'Palestinian peasants and 
urban masses. The rich people left Palestine and took shelter in neighbouring 
Arab countries. The Palestinian Arab fighters were poorly trained and 
organised under weak leadership. They made efforts to blockade the roads 
leading to the Jewish villages in order to starve them into submission. But 
their efforts were mostly fruitless because their lack of modern weapons and 
warfare experience. 
During the war, Palestinian resistance was crushed and the badly 
organised, collective Arab armies defeated and the Armistice Agreements 
were signed between Israel and Arab countries in .1949. With that the Arab 
interest in Palestine began to fade. Palestine as an entity disappeared from 
the map and the Palestinians, as has been seen, were condemned to be the 
dispossessed and displaced refugees in neighbouring Arab countries. 
It is obvious that most of the Palestinians were frustrated by the half-
hearted attitude of the Arab countries towards their problem. The Fedayeen 
group, organised by Mufti Haj Amin ai-Husseini with Egyptian assistance and 
stationed in Gaza strip, decided to launch Fedayeen raids; and by 1951 they 
started active operation. The increase in the encounters between the groups 
of the Palestinian Fedayeen and the Israelis forced the latter to adopt a policy 
of armed retaliation. In 1955, large-scale Israeli raids on Fadayeen raids and 
Israeli retaliations become a pretext for the war of October, 1956^^. 
After the war of 1956, the UN Emergency Forces were stationed in 
Aqaba and Gaza Strip to prevent hostility between the Arabs and the Israelis. 
The Fedayeen activities were restricted/ 
11 
It can be said that during the period 1948-64, Palestinian political 
activity was minimal and any resistance was unorganized because of their 
dispersion; while the Arab states-until then still uhinvolved and unaffected 
directly by the creation of the State of Israel-paid lip-service to the Palestinian 
cause, and their representatives at the UN merely delivered speeches at the 
annual sessions and returned to their countries to lead their normal lives. 
Thus, the Palestinian question, as a political issue, was shelved and 
less and less was said about it, while the Israelis attempted to suppress the 
Palestinian identity and hurried to consolidate their hold over Arab homes and 
lands in order to face the world with an accomplished fact, and to build up 
their military strength to forestall any attempt by the Arabs to dislodge them at 
any future date. The only action the UN took was to raise funds to help feed 
the destitute Palestinian refugees who were languishing in refugee camps in 
neighbouring Arab countries^'*. 
The Foundation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
On 16 January, 1964 in Cairo, the first Conference of Arab heads of 
state had, on the Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasir's Initiative, passed a 
resolution calling for the founding of an organisation to embody Palestinian 
existence.. 
On 1 June, the first Palesfinian National Council (PNC) met. This 
assembly then officially founded the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). 
The Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) was immediately set up to be the military 
arm of the PLO. The PLA serves as the regular army of the PLO. The Army is 
headed by the Chairman of the Executive Committee as "Commander-in-
Chief. The members and the officers of the PLA were integrated into the 
12 
various Arab armies^^ and drew attractive salaries under them. Most of the 
Pi_A contingents were stationed in Egypt. It depended upon the Arab armies 
to defeat Israel and consequently it had to face humiliating defeat along with 
the Arab armies in the war of June 1967^^. 
The aim of the PLO is the liberation of Palestine, a task which is 
termed to be a defensive measure, necessitated by the need of self defence -
a right provided for and upheld in the charter of the UN. The organization 
declared its readiness from the start to befriend all nations that love freedom, 
justice and peace; and urged all such nations to support and assist the people 
of Palestine in their struggle to restore what legitimately belongs to them in 
their own homeland, and to enable them to exercise their national sovereignty 
and freedom^^ 
Ahmad Shukairy, an aging diplomat and lawyer, became the first 
Chairman of the 15-men PLO Executive Committee. 
The founding of the PLO was not unexpected. In September 1963, 
Shukairy had been accepted as the Palestinian representative by the Arab 
League^®. 
Shukairy did not belong to the pre 1948 Palestinian leadership, nor to 
the factions that abounded within the Palestinian leadership during the late 
1950s and early 1960s. He had served as head of the Saudi Arabian 
delegation to the UN from 1958 until September 1963, when he was 
dismissed from his post for refusing to present to the UN a Saudi Arabian 
complaint against Egypt. He was immediately appointed by the Political 
Committee of the Arab League to represent the interests of the Palestinian 
refugees at the UN^^. 
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The decision of the Arab League to sponsor the formation of the PLO 
that would represent Palestinians and strive towards the liberation of 
Palestine, in the words of the Cairo Summit, presumably indicated a new Arab 
commitment to the Palestinian cause. In fact, in the view of vanous Arab 
leaders, its significance differed considerably. Nasir apparently backed the 
idea in order to integrate the new group within the Arab League under his 
control. This in turn would prevent Palestinians from undertaking actions 
against Israel that might draw him into confrontation with it. His purpose was 
consistent with his motives in calling for the summit meeting, to deflect Syrian 
demands for military challenge to Israel's water diversion plans. Such tactics 
also placed him once more in the forefront of the Arab cause, as one deeply 
concerned about the Palestinian issue. Syrian-Egyptian tension in 1962, 
stemming from the breakup of the United Arab Republic (UAR), had led to 
Syrian charges that Nasir hoped to shelve the Palestinian issue ; accusation 
that Cairo denied vehemently^". 
On the Palestinian traditional elite level, the emergence of the PLO 
aroused consternation in the almost forgotten offices of the Higher Arab 
Committee of Haj Amin al-Husseini, still existing in Beirut; he denounced the 
PLO as "a colonialist, Zionist conspiracy aiming at the liquidation of the 
Palestinian cause"^\ 
The Israelis, without doubt, become alarmed and charged that the 
establishment of the PLO was a direct threat to Israeli existence, and its 
objections were aggressive, aimed at the sovereignty, of the State of Israel; 
they protested at the UN, describing them as a source of danger to Israeli 
security. 
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If the term "aggression" can be applied to the aims of an organization 
which called for regaining what rightfully belongs to the Palestinian Arabs and 
what was taken away from them by forces of arms, the Palestinian Arabs 
believe that the same definition would be a mild way to describe the Zionist 
invasion of Palestine by alien Jews who had never lived or even seen 
Palestine before; the massacres and atrocities committed against the Arab 
inhabitants; and the expulsion and dispossession of those who had lived and 
owned its soil for centuries, to achieve their aggressive aims^^ 
At the other extreme was Jordan, where King Hussein viewed Shukairy 
and the idea of the PLO with deep misgiving. 
Hussein ruled over population of which nearly sixty percent were 
Palestinians. He also controlled the West Bank, deemed essential to the 
Jordanian economy. Two months after the PLO founding, Shukairy declared, 
in Amman, that all of Jordan, both east and west, banks, were parts of 
Palestine, as was Israel, and should be recovered for Palestinians. Jordan-
PLO animosity intensified to the point that Hussein barred the organization 
from activities, including recruitment in his country. But if Shukairy's efforts 
appeared ominous to Hussein, they seemed far too tame to the Syrians, who 
realized that Nasir had autmaneuvered them at the Cairo Summit of July 1964 
and muffled their demands for militant action. They began in 1965 to try to 
coopt Shukairy for their own purposes, to acquire credit for support of the 
Palestinians at Nasir's expenses. More significantly, they turned to a smaller 
Palestinian organization, al-Fatah, that was prepared to undertake operations 
into IsraeP^. 
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Al-Fatah whose official name in Arabic Haral<at al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyah 
(the Movement for the Liberation of Palestine), is derived from the first letters 
of the three words, but in reverse order^ "*. 
Al-Fatah was formed in either 1959 or 1962, depending on one's 
choice of recollections of the original members^^. The core group was 
composed of young Palestinians who fled to Gaza when Israel was created. 
Several had lived in Cairo during the mid-1950s where they dominated the 
Palestinian Students' Union while attending classes at Cairo University. 
Among them were Salah Khalaf, Khalil al-Wazir, and Yasir Arafat, related on 
his mother's side to Haj Amin al-Husseini. All left Cairo following the 1956 
Suez War, in part because of Egypt's close surveillance of Palestinians and in 
part to search for better-paying jobs. They settled in Kuwait as many other 
Palestinians previously had done, and they began to publish a journal called 
"Our Palestine" that was issued from time to time in Beirut. Several factions 
emerged that later evolved into small but significant entities, most identified 
with current trends of Arabism and Arab unity^^. Composed of approximately 
5,000 active members and 15,000 reserves, al-Fatah is considered to be the 
largest group in the Palestinian movement^''. 
The occupation of Gaza Strip during the war (the only part of Palestine 
that had not been formally annexed by Israel or Jordan) prompted the first 
nucleus of the future al-Fatah organization. Formed from students and 
politically conscious elements from a variety of social backgrounds who had 
come to the conclusion that the Palestinian people tiad no choice but to take 
their cause into their own hands, the movement made slow initial progress. It 
identified itself with the tide of Nasirism enthused with slogans of Arab unity 
and Pan-Arab strength. 
Nevertheless, an initiative from new Palestinian nationalists was no 
more welcome to the established regimes than it had been to the established 
Palestinian leadership in the 1930s. Al-Fatah leaders were accused by some 
Arab states of being agents of Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)^®. The 
strict secrecy with which al-Fatah surrounded itself upto 1967 was not due so 
much to the Israelis as to the attitude of Arab regimes which subjected 
Palestinian militants to house arrest, prison and worse. Al-Fatah still 
remembered that its first partisan casualty occurred at the hands of a 
Jordanian soldier in 1965^^. 
The beginning of the 1960s witnessed two events that had a profound 
effect on Palestinian political thinking. In September 1961 Syria ruptured the 
union with Egypt in the UAR that had been the hallmark of Nasirite Pan-
Arabism. The demonstrable frailty of Pan-Arab Unity on a practical political 
level convinced those Palestinian activists who had seen the path to liberation 
along Nasirite lines (of an Arab nation in arms against Israel) that they could 
not wait untill the rest of the Arab world pulled itself together. Now they began 
to think of liberation through independent Palestinian entity. As a result, more 
than 30 Palestinian organizations'*" sprang up (most of which had only a small 
membership). Prominent of these are; Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PELP-created in 1967), As-Saiqa (entitled the vanguard of the 
Popular Liberation War - 1968), Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF -
1968), Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP-
1969), Arab Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (AOLP-1969), Arab 
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Liberation Forces (ALF-1969), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine -
General Command (PFLP-GC-1970) and al-Ansar (1970). And while this 
proliferation of organizations was ample evidence of the new trend in 
Palestinian thinking and a renewed Palestinian enthusiasm to work seriously 
and independently for liberation of the homeland, it also reflected the lack of a 
strong and effective direction. 
The second event to have a major effect on the cause of the 
Palestinian revival was the eventual triumph of the Algerian revolution in 
1962. This example of a successful popular war of liberation could only give 
more weight to the concept of independent Palestinian activity. The Algerians 
had been able to recruit material and moral support from various Arab 
regions, and through armed struggle, attain their independence. The impact 
on many young Palestinian militants was understandably considerable. 
Practically, the effect in al-Fatah was to shift the emphasis on to the 
formation of military organization. Just as the years 1958 and 1961 had been 
spent in setting up the nucleus of a political structure, so from 1962 onwards 
the movement concentrated its efforts on the building of an effective military 
formation. The nucleus of al-Fatah gave rise to the nucleus of al-Assifa (its 
military branch-meaning "the Tempest"). But what above all decided ai-Fatah 
to go over to the cause of military action in preference to the path of political 
persuasion was the realization in the early 1960s that the movement was 
simply unable to bring sufficient political weight to bear that would affect the/ 
unfolding of developments in the West Asia'*^ 
From the start, al-Fatah became an international organization with cells 
in numerous countries. Members were recruited even from the Palestinian 
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Student Organizations in Europe, although the majority of its membership 
came from the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. 
Kuwait became the principal-funding centres. Above all strong ties were 
formed with Nationalists of Algeria who were at this time fighting their own 
liberation war. Syria became the headquarters of ai-Fatah until the Syrian 
government attempted to clamp down on its operations, at which time Jordan 
became its principal base of operations with Beirut, Lebanon its political 
centre^^. 
The rapid capitulation of the Arab armies in June 1967 War certainly 
took the Arab governments by surprise. As for the Palestinians, particularly 
the militants and the nationalists within numerous Palestinian resistance 
organizations with al-Fatah being the largest and most influential one, the 
defeat proved once and for all that dependence on Arab governments and 
armies for the liberation of Palestine would lead nowhere, and that the 
concept of Arab unity under prevailing conditions was a dangerous illusion if 
perceived as a means of the recovery of Palestine. It also helped push the 
idea and feeling that only they (Palestinians) would be able to control their 
own destiny. Only by means of overt acts undertaken by themselves would 
the Zionist government be defeated. 
Discredited, too, with Arab regimes was the leadership of the PLO. 
These spokesmen who had assumed the mantle of leadership from the Mufti 
who, on his part, had lost much prestige through his collaboration with Nazi 
German government during World War II, were now forced to step aside for 
the militants'*^. 
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Unable to cope with the challenges and demands of a war of national 
liberation of 24 November, 1967 Ahmad Shukairy had to resign. Shukairy was 
replaced by Yahya Hammudah'*'* who was, as Shukairy, a member of the 
traditional Palestinian elite whose policies had clearly failed in 1948. He was 
unable to develop new initiatives for the Palestinian struggle. The age of the 
Palestinian elite was irrevocably finished, and it was soon overtaken by 
events. As Shukairy's successor, Hammudah was no better. He was 
replaced, at the Fifth Palestine National Council held in Cairo in February 
1969, by Arafat who remains the PLO chairman'*^. This occurred after the 
battle of Karameh on March 21, 1968^ *® when al-Fatah was catapulted to the 
forefront of the Palestinian movement. From this time on the PLO has been 
dominated by the guerrilla organizations represented the Executive Central 
Committee, whose members form the majority of the delegates as the 
National Congress'*^. 
Arafat took over the charge of the PLA as he was named by the PLO 
Executive Committee as the Head of the PLC's Military Section. The following 
members were elected to the ll-man Executive Committee. Yasir Arafat, 
Farouk al-Kaddoumi, Muhammad al-Najjar and Khalid al-Hasan from al-
Fatah; Youssef al-Borji and Ahmad al-Shehabi from as-Saiqa; Hamed Abu 
Sittah from the old PLO Executive Committee; Ibrahim Bakr, Kamal Nasser 
and Yassir Amre were the independent members. Abdel Majid Shouman 
represented the Palestine National Fund. Since the PFLP was undergoing an 
internal crisis because of ideological difference among the leadership in the 
approaches of against collective Zionist enemy, it did not participate in 
National Council'*^. 
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It can be said that during mid and late 1960s a Palestinian national 
consciousness began eventually to consolidate itself with the creation of the 
PLO. For about three years after its emergence, the PLO struggled to define 
itself and to press its programme on its dispersed Palestinian constituency, on 
the Arab region, and on the world. In those days the challenge to its 
legitimacy came essentially from Israel, which saw in it the reincarnation of 
the old Palestinian people it thought had vanished. \i came from Jordan, too, 
which perceived a threat to its political system and a challenge to its 
incorporation of the West Bank, should the Palestinians there identity too 
closely with the PLO. The third challenge to the PLO came from Palestinian 
militants, who had been organizing underground for national liberation, and 
who viewed the organization and its leaders as instruments of the Pan-Arab 
Politics of Egypt and neither sufficiently militant nor independent in decision-
making. All of these challenges to the legitimacy of the PLO were transformed 
in the wake of Israel's defeat of Arab States in the 1967 June war'* .^ 
According to the Palestinian Militants, the PLO led by Shukairy could 
not achieve anything. Neither did it start a guerrilla war nor did it prepare the 
masses for a war of liberation. He only made Press statements from time to 
time. The officers of the PLA contingents were stationed in Egypt. It depended 
upon the Arab Armies to defeat Israel and consequently it had to face 
humiliating defeat along with the Arab Armies in the war of June 1967. 
The Palestinians took up arms in 1965 when it became clear to them 
that armed struggle constituted the only means to liberation. After June 1967, 
thousands of Palestinians joined the resistance movement, which has proved 
its determination in fighting the Israeli enemy. 
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PLO Guerrilla Organizations 
A brief summary of each of the guemlla groups within the PLO follows: 
Al-Fatah^° 
The origins of the movement are hard to trace in detail, and the 
organization itself has cast little light on its origins: The creation of al-Fatah 
certainly goes back to 1959 when groups of young Palestinians (some of 
whom had taken part in commando operations in Gaza Strip in 1956) joined 
together to organize propaganda and political activity, though not under the 
explicit name of al-Fatah. They published a periodical called "Our Palestine" 
to express their ideology and political views on Palestine. These may be 
summed up as follows. 
1. The only manner in which Palestine could be regained was through 
military violence and "the true meeting between Palestinian forces on the 
battle front". 
2. The battle would shape the destiny of the Palestinians, and hence it was 
imperative that old and stale ideologies and principles be dropped to 
polarize all the Palestinians forces. In other words, the Palestinians had no 
time to embark on a fruitless dialogue over the shape of the country after 
liberation. 
3. The Arab governments had given regional interests priority over 
confrontation with enemy. All that would be asked of the Arab regimes 
therefore was that they protect their own borders and permit and support 
Palestinian operations inside the occupied territories. 
4. The slogan "The Liberation of Palestine is the Road to Unity" must replace 
the slogan "Unity is the Road to the Liberation of Palestine". 
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Al-Fatah was the first Palestinian organization to believe in the principle of 
self-help, whereby the Palestinians, and not Arab States, should be 
responsible for their destiny. The first military operations against Israel took 
place in 1965 and were to escalate in the ensuing years. After the battle of 
Karameh (March 1968) during which al-Fatah members swelled by volunteers 
clamouring to enlist in the organization. Arafat became head of the PLO, 
increasing his prestige within the Arab world. He was in fact, accorded the 
status of head of state at inter-Arab conferences in which he participated^\ 
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The increase of al-Fatah's regular forces compelled the organization to 
establish a complex system of administration. A Central Committee was 
formed among the founders of the group. Approxirnately ten in number, those 
men carry out the wishes of the General Congress and oversee the 
administrative activities of the organization. The General Congress usually 
meets once a year to elect members to the Central Committee and the 
Revolutionary Council as well as to determine the cause of action the 
organization is supposed to take during the coming year. Real power is held 
by the Revolutionary Council, however, whose thirty-three members are 
responsible for determining policy and for making momentous decision. Al-
Assifa (the Tempest), the paramilitary wing of the organization, undertakes 
military activities of the group. Smaller committees or branches within al-Fatah 
have other specific duties. For example, the External Security Branch 
maintains security operations for the leaders of the organization. Jihaz al-
Rasd is the intelligence gathering service, with numerous offices abroad. And 
the Foreign Relations Branch supervises control of the operational cells 
located in many countries throughout the world^^. Al-Fatah is not only involved 
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in guerrilla operations; it maintains social service branches that function as 
public health installations, field hospitals, orphanages, and schools. It also 
distributes funds to the families .of members who were killed in the line of duty 
or who are currently imprisoned by the Israelis^^. 
In political terms, al-Fatah's stand, as compared to other guerrillci 
(Fedayeen) groups seems to be conservative. It does not make a 
fundamental break with the past though it has adopted all modern political 
ideas that suit the prevailing situation - except the Marxist of scientific 
socialism. There are two wings, rightists and leftists in the organization. The 
former is led by Khalid al-Hassan and the latter by Salah Khalaf. Yasir Arafat 
is the spokesman of the organization. He acts as an arbiter between the 
factions^'*. 
Inspite of the charges levelled against al-Fatah, it is difficult to say that it is 
fundamentally a conservative movement. It may have followed a conservative 
policy to win over the conservative elements of the Arab East but its practice 
has a definite left orientation. It has implemented the Maoist military strategy 
of people's war without uttering the name of Mao Tse-Tung^^. 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
Composed of approximately 2,000 members, PFLP's dedicated active 
core members only 500. The organization was founded by George Habash 
and Najif Hawatneh^^ on 11 December, 1967 (in Amman) as the result of the 
merger between three formerly independent groups. Two of these - the 
Heroes of the Return Organization and the National Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (Young Men of Revenge) - were affiliated to the Arab Nationalist 
Movement (ANM), whose most prominent member, George Habash himself, 
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later emerged as the PFLP's effective leader. The third participant was the 
Palestine Liberation Front, which included a number of smaller groups all 
named after Palestinians who had fought up to 1948 such as the group of the 
Martyr Abdul Latif Shrour, the group of the Martyr izzedin Qassem and the 
group of the Martyr Abdul Qader al-Husseini^''. 
The PFLP evolved from'a Pan-Arabist Organization to a Marxist one 
over a 20-year period. During the course of this evolution a number of 
schisms occurred which resulted in the creation of breakaway groups. Many 
of these groups did not survive the first few years of separation, but others, 
such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command 
and (PELP-GC) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(DFLP) continued to operate and have played prominent roles in the 
Palestinian movements' radical wing^°. 
The PFLP concentrated on urban sabotage and terrorist activities. Its 
most famous coup occurred in 1970 with the hijacking of several planes to 
Jordan, acts that precipitated the Jordanian attack on guerrilla positions^^. 
The PFLP adopted Marxism-Leninism as an ideology to fight 
imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction. The Front is led by George Habash 
who describes himself as an "Asiatic Marxist - Leinist"^°. Because of its leftist 
dogma, the PFLP has the closest contacts with other leftist international 
radical groups, such as the Red Army of Japan and the Baader-Meinhoff 
group in West Germany^\ 
Its leftist doctrines have been the main reasons why funds from most 
Arab governments have not been forthcoming. Communism is anathema to 
the peninsula countries as well as to Libya. Only Iraq has provided sufficient 
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funds to enable the organization to remain solvent. When these were not 
forthcoming, hijacking for ransom was used. Furthermore, since Habash and 
other PFLP leaders are Christians, the non-Marxist Muslims, desirous of 
Joining a commando group, would gravitate towards other organizations. Its 
appeal then, is limited. One of the main reasons, thus, for staging the 
spectacular attacks against international aviation was to gain favour with the 
Muslim masses^^. 
As often happens in such movements there were splits on ideological 
ground in the PFLP also. The radical group led by Najif Hawatmeh and 
theoreticians, Mohcen Ibrahim and Muhammad Kichli, broke away and formed 
the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP)^^. 
In February 1970 the PFLP lost another splinter, this time led by 
Ahmad Jibril, an ex-Syrian army officer who disagreed with Habash over 
which targets to attack. Jibril's group became known as the PFLP-General 
Command (PFLP-GC)^. 
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) 
Composed of a small core of approximately 100, with approximately 
1,200 adherents, the PDFLP, founded by Najif Hawatmeh, was a spin-off from 
the PFLP, in February 1969^^ 
The PDFLP changed its name to Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine in August 1974. 
It was the PDFLP's argument that the liberation of Palestine by the 
resistance could never be achieved until all the Arab regimes had joined the 
battle against Israel and imperialism . Arab countries with reactionary regimes 
were incapable of participating in this confrontation, and therefore the prelude 
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to the liberation of Palestine was a general Arab revolution. It also stressed 
that the victory of the Palestine liberation movement over the Zionist enemy 
depends on victory over imperialism in the Arab region. Hence the struggle 
against the national enemy is linked to the struggle against imperialism and 
reactionary circles that cooperate with it. Thus the future of the Palestine 
revolution is linked to the future of the Arab revolution against imperialism and 
to change the balance of power in the region.^ ®. 
The PDFLP became well known as a result of a series of political 
initiatives, particularly towards Israelis. It was this organization that 
denounced most clearly 'Chauvinistic' slogans such as: "Drive the Jews into 
the sea". In 1970 it opened a dialogue with the extreme left-wing Israeli 
organization "Matzpen"^^. Finally, from 1973 onwards, it was, with al-Fatah, 
one of the strongest defenders of the idea of a Palestinian mini-state. 
Between 1973 and 1977 its alliance with al-Fatah and as-Saiqa made it 
possible to impose this slogan on the PLO. After 1977, the date of Sadat's 
visit to Jerusalem, the PDFLP moved away from al-Fatah which it criticized for 
its compromises with Arab reaction^^. 
Comparatively al-Fatah is considered a nationalist movement; so also 
PFLP in spite of its Marxist-Leninist overtones.' But PDFLP is the only 
organization which is not close to any of the Arab regimes^^. 
As- Saiqa (The Thunderbolt) 
As-Saiqa, officially entitled the Vanguard of the Popular Liberation War, 
was created and backed by the ruling Syrian Baath Socialist Party in 1968. Its 
membership totals about 5,000, and is closely linked to the Syrian 
governemnt^°. Its influence within the PLO is closely tied to the role of Syria in 
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the West Asia conflict^^ Its leader is Mahmoud al-Maaita^^. The organization 
is structured with two major departments: political and military. 
The political development of as-Saiqa is much less significant, although 
militarily it made sufficient progress. Its political standpoint is said to be 
roughly that of al-Fatah's left wing^^. From the beginning it presented itself as 
an alternative to al-Fatah, and has never quite given up its aspirations to 
make the running in the resistance movement. At first, as-Saiqa considered 
itself to be on the left of al-Fatah, an organization it saw as right-wing in its 
connections with reactionary Arab regimes. As-Saiqa faithfully reflected 
official Baath thinking, and indeed from its birth it was attached directly to the 
Baath Party after being linked with the army (Palestinian officers had earlier 
been transferred to as-Saiqa).^'*. 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command 
(PFLP-GC) 
The PFLP-GC is a small group, founded by Ahmad Jibril, which 
withdrew from the PFLP at the end of 1968 a few months after joining it. 
Jibril's withdrawal was prompted chiefly by his insistence that commando 
activity was the prime task of the resistance and too much time was being 
wasted with futile political discussion. The leftist stance adopted by the PFLP 
at Najif Hawatmeh's instigation during the Front's August 1968 Congress 
convinced Jibril he would better off acting on his own - the choice of the 
epithet "General Command" emphasizes the military priorities of the PFLP-GC 
and reflects the former position of Jibril in the united PFLP as a military 
leader'^ .^ He is considered to be one of the best military strategists in the 
Palestinian movement. 
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Jibril reaffirmed his group's total opposition to a peaceful settlement 
and declared his intention of organizing increasingly spectacular suicide 
operations to disrupt any attempt to reach a political settlement. He aimed to 
create a situation whereby Israel would be forced to conduct reprisal raids 
which would, he hopes, drive moderate Palestinians to rally to the "Rejection 
Front^^". He also added that the PFLP-GC would prefer to see a Palestinian 
state of only 180 square miles from which to carry on the armed struggle 
against Israel to one ten times the size with enforced frontiers^^. 
The PFLP has tended to restrict its operations to forays inside Israel. 
Three known exceptions did take place, however, all involved the destruction 
of planes. Jibril has promised many more operations though, thereby proving 
himself to be the most dangerous Palestinian guerrilla leader and the greatest 
potential disrupter of current peace negotiations. His group was brought into 
the PLO, there was a chance that Arafat might be able to curtail his terrorist 
operations. But it was doubtful whether an indefinite postponement of 
operations could be achieved^®. 
Arab Liberation Front (ALF) 
This commando group led by Abdul Rahim^^, was formed in April 1969. 
Its sponsor was Iraqi regime, whose Baathist leaders kept strict control over 
its activities. The ALF emerged as a result of the Iraqi Baathist quarrels with 
al-Fatah leadership. Also involved was an attempt to emulate the Syrians who 
had recently by established as-Saiqa°°. 
The organization has a membership of approximately 400-500, mainly 
drawn from other Arab countries, particularly Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan, and 
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only minority from the Palestinians (which explains its relatively weak position 
in the refugee camps) ^\ 
The ALF was the first serious attempt to 'Arabize' the Palestine cause. 
As its name implies, the organization sees itself as stressing the Arab rather 
than just the Palestinian nature of the Palestinian war. It felt that too much 
stress was placed on the regional Palestinian nature of the struggle with Israel 
to the detriment of the Arab nature of the cause. Iraqi Baathists would rather 
give the general Arab cause precedence over regional problems^^. 
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CHAPTER -II 
RISE AND GROWTH OF THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE 
MOVEMENT (PRM) AND THE ISRELI RESPONSE 
It is not difficult to see how and why the various Palestine Resistance 
Movements (PRMs) were born of the Palestine predicament. It is only 
surprising, in retrospect, that the present style of resistance did not wake up 
before 1967. 
Clearly Palestinians were too shattered by the 1948 war to do much 
except for Fedayeen raids on self-claimed Israeli borders. Although they 
started much before it, the various PRMs really only become known to the 
west after the 1967 war. This time the PRMs rode the wave of popularity. 
Their guerrilla operations against Israel implied both war and political or 
diplomatic sense and suddenly received the attention of worldwide mass 
media. 
The PRM guerrilla operations against Israel from 1 January, 1965 to 
the 1973 War (to the 1982 Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon) aimed at imposing 
the Palestine question on the world public opinion which had forgotten the 
Palestinians. They, of course, knew their effectiveness. They were aware of 
the fact that militarily they were no match for the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), 
who, armed by the US are one of the most sophisticated forces in the world. 
Yet the PRM guerrillas attacked the Israeli targets to carry on the armed 
propaganda which was political and diplomatic in nature. Abu lyyad (Salah 
Khalaf), one of the founders of al-Fatah and the mastermind behind "Black 
September ^", and number two in the PLO with the rank of Prime iVlinister who 
was assassinated by the Israelis in 1992, in his autobiographical account, "My 
Home, My Land', says: 
The founders of al-Fatah were well aware of Israel's military 
superiority - but still they set as their main objective the 
launching of the armed struggle. Not that We harboured any 
illusions regarding our ability to overcome the Zionist state. But 
we believe that it was the only way to impose the Palestinian 
cause on world public opinion, and especially the only way to 
rally our masses to the people's movement we were to create^. 
There were three objectives of the PRM strategy: (1) The guerrilla war 
would result in Israeli retaliation on frontline Arab states dragging the latter to 
an Arab-Israeli war, which would be followed by a diplomatic solution to the 
Palestine problem; (2) Creating an "Arab Hanoi" either in Amman or Beirut in 
order to liberate Palestine; (3) Relentless armed struggle and mass resistance 
would force the Israelis to vacate parts of Palestine where the PRM would 
establish a state of their own, the base for further liberation of Palestine. 
The PRM guerrilla armed strategy aimed at harassing primarily Israel 
and then the forces obstructing their struggle. The harassment should be so 
much that finally Israel would recognize their grievances and make an 
accommodation with the Palestinians. Qouting an article written by Nabil 
Shaath, a PLO leader, in 1971 about the role of PRM guerrilla operations in 
achieving productive political goal, William B. Quandt writes about the more 
ambitious objectives of the PRM: 
- that of bringing about changes within Israel that would make 
an eventual accommodation possible. Israel, it was argued, 
could be forced to recognize the validity of Palestinian 
grievances. The burden of continuing warfare, heavy defense 
spending and costly casualties would also eventually serve to 
convince the Israelis to accept political arrangement in which 
Palestinian demands were granted^ 
The October 1973 war was a historic turning point as well as rude 
awakening for the PRM. They collaborated with the Egyptian and Syrian 
armies in the war against Israel and achieved notable victories. The PRM 
guerrilla operations played an important role in the war and succeeded to 
some extent in weakening Israel. 
Israeli sensitivity was not completely baseless. The de-Palestinization 
of the Palestinians was the sole interest of Israel. Any deviation from this 
process was considered by the Israelis as "dangerous". Any Palestinians 
claim as such was perceived in terms of zero-sum game facing the Israelis. 
From a political and institutional point of view; the Israeli reaction to the 
reappearance of a partially independent, Palestine centred, organization and 
leadership may have been exaggerated, but from a behavioral point of view 
the reason for anxiety was evident. From the outset, the PLO-constitutionally, 
at least has continued the traditional Palestinian denial of any collective-
political rights for Jews in Palestine. 
The PLCs argument with the central assertions of Zionist doctrine is 
also understandable, given the history of both collectivities and the 
catastrophic outcome for the Palestinians of the encounter with the Jewish 
national movement. The Palestinian National Charter's direct assault on the 
very raison d'etre and identity of Jewish collectivity, reflected the nature of the 
communal conflict, based on the mutual "delegitimatiori game". Later, both the 
nature of the conflict as well as the mutual delegitimation drove the partners 
towards some mutual accommodation. 
Both Israeli approaches towards the Arabs, the Palestinians, and the 
conflict were embodied in the personality and figure of the al-Fatah's leader, 
and later the PLO's chairman, Yasir Arafat. Of course this perception was 
fueled by Arafat's self-presentation as an ascetic "man of the people", 
completely dedicated to the "revolution". In contrast, he was perceived and 
presented by most of the Jewish Israel media in caricature; shaped as an 
appalling but ridiculous terrorist, a cunning conspirator with a limited 
performed record, a loser. survivalist, a .non-trustworthy consistent 
programatist, and above all, as the personification of ultimate evil. However, 
just as Arafat preferred, he remained for most Palestinians and Israelis an 
enigma. 
The Era of the Palestinian Guerrilla Warfare 
Al-Fatah carried out its first military operations against Israel on 31 
December 1964. Arafat, al-Fatah's leader, saw the importance of armed 
campaign to pressurize his foe at this stage. Driven by a sense of urgency he 
said "that I had already made a pledge to God and myself that 1964 would 
see the launching of our armed struggle"^:. Three conimando groups were to 
operate independently from Lebanon, Jordan and the Gaza Strip. The first 
successful operations included the blowing up of bridges, mine laying and 
attacks on kibbutzim, on 1 January al-Assifa (the Tempest), the military arm of 
al-Fatah, issued its first military communique. The name of al-Assifa had been 
chosen to avoid compromising al-Fatah if the operation failed. "If al-Assifa 
succeeded, al-Fatah would then endorse the armed struggle", Arafat 
explained. "If al-Assifa did not succeed, the al-Assifa would take responsibility 
for the failure, and not al-Fatah^. To reassure the counselors of caution 
further, military activities would be under the command of Muhammad 
Youssef al-Najjar, a tough Gazan militant then living in Qatar^. 
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Initially, the commandos had to fight not only against Israel but against 
harassment from the Arab side. The group operating in the Gaza Strip was 
discovered by the Egyptian secret service on 15 February 1965. By 20 
February, all its leaders had either been imprisoned or placed under house 
arrest^. 
The decision to take up the armed struggle had been preceded by 
fierce and controversial discussions within al-Fatah itself. There were two 
camps. One argued that it was too early to start guerrilla warfare and that they 
should wait until al-Fatah was a mass movement with substantial support and 
membership. To this, Abu Jihad (Khalil Wazir), Abu Youssef al-Najjar, Abu 
Lutf, Abu lyyad and others replied that only through armed struggle could al-
Fatah make itself mass movement. The hopes that al-Fatah had aroused in 
the Palestinian people should not be disappointed. A decision was postponed. 
The adoption of military operations was not finally approved until another 
meeting of the entire, al-Fatah leadership in Damascus in October 1964^. 
The spectacular operations of 31 December 1964 achieved the desired 
effect. After a few days of silent consternation, a storm of outrage and 
indignation broke out over al-Assifa. Almost all the Arab newspapers 
condemned the operations, describing them as the deeds of "Muslim 
Brothers", "CIA agents" or "agents of international communism". Press organs 
in various Arab countries were even forbidden to mention the name of al-
Assifa. A resolution of Arab League defense ministers called on all Arab 
countries to prevent al-Assifa operations so as not to give Israel a pretext for 
an attack^. 
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On New Year's Day 1965, al-Fatah issued its first communique, whicli 
in part read as follows: 
Sixteen years have elapsed while our people live detached from 
their cause which has been shelved at the United Nations as a 
problem of displaced refugees, where as the enemy's plans, 
with all his means, on the local and international levels, for an 
extended stay in our homeland ... In the light of this distressing 
fact, and because of the adverse effect of the lapse of time, the 
Assifa forces have been launched forth to reiterate to the enemy 
and the world at large that this people did not die and the armed 
revolution is the road to return to victory^". 
Unfortunately the first Palestinian revolutionary killed in action was shot 
by Jordanian army bullets. Ahmad Mussa was killed by King Hussain's troops 
when he returned to Jordan, where he thought he was safe. Palestinians were 
now kept under surveillance, persecuted and imprisoned. In 1967, there were 
250 Palestinians in Jordanian prisons on suspicion, of membership of al-
Assifa. Some of al-Fatah leaders were also arrested. For example, in spring 
1966, Yasir Arafat, Abu jihad, Abu Ali lyyad and others were arrested in 
Damascus. It was only after a one-month hunger strike and the intervention of 
other al-Fatah leaders such as Farouk Kaddoumi and Abu lyyad that they 
were released^ V 
Shortly aften/vard Yasir Arafat was arrested by Lebanese security 
forces on suspicion of being an Israeli agent. Al-Fatah again managed to get 
him released. The Lebanese authorities had been unable to establish his 
identity^^. 
Al-Fatah did not wish and could not afford to jeopardize the effective 
organization of the Palestinian people and the continuation of the armed 
struggle. It had to normalize its relations with the other Arab countries. Later 
the al-Fatah leadership visited Cairo to discuss political cooperation with 
President Nasir. They hoped that Nasir would be able to use his influence in 
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the Arab world to win support for Palestinian resistance. But in fact no 
meeting with Nasir took place. The Egyptian government was interested only 
in finding out as much as possible about the structure and leaders of al-Fatah. 
Al-Fatah had to get by without such support until after the June War in 
1967. But the military as well as political struggle continued just the same. In 
the two years from 1965 to 1967 the Fedayeen (PRM) carried out more than 
200 operations'^. This new manifestation of Palestinian nationalism was a 
frightening nightmare for Israel. 
Israel's War on Palestinian Nationalism 
As has been seen, the Palestinians conducted a guerrilla campaign 
against Israel from different places but with limited means. Israel responded 
with a fully fledged war conducted with the state's resources. The reason is 
not difficult to perceive. Despite its tactical acceptance of the resolution for the 
partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, and despite the Armistice 
Agreements, Israel wanted and wants the whole territory of Palestine. 
Palestinian nationalism, and in particular the existence of the PLO, has stood 
in the way of the success of this plan, hence, the wars of 1965, 1967 and 
1982. 
In its war against Palestinian nationalism Israel has pursued three 
objectives: 
1. To seize and annex the territory of the whole of Palestine so as to deprive 
the Palestinians of any territorial base for the establishment of a state. 
2. To stamp out guerrilla action and to annihilate the PLO which, since its 
creation, has become the embodiment of Palestinian nationalism. 
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3. To crush political opposition and to terrorize the Palestinians who are 
under its domination in order to force them into submission or cause their 
exodus from their homeland. 
Undoubtedly, in execution of its objectives, Israel has had recourse to 
the following weapons: war and massive bombings of Palestinian villages and 
refugee camps, massacres of civilians, political assassinations, oppression 
and repression in territories under its control and a smear campaign against 
the PLO and the Palestinians. 
Palestinian Resistance l\/lovements and Arab Countries 
Jordan and the Palestinians 
The kingdom of Jordan (previously, the Princedom or Emirate of 
Transjordan), was set up by King Abdullah Ibn al-Hussein al-Hashem (1882-
1951) in 1992. The establishment of Transjordan was as much a by-product 
of efforts by Great Britain to implement the "Sykes-Picot agreement^ "*" as it 
was to placate its former Hashimite ally against Turkey during World War I. 
On March 22, 1946, the Emirate of Transjordan was proclaimed the 
Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan; and on 15 May, 1948 the Arab Legion crossed 
the Jordan Rivet to participate- in the first Arab-Israeli war. In its aftermath, 
Jordan was to be subjected to the turbulent ramifications of what came to be 
known as the Palestinian Issue. The defeat of the Arab armies by Israel, the 
influx of a large number of Arab Palestinian refugees to Jordan with its 
demographic implications - affected the political process of the kingdom and 
its army. These followed in April 1950 the union between Jordan and 
Palestine by a vote of the National Assembly under the condition, among 
others, that such union should not prejudice the final settlement of the 
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Palestine Question. After the union, King Abdullah consicl6red himself the 
representative and spokesman of the Palestinians, and he did not allow or 
encourage the manifestation of any Palestinian personality or identity. On 20 
July 1951, King Abdullah was assassinated by a Palestinian for having met 
with Mrs. Golda Meir and having sought a permanent peace settlement with 
Israel. He was succeeded by his son, Prince Talal, who was deposed in 
September 1952 for reasons of mental health and he was succeeded by King 
Hussein, his son or King Abdullah's grandson^^. 
It should be noted that the population of Jordan trebled with the influx 
of refugees to Transjordan and the annexation of the West Bank of Palestine. 
With original population of about 400,000 at the eve of the Arab-Israeli war, it 
jumped to over 1,500,000. The 1,100,00 Palestinians were roughly divided 
between refugees and the actual inhabitants of the West Bank area. About 
100,000 educated and trained Palestinians quickly filled the need for an 
expanding state, becoming Jordan's new middle and upper class^^. However, 
the process of Palestinian integration was well under way and continued with 
major modification under the rule of King Hussein. 
(a). Relations between PLO's Guerrilla Groups (PRMs) and Jordan 
Obviously the political developments surrounding the creation of the 
PLO in 1964, and the selection of Ahmad Shukairy as its leader, contributed 
to the fragmentation of the Palestinian political elite and to the eventual 
emergence of a new elite, one that sought greater freedom of action within 
Jordan. Jordan, for its part suspecting that the PLO and the PLA were tools of 
Egyptian policy, refused to comply with the decisions taken by the Arab 
leaders at the Second Arab Summit Conference in September 1964. It limited 
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and watched closely the PLO's activities within Jordan, refused to allow the 
PLA to recruit among the Palestinian units, and continued to draft Palestinians 
in the Jordan army. 
Before 1967, Jordan was careful not to encourage any thing that could 
dissociate the Palestinian entity from the Jordanian. It is official Jordanian 
policy to insist that there were no differences: it is ofTicial Palestinian policy to 
insist that there were. By 1968 the two sides had reached the breaking point. 
Palestinian militants were refusing to consider themselves Jordanians; they 
were first and foremost Palestinians^''. 
Already before 1967 the PLO and Jordan had engaged in a political 
dispute over the former's claim for freedom of action in the West Bank. Given 
the tight linkage between the two banks of the Kingdom and the massive 
presence of Palestinians east of the Jordan River, the dispute had direct 
repercussions for the existence of the Hashimite regime itself^^. 
Jordan's proximity to Israel and their large Palestinian populations also 
rendered Jordan preferable to the Palestinian resistance groups as territorial 
base for guerrilla warfare against Israel. Yet it was primarily its fragile 
domestic systems and strategic vulnerability that subjected the state to 
pressures by stronger Arab neighbours to allow the PRM to operate on its soil 
and pay the heavy prices entailed in terms of Israeli retaliations^^. 
Another significant factor aggravating the already, mutually-hostile 
attitude between the PRMs within the PLO and Jordan, has been a feeling 
among the Palestinians that King Hussein never stood for the liberation of 
Palestine. The following two reasons were given; Jordan gets arms from the 
US and the monarch depends upon Israel for his survival. Whenever there 
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was agitation against Hussein's regime, Israel attacked some part of Jordan 
and the people were called upon to cease the agitation lest Israel might 
occupy certain areas. There was always mutual suspicion between the 
Palestinians and King Hussein. Hussein found that Cairo and Damascus were 
inciting the Palestinians to overthrow him. He, therefore, took precautionary 
measures in May 1967, and introduced a Press Law, which suppressed 
newspapers In Jordan. The Palestinians lost three of their four Arabic 
dailies^''. 
After the June 1967 war and the Israeli occupation of the whole of 
Palestine, Jordan became the base for the PRM: its political and military 
leadership operated from Palestinian refugee camps. It was here that they 
trained most of their resistance fighters, organized their militias and built up 
their own social and political institutions. 
The PRM was responsible for administering and organizing life in the 
refugee camps.^^ In mid 1968 there was a short period of token unity between 
the PRM and the Jordanian troops and it was manifested in the battle of al-
Karameh on 21 March, 1968. The PRM acquired a wider base among the 
Arab masses after that battle. Even King Hussein said that he was a 
fedayeen. It was of course sheer expediency for him to identify himself with 
them. But, he could not win any credit from the PRM sympathizers who 
always did not rely upon him. On the other hand his supporters resented such 
a statement^^. Soon the PRM, who had already acquired a large quantity of 
arms and ammunition, began to be "state within a state" and utterly 
disregarded the law and order of Jordan and challenged the Jordanian 
authority^l Before the end of 1968 the two sides had reached the breaking 
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point. As stated above, Palestinian militants were refusing to consider 
themselves Jordanians; they were first and foremost Palestinians. The 
Hussein government was adamant in refusing to recognize Palestinians in 
Jordan as other than Jordanian citizens. As the PRM gained momentum and 
strength following the 1967 war, the PRM forces began to flaunt their power, 
to parade with weapons, to establish their own form of government in the 
camps, and to overtly oppose US attempts to conclude a peace settlement 
among the warring countries, which included Jordan - a clash became 
inevitable. The first one took place in November 1968, to be followed by three 
more and eventual annihilation of the PRM in Jordan^'*. 
(b). Conflict between PLO and Jordan 
Apparently, the Bedouin elements in transjordan, despite the union with 
the Palestinians, still controlled the army and the administration, and did not 
look favourably on the presence of the PRM in the country. As for the 
Palestinians, they had created their own structures in the camps and had thus 
taken the first steps towards their social and political emancipation. Their 
large number and degree of independence had made them a powerful factor 
in Jordan, which the king could not control. The king's authority was now 
called into question. The Jordanian state apparatus could no longer impose 
the rule of the royal family as absolutely as before. King Hussein realized that 
his throne was in danger and not just because of the possible impact of social 
change on Jordanian society. A good half of his country's inhabitants were 
Palestinians. The Jordanian army and police had been virtually powerless for 
some months after the June 6 war and during this time the standing, power 
and arms of the PRM groups had grown, in the king's eyes, to alarming 
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proportions. King Hussein saw only one possible solution and from 1968 he 
began preparing for a confrontation. 
On 2 November, 1968, a loose organization, called Kataeb al-Nasr 
(Victory Contingents) led by Taher Dablan precipitated a crisis. Taher Dablan 
was arrested. On 4 November, other members of the same organization 
ambushed a police car containing four Bedouin policemen and held them as 
hostages. On the same day, elite Jordanian troops entered the large refugee 
camps of Jabal Ashrafiyah and Jabal Hussein in Amman, where they killed 28 
people. This was followed by a big demonstration of 10,000 people in protest 
against the government's anti-Fedayeen (PRM) policy^^. Al-Fatah and the 
PLO denounced the action of Kataeb al_Nasri which, it alleged, was working 
in collaboration with the Jordanian authorities to create a situation which 
would provide an excuse for the army to liquidate the PRM. 
Jordanian army now posed a serious threat to commando bases and 
attempted to prevent PRM fighters infiltrating into the occupied areas. Al-
Fatah at this time took advantage of the help of friendly Iraqi officers in Jordan 
to bypass Jordanian check points and even to enter Israel via North Syria. 
After this the conflict escalated: verbal abuse, kidnappings and shoot-
outs were the order of the day. Ceasefire agreements were reached only to 
be constantly broken. The Jordanian Secret Service operated skillfully, 
smuggling "agents provocateurs" into the Palestinian ranks; and the Jordanian 
security services provoked incidents whenever this appeared to be to the 
king's tactical advantage. Certainly Hussein had good reason to be worried. 
The PFLP led by George Habash and the PDFLP under Nayif Hawatmeh 
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were openly calling for the overthrow of the oligarchy in Jordan, wishing the 
king a well-earned exile in the United States^^. 
It should be mentioned here that in June 1970 the US Secretary of 
State, Willian Rogers, announced his now famous plan based on the original 
UN Resolution 242 of November 1967. This called for, above all things, an 
end to the state of belligerency Israel's withdrawal, and recognition of her 
safe, secure boundaries'^. Rogers proposed and achieved a ceasefire. He 
made history. But this was like rubbing salt in the wound of the Palestinian 
conflict. By accepting the ceasefire, and the Rogers' Plan, both Egypt and 
Jordan reaffirmed their acceptance of the Israeli State. For the Palestinians, 
this implied that both Egypt and Jordan had ceased to support their cause'^. 
Prior to Rogers' announcement in April 1990,. when he visited Amman, 
several PRM groups led violent demonstrations in which the American 
Cultural centre was burnt down and the US embassy attacked. These 
operations inevitably led to harsh reactions and the screw of violence was 
turned over tighter. However, the majority of Palestinians under Arafat and al-
Fatah were anxious to avoid open conflict with the military superior Jordanian 
forces'^. A Palestinian defeat in such a conflict might imply a pretext for Israel 
to expel Palestinians to Jordan. Jordan was not and would not be the home of 
the Palestinians. Their goal lay on the other side of the Jordan. 
The Emirs, the Bedouin Chiefs and the senior officers, who constitute 
the privileged class, felt that the emergence of the Palestinians as the major 
factor in the Jordanian political equation was a threat to their privileges"^". 
Leaders of 33 tribes of the East Bank met near Amman on 20 February, 1970, 
and pledged their support to the Hashemite throne^\They denounced the 
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State of chaos then existing in Jordan and demanded that firm action had to 
be done against the PRM guerrillas. Then on 7 June, the Fadayeen and the 
Jordanian troops clashed at Zarka, a small town, 25 kilometres north east of 
Amman. The PRM militants kidnapped Morris Draper, the First Secretary of 
the US embassy in Amman, but he was released later. Fighting between the 
PRM militants and the elite troops continued for three days. The number of 
casualties was high. "Voice of ai-Assifa" accused the CIA of being behind the 
incident, which the radio described as a provo'cation against the PRM 
militants. King Hussein himself was attacked by the militants when his 
motorcade was fired on outside Amman. Event now came thick and fast. In 
august. King Hussein announced on Jordanian television that he (along with 
President Nasir) would give his backing to the peace plan of American 
Secretary of State Rogers, which he later accepted^^. This announcement 
was virtually a declaration of war on the Palestinians because it amounted to 
the King's acceptance of the existence of Israel. The situation during this time 
was tense and, further, exacerbated, on 6 September, when the PFLP 
hijacked three aero planes; it later hijacked a fourth. One of planes was blown 
up in Cairo in protest against Nasir's troop reduction agreements on the Suez 
Canal. The others landed at "Dawson Fields", a former British military airfield 
25 kilometres from Amman. The escalation of violence was now inevitable. 
On 16 September, Hussein dismissed the civilian government and appointed 
a military government in its place. A large-scale confrontation was expected 
any moment. It took place on September 17. The Jordanian army began its 
attack on Amman and the Palestinian refugee camps. Fighting between the 
PRM and the Jordanian army continued for nine days. The casualties could 
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not be ascertained but something like 3,500 were reported to have died and 
more than 10,000 wounded^^. The PRM militants with their light weapons had 
no chance in street fighting against tank-backed Jordanian infantry. The 
guerrillas had been trained for quick commando attacks and rapid retreats, 
not for long positional and defensive warfare. Hussein emerged victorious 
from the one week battle of Amman. 
On 26 September, at Nasir's insistence, a ceasefire agreement was 
signed at Cairo by King Hussein and Yasir Arafat under the aegis of an inter-
Arab peace making mission headed by Ja'far al-Numeiry. This was followed 
on 15 October by a formal agreement between the PLO and Jordan. The 
agreement gave the PLO complete freedom of movement in Jordan, 
guaranteed the continuation of PRM action and at the same time ensured 
respect for Jordanian sovereignty^^. King Hussein officially committed himself 
to unreserved support for the Palestinian revolution. 
In reality. King Hussein did every thing he possibly could to restrict the 
Palestinian even further. 
In accordance with the agreement, the PRM guerrillas had withdrawn 
from Amman to Jerash and Ajlun, north of the capital. Now the PRM militants 
were confined to Northern Jordan. King Husssein was planning to wipe them 
out from there also. From November 1970, to July 1971, there were several 
clashes between the PRM militants and the king's army resulting in heavy 
casualties. One 13 July, the Jordanian army began its final offensive against 
PRM units. Completely cut off, the PRM militants at Jerash and Ajlun fought a 
desperate rearguard action. The heroic stand of commander Abu Ali lyyad, a 
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member of al-Fatah Central Committee at Tell al-Akra, has become 
legendary^^. 
PRM guerillas led by Abu All lyyad defended their positions in the hills 
to the west of Jerash to the last bullet, till they were massacred by the 
Jordanian army. In the same month the PRM guerillas faced their Waterloo at 
Ajlun^^. On 19 July, the Jordanian Prime Minister, Wasfi Tall announced that 
there were no longer any guerrilla bases in the kingdom. The PLO was 
defeated; its political and military presence in Jordan was destroyed. Thirty 
thousand Palestinians were killed in this blood (fratricidal) civil war. 
(c). Outside Intervention and Israeli Role in the Crisis 
Clearly the build-up to the 1970 crisis also had an important 
international dimension. The story of foreign involvement began in 
Washington when on 9 June 1970, the news of King Hussein's survival in an 
assassination attempt was heard by Dr. Henry Kissinger, then President 
Nixon's National security advisor. The reported assassination attempt did, 
however, provide Kissinger with an opportunity to plan out for the US a 
decisive role in future development in Jordan. The US first concern was to 
ensure the safe evacuation of American civilians from Jordan and save 
Hussein. Next to it was preventing outside forces from intervention in the 
Kingdom and keeping the Israelis right out of it^^. 
Iraqis still had 17,000 regular troops in Jordan in 1970, which had been 
there since the 1967 West Asian War. But in the September crisis, they 
noticeably abstained from intervening on the PRM militants' behalf. The only 
Arab state which did anything on the ground to the be leagued guerrilla 
positions was Syria. It was on 18 September the Kissinger received first word 
in Washington that Syrian tanks were crossing into Jordan from the north^^. 
Significantly, his informants about this new development were both the 
Jordanian Ambassador in Washington and the Israeli Ambassador there, 
Yitzhak Rabin. It was reported that Kissinger and Rabin were on phone 
several times that night, discussing different aspects of the unfolding crisis. 
Late in the evening of 20 September, Kissinger had an urgent new message 
for Ambassador Rabin: "Kissinger's voice seemed tense. He said the 
Jordanians had asked him to pass on an urgent message: would Israel 
provide Jordan with air support against the advancing Syrian tanks?" . 
Kissinger himself did not record passing on such a direct request in this call to 
Rabin. He wrote merely: 
I told Rabin of the information we had received from Jordan 
without specifying the source. After discussion with the 
President and the Secretary (Of State), I could inform him that if 
Israeli reconnaissance confirmed (a serious Syrian incursion into 
Jordan), we would look favourably upon an Israeli air attack. We 
would make good the material losses, and we would do our 
utmost to prevent Soviet interference^^. 
The following day, as Israeli army and air force units continued 
preparations for an intervention in Jordan which it would have the role of 
reacting to any Syrian or Iraqi moves to help the PRM militants in Jordan, 
Hussein threw his armour and air force against the Syrian tank concentration 
near the Jordanian city of Irbid. The latter, having no air cover, were finally 
towards the end of the day forced to grind their way back to their own side of 
the international border: the Palestinian militants, who on 17 September had 
called urgently but unsuccessfully on the Iraqi units in Jordan also to come to 
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their aid, were finally left to face their fate alone until they were beaten out of 
Amman and ultimately out of Jordan, an episode which was completely and 
quietly to the satisfaction of Israel. 
Many PRM militants obviously preferred to flee to Israel rather than fall 
into the hands of Hussein's troops. This was a truly tragic end to a sorrowful 
chapter in modern Arab history. 
(d). Post-1970 Development of the PRM: The Emergence of the 
Black September Group 
After the September 1970 crisis in Jordan the PRM was virtually in 
disarray. People got a general impression that the Palestinian movement 
could not be continued because of the hostile attitude of some of the Arab 
regimes, particularly of Jordan. The greatest problem for the PRM was how to 
carry on the movement. This problem was discussed by the PRM leaders in a 
secret meeting after the disaster of September 1970. They were of the opinion 
that the PRM could be saved by 500 guerrillas who would work 
clandestinely''". These guerrillas would receive a special kind of training and 
would be free from political pressures. Their strategy was to fight violence 
against violence. 
In autumn 1971, "Black September Group" was founded. The name 
commemorated the beginning of the civil war in Jordan in September 1970. 
Black September was not a closely knit organization but a loose association 
of militants from all Palestinian organizations. Its aim is to punish those 
responsible for the bloody massacre in Jordan. 
The existence of the Black September Organization came to light when 
the Jordanian Premier, Wasfi Tal, was assassinated in Cairo on 28 
November, 1971. The Jordanian Prime Minister was seen as a living symbol 
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of the betrayal of th^-^alestinians. He w^^ij^^hot down in the lobby of the 
Sheraton Hotel by four Palestinians, who were immediately arrested. When 
asked about their motives, they said they had kilfed an executioner of the 
Palestinian people. Their organization was "Black September". The arrest led 
to a big agitation in Egypt in which 35,000 students supported the Palestinian 
cause and demanded war against Israel'*^. 
After this operation, there were persistent reports of a link between 
certain al-Fatah leaders and Black September. The name of Salah Khalaf has 
often been mentioned in connection with the Septemberists. Abu Daoud, an 
al-Fatah official arrested in Jordan (later) in February 1973, accused some al-
Fatah leaders of planning the Septemberists' operations'*^. 
The organization has been responsible for a great many spectacular 
strikes. On 15 December, 1971 its men shot and slightly wounded Zeid Rifa'l, 
the Jordanian Ambassador in London (and Later Jordanian Prime Minister). 
The following day a letter bomb was delivered to a member of the Jordanian 
mission in Geneva, wounding four people. On 6 February, 1972, the 
Septembrists blew up a gas plant in Ravenstein, Holland, owned by a 
company that was supposed to have close connections with Israel"*^. 
Another objective of the Black September in those years was the 
liberation of Palestinian prisoners from the cells of the Jordanian Secret 
Service. A detailed plan to occupy the US embassy was worked out and the 
occupiers' demands were formulated. But on the day of the operation, ail the 
militant members were arrested. 
The Black Septembrists also punished five Jordanians living in (then) 
West Germany whom it suspected of spying for Israel. The Septemebrists 
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electricity factory at Humbury, which, supplied electric generators for the 
Israeli Air Force, and they were also responsible, in August 1972, for 
sabotaging the Trieste oil refinery in Italy, which was sending oil to the "pro-
Zionist interests" in Germany and Austria^^. The men and two girls of the 
Black September were the first to hijack an airliner to Lydda Airport in Israel in 
May 1972. This was a Belgian airliner. The Septembrists demanded the 
release of the militants in the Israeli jails. The men were shot dead by the 
Israeli forces and the girls were captured. The Lydda operation failed and the 
Black September waited for the next opportunity. 
(e). The Munich Operation and Israeli Reaction 
An event occurred on 5 September, 1972 which was to shake world 
opinion and cast dark shadow over the PRM for years to come: the attack on 
the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics - in which nine (out of eleven) 
Israelis were held hostages and the rest managed to escape. The "Collective 
Will" of the eight militant Septembrists who carried on the operation, was 
released by the Palestine News Agency {WAFA) on 11 September, 1972. It 
said: 
Why does the Zionist delegation have a place in this 
tournament? Why is the banner of occupation, which is based 
on terrorism and intimidation, be raised next the flags of all 
countries of the world, and our flag be absent from the 
tournament ? the whole world is having fun and watching, while 
we suffer and suffer and fight on more than one front, and no 
ears listen to our complaint or to the morning of our people'*'*. 
The Septembrists delivered their demands which included the release 
of 200 who were held in Israeli jails. Also on the list were Ulrike Meinhof and 
Andreas Baader, leaders who had robbed at least eight banks, bombed US 
army ports and killed three policemen and Kozo Okamoto, the Japanese 
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army ports and killed three policemen and Kozo Okamoto, the Japanese 
revolutionary and a member of the suicide squad, was responsible for the 
May, 1972, Lydda Airport Operation in which 26 people had died"* .^ They 
threatened that if Israel did not comply with their demands, the hostages 
would be executed. 
The Israeli Premier, Mrs. Golda Meir, discussed the matter with her 
advisers. The decision not to negotiate with the Black Septembrists or to 
release any prisoners was taken by her. She told the West German 
authorities that they had full responsibility for any type of rescue operation. 
She said that the Israeli government would not object if the Germans gave the 
Septemberists safe conduct out of the country under the condition that they 
received iron-clad guarantees that the hostages would be set free'*^. 
The West German Interior Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher negotiated 
the militants who extended the death line for execution four times. Genscher 
made frantic efforts for negotiations with some Arab governments who did not 
want to get involved. Right from the beginning he was in touch with Israeli 
Prime Minister Golda Meir. Israeli intelligence officials reached Munich to 
advise the German government. Germans were capable of handling the 
situation and they could have saved the lives of hostages, if the Israelis could 
have released some of the prisoners. Golda Meir was too adamant. The 
Septembrists were given a front promise by Genscher, with Israeli advice, 
they would be given safe passage out of the country. Instead of taking them to 
Munich airport they were taken to Purstenfeldbruck, a German air base 16 
miles away, which was ringed by 5 soldiers including sharp-shooters. The 
soldiers opened fire at the militants when they came out to check the 
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militants dived under a helicopter and fired back after finding that two of his 
comrades were shot dead. A sanguine battle continued for about two hours. 
The militants killed some soldiers and blew up the control tower, lights and 
parts of the airport. When five of their comrades were killed they blew up the 
hostages. Three surviving Septembrists surrendered. 
Apparently the Munich operation ended in bloodbath. This is because 
the Israeli government under Golda Meir rejected the Septembrists' demands 
out of hands, saying that it was at war with the Palestinians and that death 
was one of the risks of war. It categorically rejected negotiation. 
After the operation, the Palestinian News Agency {WAFA), published a 
"Fedayeen Testament" which said: 
Our aim was to tell the athletes that there is a people whose 
land has been occupied for 24 years, whose honour was been 
trodden underfoot. It will do the world's youth no harm to reflect 
on the tragedy of this people for a few hours. So let the 
Olympics Games be interrupted for a few hours'*^. 
Just after the Munich episodes Israel did not hesitate by bombing the 
Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. But it failed to counter the Black 
September. On 28 December 1972 four militants of the Black September 
entered the Israeli embassy in Bangkok and held the Israeli diplomats as 
hostages. They demanded the release of 36 PRM guerrillas held in Israeli 
prison. On the list were the names of 28 militant girls and Kozo Okamoto"*^, a 
member of the PFLP from Japan. They threatened to execute the diplomats if 
their demands were not conceded. 
The officials of Thailand negotiated with the Septembrists who freed 
the hostages. The reasons given by the militants for their action was that it 
was a sacred day for the Thais, the day of the investiture of Crown Prince 
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Vachralongkorn. The Septembrists said that they did not bother for Israel but 
had great respect for the Thai people. Hence they did not want to carry on 
their operation to which the Thais would resent. Although it was reported in 
the western press that after their return to Cairo, the Septembrists were taken 
to Syria to appear before a "Revolutionary Court" to explain why they 
neglected the order of the "militant command'*^:" in fact Israel entered into 
agreement with the Septembrists through the Thai government and released 
14 prisoners. This was Black Septembrist's one of the successful operations. 
From the look of the events it can be safely concluded that the 
Septembrists wanted to prove that they would attack the Israeli interests 
wherever they may be; to show that the Israelis were not safe anywhere in the 
world and to carry on armed propaganda for the cause of the Palestinian 
liberation. They may be branded as murderers and terrorists by the rest of the 
world but they are certainly heroes in the eyes of the Arabs in general and the 
Palestinians in particular. The most important thing they wanted to prove is 
that no political settlement, either proposed by King Hussein and Nasir or by 
all other Arab (and foreign) parties, without taking account of the PLO and 
Palestinians - is possible. One can know what dimension the Munich 
incidents gave to the Palestinian problem from the statement of an Egyptian 
who said: "They have proved the virtual impossibility of reaching a settlement 
that does not take account of the Palestinian problem. They have provoked 
the Kind of Israeli retaliation that deepens Arab hatred. And they may succeed 
in bringing the West Asia to the brink of war"^°. 
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In 1973 the West was for the first time forced to sit up and take notice 
of the Palestinian problem and the Palestinian people. Since then, such 
operations have completely ceased. 
Lebanon And the Palestinians 
The state of Greater Lebanon, created by the French during the 
mandate period in 1920 by annexing territories from neighbouring Syria, was 
an artificial country. The largely Muslim population of the coastal areas of 
Beirut and Tripoli would have preferred to remain part of Syria. They felt a 
strong bond of solidarity with the Arab states of the Fertile Crescent and the 
Palestinians, and so contrasted.strongly with the Maronite Christians of Mount 
Lebanon who were Western-orientated and had always fought to preserve 
their separate status within the Arab world. There was, therefore, no real bond 
to hold the country and its people together in the face of economic and 
political difficulties. 
Since becoming an independent state in T943, Lebanon has been 
governed according to an unwritten "National Pact" in which the President 
must be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a sunni Muslim and the 
President of the National Assembly a Shi'a Muslim. Since the President and 
the Commander-in-Chief were Maronites, they were in a position to ensure 
that their community retained a predominance which corresponded to their 
economic, educational and demographic superiority^V 
As a result of the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, hundreds of thousands of 
Palestinians left their homes and settled in neighbouring countries. Lebanon, 
as a member of the Arab community, and a belligerent in the 1948 war, 
opened its frontiers to over 100,000 of these displaced persons. 
Approximately half reside in 15 camps, established by the Lebanese 
government and maintained by the UN agency^^. With the entry of Palestinian 
refugees the Palestine issue slowly encroached on Lebanese politics and 
became intertwined with the question of Lebanon". 
The history of the PRM in Lebanon has been a series of confrontations 
with the government that have uniformly failed to solve the underlying 
problems aroused by PRM presence in the country. After the June 1967 war, 
one factor was chiefly responsible for tension between the PRM and the 
government, namely the social and economic status of the refugees was 
bound to cause friction, but this was made all the worse by the complications 
of the Lebanon's own multi-confessional social organization. 
But the real problems began to surface when the PRM grew in Jordan 
and attempted to expand operations into South Lebanon^"*. Lebanon, like 
Jordan, has common boundary with Israel. To Israel she was, and remains, a 
soft target on which to vent wrath about PR operations. Lebanon played host 
to most of the best Palestinian research and propaganda organizations. A part 
from refugee camps in which the PLO had offices and drilled militia the PRM 
had hideouts in southern mountains from which PRM guerillas with nothing to 
lose mounted raids into Israel from the area which Israelis called "al-Fatah 
land"^^ 
By 1968, Lebanese army patrols in the south were engaging PRM 
commandos in small skirmishes as the guerrillas tried to launch operations 
against Israel across the border. Israel lost no time in carrying out retaliatory 
raids, culminating in the dramatic attack on Beirut Airport on 28 December, 
1968 during which 13 Lebanese civil airliners, valued at $43.8 million, were 
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destroyed by Israeli commandos. The event represented a milestone in 
Israeli-Lebanese relations and a turning point in the attitude of the Lebanese 
towards Israel. The raid was launched in retaliation for an attack by two 
members of the PFLP on an El Al passenger plane two days earlier at the 
Athen airport^^. Lebanon was held responsible by Israel because the 
perpetrators had left Beirut for Athens on Lebanese travel documents 
provided to stateless persons, and had acted on orders of the PFLP, which 
operated in Lebanon with the apparent acquiescence of the Lebanese regime. 
The Israeli raid was also a warning to the Lebanese government to curb the 
activities of the Palestinian guerrillas on its soil, and a warning to other Arab 
governments that continued support of the PRM might, in the future, subject 
their own territories and property to Israeli retaliation. The Lebanese 
government categorically rejected any responsibility for the attack on the El Al 
plane in Athens, and the Security Council, which met to consider the matter at 
the request of Lebanon, agreed by unanimously condemning Israel on 
December 31, 1968^^. The net result of the raid, however, was to move the 
Lebanese government and people closer to the Palestinians, the exact 
opposite effect of what the Israeli policy makers intended. 
Lebanese political parties themselves were, as a matter of fact divided 
on the issue of the presence of the PRM militants and their freedom to 
operate against Israel from the Lebanese border. The Tripartite Alliance, 
comprising three pro-Western Christian parties; the National Liberal Party, the 
Phalangist Party, and the National Block, opposed the PRM activities in 
Lebanon. The Leftist Parties like the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the 
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communist Party, the Baath Party and the Arab Nationalist Movement, 
supported the PRM. 
The PRM presence in Lebanon accelerated the process of strife 
between the Christians represented by the Tripartite Alliance and the 
Muslims. The Christians opposed the presence of the PRM because it would 
go in favour of the Muslims. 
(a). Consolidation of the PRM in Lebanon 
The rise of the PRM after June 1967 led to a transformation of the 
Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon into strongholds of the guerrilla 
organization. Prior to 1967 al-Fatah had organized a few secret cells in some 
of the camps. The Deuxiene Bureau (Army Intelligence Bureau) had, 
however, maintained a strict surveillance over the camps and foiled most of 
the attempts to infiltrate into Israel. As early as December 1965 one of al-
Fatah's militants Jalal Kawash was arrested by the Lebanese army as he 
prepared to lead a guerrilla operation against Israel. He died in custody a few 
days later and a communique from the Lebanese Defense Ministry 
announced on 11 January, 1966 that Kawash had committed suicide during 
interrogations. This version was strongly contested by al-Fatah which claimed 
that Kawash had been tortured to death^^. 
In June that year another commando was killed in a skirmish that took 
place between Lebanese security patrol and commandos near the Israeli 
border in south Lebanon^^. During the same summer Arafat himself was 
arrested while entering Lebanon after a reconnaissance mission in Israel. 
Syria subsequently had to intervene to get him released^". 
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Following 1967 war there was a tremendous upsurge in sympathy for 
the commandos among the ranks of the Lebanese Muslims. The Battle of 
Karameh in March 1968 in the Jordan valley gave a further boost to the 
popularity of the PRM^V The following month when the first Lebanese 
volunteer in the Palestinian commando ranks, Khalil al-Jamal was killed in 
action a quarter of a million people participated in his funeral. Later the funeral 
procession was turned into a massive demonstration demanding freedom of 
action for the PRM in Lebanon^^. 
Despite the lack of official sanction, the build up of command bases 
and the training of PRM militias in southern Lebanon continued at a rapid 
pace throughout 1968. The Syrian authorities assisted the PRM in 
establishing commando bases and developed special lines of supply 
connecting these bases with Syria^^. 
It is beyond doubt that after bitter experience in the 1970 Jordanian 
crisis, Lebanon was expected to offer a safer haven for the PRM. The political 
and military fragility of the Lebanese central government, the pervasiveness of 
socio-economic cleavages within the Lebanese society, and the ethnic and 
the religious sensitivities that continued to plague the Lebanese polity made 
the country an "attractive base" for launching PRM guerrilla attacks on Israel. 
Moreover, the presence of nearly a quarter of million Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon provided the PRM and the PLO with a broad base of popular support 
and human resources^'*. 
From the mid-sixties onwards the PRM guerrillas' activities began to 
create troubles and anxiety for Israel. It is true that the Lebanese army 
maintained strict surveillance over PRM activity in the south. However, 
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Lebanon's armed forces were small in size which by 1968 had reached a 
strength of 13,200^^ and such a small force found it extremely difficult to 
enforce discipline on a growing number of commandos who were receiving 
financial and logistical support from other Arab states particularly Syria. Thus 
despite the army's strict surveillance PRM guerrillas did manage to carry out 
occasional commando operations against Israel. 
(b). Israeli Raids against Palestinian Bases 
The rise and growth of the PRM in southern Lebanon brought in its 
wake Israeli raids, a phenomenon from which Lebanon had been totally safe 
till the mid 1960s. The first Israeli raid against Lebanon was launched on 28 
October 1965 when units of the Israeli Army crossed the frontier and 
dynamited three water reservoirs and the house of a Lebanese village chief 
thereby killing one woman^^. In time, this kind of raid was to become a routine 
affair in much of southern Lebanon. 
On the face of it Israeli retaliatory raids were in response to guerrilla 
operations launched by the PRM from Lebanon against Israel and formed a 
part of its overall policy of reprisal against Arab states. In the language of 
strategic theory Israel's "reprisal policy" exemplified coercive diplomacy 
intended to affect on opponent's will rather than impose a military solution. 
This strategy was most often used in the mode of negative compellance, that 
is an attempt to persuade the target nation to stop taking certain actions. 
Israel wanted to oblige Arab government to cease permitting infiltration across 
their borders by convincing them that the costs of doing so were prohibitive. 
The reprisal policy had been initiated in the early fifties in the face of large-
scale infiltration by Palestinian refugees from the West Bank and Gaza. In the 
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beginning, Israel retaliated clandestinely in the primitive "eye for eye" fashion. 
A small group of IDF personnel would secretly cross the border, lay an 
ambush somewhere, causing thereby a number of casualties and then retreat. 
Israeli retaliation was usually "calibrated to the scale and linked to the timing 
and location of the Arab act directly proceeding it"^''. This type of response, 
however, failed to produce an end to infiltrations and soon Israel changed its 
strategy to one of massive retaliation, i.e. a deliberate disproportion between 
Arab provocation and Israeli response as a means of compelling Arab 
governments to take firm measures against Palestinian infiltrations^®. Such a 
policy had been applied against Egypt, Syria and Jordan and had been largely 
successful. Apprehension over Israeli reprisals was a major factor 
discouraging these countries from permitting PRM guerrillas to operate on 
their territory. A deeper analysis of the Israeli raids against Lebanon, however, 
suggests that in applying this policy to Lebanon, Israel had certain 
fundamentally different expectations. To begin with, commando operations 
from Lebanon never really posed a serious threat to the security of Israel's 
northern settlements and in any case remained far below those launched from 
Jordan which was the main base of the PRM till 1971. The camps in the 
Arkoub of Lebanon were strictly subsidiary. 
Jordanian civil war of September 1970 and the subsequent mopping-
up operations by the Jordanian army in the spring of 1971 caused the focus of 
PRM activity to shift to Lebanon^^. Nevertheless raids from Lebanon into 
Israel remained limited in scope primarily because of two reasons. First, the 
PRM was militarily weakened after the Jordanian crisis and simply did not 
possess the necessary wherewithal to carry on guerrilla activity on the scale 
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on which it had done so before 1971. Though commandos buildup began in 
the Arkoub immediately after their expulsion from Jordan it took more than 
two years for them to regroup, reorganize and re-equip themselves so as to 
partially offset losses suffered in Jordan. Secondly, conducting raids from the 
Arkoub region was a difficult task as the Israelis were in good positions in the 
overlooking hills, and had constructed a supply road, some of which lay within 
Lebanese territory. In summary, guerrilla activity in southern Lebanon 
between the third and fourth Arab-Israeli wars was not particularly effective 
and had a very limited impact on northern Israel. The commandos were, for 
the most part, restricted to the Arkoub region of Lebanon. With a few minor 
exceptions their cross-border activities were limited to the occupied Goland 
Heights and had little affect on the Israeli settlements^". 
If the PRM guerrillas did not pose a serious military threat to Israel's 
northern settlements then why is it that Israel resorted to a policy of 
conducting incessant raids against Lebanon? Between 14 June, 1968 and 10 
June, 1974 (2188 days) UN observers reported 3036 Israeli violations of 
Lebanese territory which included twelve major operations'^ ^ During these 
raids hundreds of Lebanese citizens, apart from Palestinians were either killed 
or wounded, thousands rendered homeless as a result of many villages burnt 
to ashes. The intensity of Israeli raids suggests two things. First, the Israeli 
intention was to liquidate all or any manifestation of Palestinian nationalism 
particularly its militant variant so forcefully represented by the Palestinian 
guerrillas. Second, the Israeli strategy was intended to facilitate the attainment 
of certain long-term aims with regard to Lebanon. Israel was aware of the 
deep sectarian cleavages in Lebanon and the conflicting perceptions of 
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Christians and Muslims towards the presence of Palestinian guerrillas in 
Lebanon. By resorting to a relentless series of raids Israel's aims in the long 
run was to bring about a polarization between the Lebanese Christians and 
Muslims over the issue of presence of Palestinian guerrillas in the country. 
Such a polarization, Israel calculated, would undermine the uneasy national 
consensus, reinforce trends towards Moronite separatism as well as generate 
intense political strife. Domestic political strife could then lead to Lebanon's 
partition, a theme to which the Israeli leaders were not averse, while at the 
same time giving Israel the option of asserting defacto control over southern 
Lebanon or even its annexation^^. That a breakdown in the national 
consensus and domestic political upheaval was indeed one of the Israeli 
objectives is clearly visible by an analysis of the nature and pattern of Israeli 
raids from the late 1960s till the onset of the Lebanese civil war. 
(c). Armed Conflict between the Lebanese Army and PRM, and 
Cairo and Meiiiart Agreements 
The cause of conflict between the PR groups and the Lebanese army 
was somewhat similar to that in Jordan. Within a short period, the PLO and 
PRM created also in Lebanon "a state within a state'.', smuggled weapons and 
ammunitions to the refugee camps, turned the country into de facto ex-
territorial areas, and brought the country into the vicious circle of PRM attacks 
against Israel and Israeli retaliations. 
The pluralist, internally divided Lebanese society facilitated infiltration 
by the PLO. The PLO found Beirut more convenient than Amman as a 
political center. The local Muslims and Left factions were decidedly more 
sympathetic, mass communications were better developed and the Lebanese 
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authorities, who were afraid of any change in the delicate balance between 
Christians and Muslims, could be more easily manipulated^^. 
Relation between the PRM guerrillas and the Lebanese army which 
had never been cordial deteriorated sharply after the airport raid. Clashes 
between the two began to occur with increasing frequency from mid-January 
1969 onwards. In April popular demonstrations against the army were held 
throughout Lebanon and on 23 April clashes between the security forces and 
the protesters led to the death of ten^"*. The bloody clashes led to the 
imposition of emergency and Premier Karami (who had replaced Yafi in 
January) realizing that he ran the risk of antagonizing his Muslim constituents 
if he continued to associate himself with a regime that espoused only the 
Christian point of view resigned on 25 April. Speaking in a frank tone about 
the PRM presence, Karami in his resignation speech- spelled out clearly the 
fact that there were two trends in Lebanon: one supporting the PRM and the 
other opposed to it. "Therefore" he said "any government adopting one trend 
rather than the other will inevitably cause a split in the country^^. The political 
crisis arising out of the airport raid had led to a second governmental 
resignation within a short span of four months. 
As the political crisis dragged on with no Muslim leader of national 
stature prepared to assume the office of the Prime Minister, Israel decided to 
employ air power for the first time against Lebanon. On 11 August the Israeli 
Air Forces (lAF) went into action against Palestinian positions in southern 
Lebanon''^. The following month a large force of infantry attacked the 
Lebanese village of Malta, killing several people and destroying a large 
number of buildings. On 3 and 4 October Lebanese villages came under 
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Israeli attack once again, leading to an even greater loss of lives and 
properteis^^. 
With the political crisis still simmering and tensions running high in the 
country, the new round of Israeli raid sparked off a large-scale conflict 
between the PRM guerrillas and the Lebanese army. On 28 August fighting 
broke out between the army and the Palestinians and in the Nahr al-Bared 
refugee camp near Tripoli, in northern Lebanon. By October tensions rose to 
such an extent that US Assistant Secretary of State Joseh Sisco was 
prompted to publish a note of concern (on 12 October). Less than a week 
later, on 18 October, heavy fighting broke out between the Palestinians and 
Lebanese army units throughout southern Lebanon. Within a few days the 
hostilities spread to Bikaa valley. On 23 October "there were first signs of 
Syrian intervention as as-Saiqa units-though part of the PLO but in fact under 
the command of the military branch of the Syrian Baath party - attacked 
Lebanese army units in the border town of Masana. Simultaneously there was 
an attempt by the PRM to capture new positions in Muslim sections of Beirut 
and in Tripoli, where local Muslim and radical organizations joined the 
Palestinian fighters. Some of the severest clashes during this period took 
place around Tripoli when PRM guerrillas on the outskirts of the city cut it off 
from highway access to Beirut. Inside Tripoli the forces of 24 October 
Movement led by Farouk Mukaddam clashed with the security forces leading 
to large scale casualities'^^. With hostilities rapidly spreading to all parts of the 
country and with early sings of Syrian involvement, the Lebanese President 
Charles Helou felt incapable of coping with the crisis and appealed to 
President Gamal Abd al-Nasir, asking him to mediate. The Lebanese Chief of 
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Staff, General Emile Bustani, hastened to Cairo and in the negotiation 
between him, Arafat, Egyptian War Minister Lt. General Mahmoud Fawzi and 
Egypt's Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riyad, an agreement was reached on 
November 3, 1969, that is known since then as the Cairo agreement''^. Its text 
was never officially published, but it was soon leaked in a Lebanese 
newspaper. 
The Cairo agreement expressly stipulated PLO recognition of 
Lebanon's sovereignty and the authority of its government. But it also officially 
recognized PLC's resistance groups (PRMs) to act from Lebanon against 
Israel. The agreement called for a census of the members of PRMs in 
Lebanon at that time. Joint PLO-Lebanese units were to be established to 
supervise its implementation^*^ 
The Cairo agreement amounted to a victory for the PLO and their 
Lebanese allies and a defeat for the maronite-dominated Lebanese 
government. It legitimized the right of the PLO to maintain centres in Lebanon. 
No other Arab government had ever agreed to such an arrangement before. 
The agreement therefore caused considerable alarm in Israel. In no 
case could Israel permit the transformation of the strategically important 
southern Lebanon into a Palestinian stronghold. Neither could it permit a 
Muslim or radical takeover of Lebanon-a takeover which the PRM presence 
could foster in the near future. The Cairo agreement itself was an indication of 
a shift in the sectarian balance of power inside Lebanon. The Israeli response 
was to intensify its raids against Lebanon still further in order to create such a 
state of chaos that it would lead to a total breakdown of organized political life 
in the country. 
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The Christian rightists (the Phalangists and the National Bloc), from the 
beginning, opposed the agreement and resolved to annul it. This led to 
further clashes during 1970. Such incidents developed in may 1973 into a 
violent struggle. The Lebanese army intervened, using heavy arms, tanks and 
the air force. Sysia closed her border as a means of pressure on the 
Lebanese authorities. The waves of violence ended with the Melkart 
agreement of may 1973, which supplemented the earlier Cairo agreement. It 
limited the numbers of armed PLO members in different areas of Lebanon, 
with exception of Arkoub (al-Fatah land), restricted the quantity of arms which 
PRM groups were permitted to hold in refugees camps to only light weapons; 
prohibited medium and heavy arms, prohibited the PLO to wear uniforms and 
carry arms while visiting towns and to block roads inside Lebanon^V 
Within a short time, new clashes broke out, this time as a result of 
disagreements in interpreting the Melkart agreement. The question was 
whether the limiting of the number of armed PLO men and arms referred to 
the situation that existed in Lebanon in 1973-at the time of the Melkart 
agreement, or because it was a supplement to the Cairo 
agreement-according to the situation in 1969. The clashes ended only with 
the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. 
Syria and the Palestinians 
Where as the PRM militants were opposed 'by the regimes in Jordan 
and Lebanon, they got political and military support in Syria. In 1966, Left-
wing of the Baath (Renaissance) party led by Nureddin Attasi ousted Michel 
Aflak. The Left-wing was in favaour of a popular war against Israel. It set up 
as-Saiqa, the guerrilla organization, under its control. The ruling Left-wing 
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Baathists were also close to the PDFLP. They allowed to the Fedayeen to get 
military training in the Syrian military training schools. One of the reasons for 
the Syrian support to the Fedayeen was that the Left-wing regime there 
wanted to build up the image of Syria as a revolutionary state. Egypt and 
Jordan had accepted the UN security council resolution of 22 November, 
1967, but Syria rejected it and declared that popular war of liberation was the 
only path to extinguish the Zionist State of Israel. The Syrian government also 
threatened Lebanon that it would confront with the Lebanese army if the latter 
did not stop massacring the Fedayeen. Also, the Golan Heights were still 
under the Israeli occupation and the Fedayeen could be used as an 
instrument to pressurize the Israelis. 
Among the PRMs, four groups only were allowed to function 
officially-al-Fatah, the Syrian Baath-sponsored as-Saiqa the PFLP and the 
PLCs regular military wing, the PLA. All were required to maintain a 
representative at the Defense Ministry to co-ordinate activities with national 
defense authorities, and no commandos were permitted to enter the occupied 
territories from Syria without the ministry's written approval. While in Syria, the 
militants were prohibited from carrying arms when moving through the country 
or wearing uniforms except when carrying out official instructions from the 
intelligence department. Similarly, there were restrictions on the location of 
training camps and shooting ranges, the use of special identity papers, 
detention or questioning of suspects, unauthorized-statements and marches 
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or ceremonies. 
After Hafez Assad (then Defense Minister) took over as president, 
restrictions were imposed on the militants. Some of the top as-Saiqa leaders 
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were arrested by the Syrian army. Among the arrested leaders were: Dhafi 
Jumai'ani, as-Saiqa leader in Jordan, who came from a prominent East Bank 
tribe which sided with the PRM militants at the time of confrontation with the 
Jordanian army in September, 1970; Hasan al-Khatib, as-Saiqa's 
representative in the Executive Committee of the RLO; Youssef al-Burji and 
Youssef Katanani.®^ as-Saiqa was brought under the control of the Syrian 
army. In the past, the PRM gurrillas had received Chinese arms through 
PLO's Damascus office. In July 1971, a consignment of Chinese arms 
intended for the PLA, including 200 tanks, thousands of machine-guns, and 
millions of rounds of ammunition, was seized by the Syrian army at the port of 
Latakia.^ When Yasir Arafat asked for their release, President Assad said 
that if it was done, the PLA would be better equipped than the Syrian army. " 
Do you want to takeover our country?' was his reply.^^ Ostensibly, Assad's 
regime was threatened by the presence of the PRM militants in Syria. Their 
presence was allowed only on the frontiers. Despite this contradiction 
between the militants and the Syrian government, the militant attitude of the 
Syrian regime towards Israel, because of the presence of the pressure of the 
masses, helps the Palestinian resistance. 
At the same time, Syria's policy towards the PRM, like every other Arab 
regime's, is subject to the flux of events in the Arab world. Then with October 
war, Syria found it more suitable to recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people, and since then has given strong 
support to the overall policy of the PLO. 
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Egypt and the Palestinians 
No doubt, President Nasir of Egypt was the first to use the 
Palestinians as a paramilitary force in mid-1950s. There was no use to his 
own forces to harass the Israelis. Instead, he organized and trained units of 
Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and called them "Fedayeen" and "approved 
their infiltration into and attacks on the Israelis in the late spring of 1960".^ ® He 
was to rue his decisions since they were to encourage retaliation by Israel. 
Nevertheless, these Fedayeen had shown the way to counter Israeli charges 
that Palestinians were of no importance to the Arab world. 
But serious Egyptian involvement with the PRM effectively dates back 
to a meeting between two al-Fatah leaders, Abu' lyyad and Abu Luft, with 
Egyptian officials on 1 August, 1967. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad was 
informed of the principles of the movement and extended his "good wishes". 
The two Palestinians met Muhammad Hassanein Heykal, the influential editor 
of Al-Ahram and were introduced to President Nasir. The Egyptian leader 
expressed his wish to see firm relations established with al-Fatah and offered 
large-scale aid in arms, training and supplies. Nasir proposed that Liaison be 
assured through the head of military intelligence Major-General Sadet, and 
Heykal^^ 
Relations between Egypt and the PRM commandos were fairly 
unruffled untill Nasir's surprise acceptance of the Security Council Resolution 
242 of 22 November, 1967, and the US-sponsored Rogers Plan in July 1970, 
the PDFLP openly criticized him. The PFLP and the PDFLP instigated anti-
Egyptian demonstrations in Amman. Al-Fatah, however, criticized Nasir 
indirectly. It openly denounced the US peace initiatives. Al-Fatah radio had 
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said: "No and one thousand times 'no'" to reject all peaceful solutions of the 
Palestine problem® .^ Meanwhile Nasir felt impelled to assure al-Fatah that he 
thought there was one chance in a thousand that the plan would succeed. 
However, King Hussein's onslaught against the • commandos in Jordan 
brought about a rapid reconciliation between the Egyptians and the PRMs. 
Only the PFLP was discontent with the changing Egyptian attitude. The group, 
later in September hijacked a Pan-Am Jumbo jet to Cairo to foil the Egyptian 
initiatives. 
It can be clearly seen that the most Nasir could do for the PRM was 
that he acted as a mediator when there were confrontations between the army 
and the militants in Jordan and Lebanon. Two major peace agreements were 
signed under his aegis: The Cairo Agreement between the PRM and the 
Lebanese government which was signed on 3 November, 1969; and the Cairo 
Agreement between King Hussein and the PRM militants on 25 September, 
1970. 
The PRM criticized the expulsion of Soviet Experts from Egypt in July 
1972. They accused President Sadat of going "right". The PRM saw this as 
preparation for Cairo's acceptance of a US settlement in West Asia. Indeed, 
Arafat had begun talks in Moscow with Soviet leaders only one day before 
Sadat's move^^ 
In Egypt the students and workers supported the Palestine struggle. 
They agitated and demanded the release of four members of the Black 
September organization who had assassinated the Jordanian Premier, Wasfi 
Tal, and a war against Israel. The Egyptian government ultimately released 
them^°. 
But the Egyptians?" managed to ride o,t!i^ /the storm of Palestinian 
criticism. At a tripartite confere(Vbe,,)iwith the PLO and Syria in September 1974, 
a joint statement affirmed that the two regimes would continue "to give 
support to the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people —". In November, Egypt, along with the other members of the Arab 
League, confirmed this recognition at the Rabat Summit, which was held on 
28 October, 1974. 
Other Arab Countries and the Palestinians 
Arab countries, other than those mentioned above, are far off from the 
Israeli border. They have been less affected by the Palestinian problem. 
These regimes financed the PRMs. Some of them like Algeria, Iraq, and 
Yemen were committed to the PRM's theory of a people's liberation war. 
Others were not. 
Iraq's ruling Baath Party created a PRM known as the Arab Liberation 
Front (ALF) and paid the salaries of the PLA Qaddissiah Brigade stationed 
there and attached to the Iraqi army. Iraq placed strict limitations on guerrilla 
activities inside Iraq proper. Iraq's relations with the PRM have been dictated 
by the ruling Baath Party's assessment of its support in Iraq and its conviction 
that a political settlement with Israel would constitute a signal defeat for the 
Palestinian cause. 
The PRM militants fared much better in the other Arab states. Libya, for 
example, has contributed heavily to the most radical groups, except the PFLP, 
which had a strong Christian leadership and Marxist ideas. 
The Persian (Arabian) Gulf States have a precarious relation with the 
PRM. Since they have been besieged by the Popular Front for the Liberation 
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of the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) on the one hand and asked to contribute to the 
PLO on the other, they are literally between the pan and the fire. If the Gulf 
states' regimes refused to contribute, then the PLO groups would support the 
PFLOAG with arms, other material, and personnel. 
The same could be said for Kuwait. Although the Kuwait government 
has, from the beginning, supported the PRM militants, permitting them to 
open offices, and to collect funds. Its positive actions have been motivated 
partly by the fact that a large Palestinian community existed and still remains 
in Kuwait. This country had opened its door to the educated Palestinian 
refugees and provided them unlimited opportunities, in exchange for their 
economic and technical a acumen. Although the Palestinians never stated it, 
the fact that this community is a potential fifth column against the Kuwaiti 
regime exists in many people's minds. 
The Saudi government had no fear of threat from the Palestinians. By 
disbursing its oil revenues, the Saudis have bought the good graces of the 
PLO and al-Fatah. The government realized that the Palestinians were a 
useful tool to keep around in order to bring pressure upon those powers who 
were most influential in bringing peace to the area. By advocating the return of 
Jerusalem to the Arabs, and thus to the Palestinians, king Faisal served all 
Muslim People who then looked upon them as savior. 
Algeria has had close ties with the PRM militants since the Algerian 
people were fighting for their independence. Palestinians supported the 
Algerian insurgents as best they could and were present at the Algerian 
guerrilla training camps. When independence was achieved; the Algerians 
permitted Palestinians access to the training camps and weapons. Currently, 
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however, although continuing lip service and monetary assistance, the 
Algerian regime has tended to criticize the most overt terrorist acts committed 
by the PRM militants. 
South Yemen extended unconditional support to the PRM. Tunisia has 
had little to do with the guerrillas. Morocco, however, taxed its people to 
provide assistance to the PRM militants. Notwithstanding the revolutionary 
nature of the PLO, the regime paid tribute the guerrillas. With the destruction 
of the Pan-American Plane in December 1974, in which several high ranking 
Moroccans perished, support for the PRM militants has cooled perceptively. 
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CHAPTER -
ISRAELI POLICY TOWARDS THE PLO AFTER THE 1973 
ARAB-ISRAELI WAR 
Israeli policy towards the Palestinian and the PLO has, from the start, 
been very hostile, aggressive, treating them as refugees and not accepting 
them. Different only in degree of its applied intensity both before and after 
1973, the kind of Israeli policy, as will be seen in this chapter, is a product of 
its political culture. Hence it becomes imperative to briefly discuss the unique 
elements of the Israel's political culture before analyzing Israel's policy 
towards the PLO after 1973. 
Before discussing the Israeli policy, it seems necessary to briefly 
examine the political culture of Israel for clearer understanding as it always 
has either direct or indirect impact on Israel's decision-making and policy 
planning. 
Israeli Political Culture 
Usually, both the media and the intellectual community depict the 
Jewish-Israeli political scene - in the context of Israeli-Arab, and Israeli-
Palestinian conflict - as divided between "right" and "left", "doves" and 
"Hawks", with the addition of a recent third category of "Jewish religious 
fundamentalists". These cleavages certainly exist, but mainly in the ongoing 
domestic competition. However, they are highly simplistic, serving a 
stereotyped social order and the need to manage a complex situation of 
quasi-external conflict that lacks clear-cut and permanent boundaries or easily 
identifiable rules of game. 
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Israeli political culture is characterized by a mixture of a permanent 
anxiety and a power - oriented culture. On one hand, the Jewish-Israeli polity 
is driven by a code of self-perceived weakness, permanent wretchedness, 
and existential threat. A sense of permanent siege and potential annihilation 
in a hostile Gentile world of anti-Semites- be they Christians, Muslims, 
Buddhists, or agnostics - is perceived as the state of nature, or the cosmic 
order. Two or three thousand years of Jewish persecution and diaspora, 
culminating in the holocaust, are offered as final proof of the eternal relevance 
of the particularistic interpretation of history and collective memory, and its 
relevance to the present time. 
On the other hand, Jewish Israelis are well aware of their country's 
status as a regional military power with one of the best -equipped and trained 
armed forces. Military service is an important component across the entire 
spectrum of Jewish - Israeli life (as servicemen and women in both regular 
service and reserve duty, as the parents of soldiers, and so on). The "new -
Israeli"- in counter-distinction to the "Jew-of-exile", shaped and disdained by 
Zionist ideology and methodology - is first and foremost a warrior. Jewish -
Israelis adore match (action); they are confident that force, now that they have 
it, will solve most societal and political problems, making the power-orientation 
the touchstone of their political culture. There is a deep conviction that "Arab" 
in general, and Palestinians in particular, "only understand the language of 
force". The weakness and power- oriented components of this culture 
complement each other, yet they are also a source of internal strain within the 
Jewish - Israeli collective society\ 
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In Jewish-Israeli culture the Jewish-Israeli "man" - especially the 
Askenazi native - born one- is depicted as modern, educated, sophisticated, 
highly skilled, motivated, and an omnipotent warrior - in opposition to the 
Arab (in general and the Palestinian in particular), who is seen as primitive 
and backward, uneducated, and militarily inferior. Poor work is labelled "Arab 
work", and the language - especially Hebrew slang - was once filled with 
degrading and pejorative stereotypes of Arabs. A slight change occurred 
following the 1973 and 1982 wars, accelerating after the popular Uprising 
(Intifada), in the occupied territories.^ 
The reappearance, embodied by the PLO, of the Palestinians as 
independent actors on the stage of the Jewish - Arab conflict was interpreted 
by Jewish-Israelis to fit perfectly with both components of their political 
culture. Israeli overaction was one of the factors that helped to both give the 
Palestinian organizations publicity and to reconstruct Palestinian identity and 
nationalism. For example, the first guerrilla attack of al-Assifa (belonging to 
the movement al-Fatah in their role as the armed force of the Palestinian 
people)^, an attempt to install a bomb into a reservoir of the Israeli national 
water carrier, had been proceeded by several abortive attempts to infiltrate 
into Israel"*. These were given a great deal of publicity by the Israeli 
government. On May 1, 1965 Levy Eskol, the Israeli Prime Minister and 
Minister of Defense, warned the Arab countries not to give shelter to 
Palestinian guerrillas, and he filed a complaint to the UN Security Council. Al-
Fatah then requested that the UN consider its captured gunmen prisoners of 
war, to be treated according to the Geneva Conventions and international law. 
Al-Fatah not only gained relatively rapid worldwide recognition, but, moreover, 
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this small group was presented and constructed by the Israelis as a major 
danger for Israel. This alone operated as a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, and 
lay the foundations for a new Palestinian pride. 
Israeli over sensitivity was not completely baseless. As we have seen, 
the de-Palestinization of the Palestinians was the common interest of Israel 
and at least some Arab states. Any deviation from this process was 
considered by the Israelis as well as the Jordanian regime as dangerous. Any 
Palestinian claim as such w^s perceived in terms of a zero-sum game facing 
the Israeli as well as Jordanian politics. What must be remembered is that the 
founder and first chairman of the PLO, Ahmad Shukairi, the man who gave 
the PLO its initial shape, declared Jordan as a part of Palestine^. 
From a political and institutional point of viewi the Israeli reaction to the 
reappearance of a partially independent, Palestine-centered organization and 
leadership may have been exaggerated, but from a behavioral point of view 
the reason for anxiety was evident. From the outset up to PLCs Declaration 
of Independence in November 1988^, the PLO-constitutionally, at least-had 
continued the traditional Palestinian denial of any collective-political rights for 
Jews in Palestine. 
The PLO's argument with the central assertions of Zionist doctrine is 
also understandable, given the history of both collectivities and the 
catastrophic outcome for the Palestinians of the encounter with the Jewish 
national movement. The Palestinian National Charter's direct assault on the 
very raison d'etre and identity of Jewish collectivity, reflected the nature of the 
communal conflict, based on the mutual "delegitimation game". Later, both the 
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nature of the conflict as well as the mutual delegitlmation drove the partners 
towards some mutual accommodation. 
Israeli Policy and Palestinian Response from June War, 1967 to 
Camp David Accords, 1978. 
To grasp a clear perspective of Israel's position and intentions during 
this long period, study and analysis must be made of Israel's expansion, 
settlement, economic, and repression as well as deportation policy towards 
the Palestinian people and its leadership (PLO). The two major wars (1967, 
1973) are no less significant because they had caused changes in the 
direction of Israeli policy from time to time as had the influence and 
involvement of outside players like the US, USSR, some Arab countries and 
Europe. 
To begin with, since the conclusion of the Six-Day War in June 1967, 
Israel has been in control of all parts of the former mandatory Palestine (as 
well as Sinai and the Golan Heights). Immediately upon the conclusion of the 
war in June 1967, Israel took administrative measures to unify the City of 
Jerusalem pursuant to Israeli legislation. The actions are considered to 
amount to an attempted annexation by Israel of the city and its environ. Israel 
has during this period controlled the Holy Places within and outside the city. It 
has exercised a military government administration in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, allowing minimal powers of local administration, under Israeli 
military control, by local Arab mayors and town councils^. 
The occupiers called this a policy of "non-interference". It left the local 
administration in place and thus made available an "intermediary" which 
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massaged national feelings but could easily be bypassed. A ministry of 
defense notice put it in concrete terms: 
It could be said, in principle, that the aim of the military 
government is that an Arab resident of the zone could be born in 
the hospital, receive a birth certificate, grow up and be 
educated, marry and bring up his children and grand children to 
old age, all without the help of an Israeli clerk or government 
official and without even having seen one®. 
This idyllic vision undoubtedly had little to do with every day reality, but 
it sums up the occupiers' philosophy very well. 
In connection with the city of Jerusalem, the legal and administrative 
framework for Israeli policy was established on June 27 and 28, 1967, barely 
three weeks after Israeli forces first crossed the armistice demarcation lines 
into Jordanian Jerusalem. A law enacted by the Knessed on June 27 
authorized the minister of the interior to proclaim the enlargement of municipal 
boundaries and to apply, in designated parts of occupied territories, the same 
legal jurisdiction and administration in force in Israel itself. The next day the 
minister took this step with regard to Arab Jerusalem and surrounding areas, 
incorporating it under the administration of Major Teddy Koliek of the Jewish 
City^ 
With regard to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Israelis adopted an 
equivocal attitude to the question of occupation of the West Bank. As part of 
their claim that belligerency between members of the UN is inconsistent with 
the provisions of the UN Charter, they deny that Israel is a belligerent 
occupant of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Israeli contention is that 
neither Jordan nor Egypt had acquired territorial sovereignty over these 
territories by the time of the 1967 war. Therefore, their argument runs, there is 
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no "opposing belligerent to support a belligerent occupation. Israel, it is 
claimed, has neither annexed the West Bank nor subjected it to belligerent 
occupation. This is the legal explanation for the Israeli reference to 
"administered areas". This formula is designed to keep intact whatever little to 
territorial sovereignty over the West Bank Israel may ultimately be able to 
assert. Indeed, Israel prefers to await a peace settlement while affecting 
serious changes in the occupied territories that may irreparably jeopardize a 
just peace in the region^°. 
Israel claims that its military presence in the West Bank is necessary 
for its own security and that of the West Bank and Gaza settlements against 
Palestinian hostility within these territories, and' armed incursions from 
without^ \ 
Israel, like the Hashemites, maintained the practice of political and 
social fragmentation, dealing with village leaders on an individual basis and 
seeking to prevent any growth of a collective identity as Palestinians. This 
was not accidental. It reflected the Israelis' perception that there was "the only 
legitimate collective in the land of Israel (including the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip) and therefore all Palestinian claims to communal (economic and 
political) rights are illegitimate and, by definition, subversive"^^. Economic 
practices developed whose aim was to subvert. West Bank Palestinian 
interests to those of Israel, but their impact also reflected the government's 
political tactics. 
Almost from the beginning, the rules of the game were explicit - the 
Israelis wanted to keep all or most of the territories of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip because, as Levi Ashkol, the pragmatist and dovish premier, put it: 
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"The roots of the Israeli people are in this land, as deep as ancient day". 
However, from the Israeli point of view, formal annexation of the occupied 
territories was out of question (with the exception of East Jerusalem, and the 
Golan Heights, where most of the Syrian population had left or was forced to 
leave) as it would have changed the entire demographic balance between 
Jews and Palestinian, trans of forming Israel into binational political entity. 
Even the right-wing regime that came to power in 1977 was not willing to fulfill 
the expectations of elements of its constituency by formally annexing the 
occupied territories^^. 
It should be noted that some Israelis believed that if the Israeli 
annexationist policy was totally applied to all the occupied territories it would 
bring about a new flourishing of Zionism and awaken a fresh wave of Jewish 
immigration that will offset the increase in the Arab population. But increased 
Jewish immigration would not detract from the existence of a large Arab 
population, even if its relative proportion in the country was thereby 
decreased. Nor is there any reason to assume that Jewish immigration will 
increase. Jews may be attracted to a Jewish state, but not to a country with a 
mixed and unsettled population. No preaching about their obligation to move 
to Israel will help. Jews will prefer to continue to live with their Christian 
neighbours in America or Europe than to live along side an angry Muslim 
puplation^'*. 
Despite the fact that the territories were not formally annexed, they 
were opened up as settlement frontiers and were incorporated within a single 
economy and military control system. In the f i i ^^ period of the Jewish 
settlement a grassroots movements sprang up, sporadically supported by the 
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government, or better put, no serious efforts were made to halt it. Later, the 
government openly supported and encouraged the settlements within the 
framework of the "Allon Plan"^^. From 1977 onwards, a concentrated effort 
was made to create an "irreversible" territorial fait accompli^^, through the 
creation of Jewish settlements within a densely settled Arab (Palestinian) 
areas. 
One of the Palestinian responses to the invasion of their land and the 
attempt to suffocate any possibility of future self-determination, was to attempt 
a process of rapid internal institutional and local leadership building or what 
can be perceived as the creation of a Palestinian civil society^^. Th new local 
leadership was also supposed to prevent any possible settlement in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, such as between Israel and Jordan, without PLO 
involvement. Initially, the process of local leadership formation did not 
contradict Israeli policy, which tried not to interfere with Palestinian internal 
affairs, at least on a local or municipal level. The idea of indirect rule was built 
into the situation from the beginning of the occupation, but the actual nature of 
its application varied from time to time. Most of the mayors elected in the 1976 
municipal elections were "nationalists", supporters of the PLO, replacing the 
traditional pro-Jordanian leaderships^. Together with other nobles, 
intellectuals, and professionals, the new mayors tried to establish an "inside" 
leadership (supposedly subordinate to the "outside" leadership), through the 
formation of the National Guidance Committee (NGC). The NGC was 
outlawed by Israel in 1982, and most of its principal members were dismissed 
from their offices or exiled. In short, the occupiers could not allow the creation 
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of a country-wide independent Palestinian leadership that was perceived as a 
kernel of state and nation building, an extension and arm of the PLO^^. 
However, the complete economic dependence on Israel prevented any 
real development of the economic and social infrastructure of local 
institutions. Almost no investments were made in economic or social 
development. In addition, employment in Israel undermined the traditional 
family structure; youngsters and women were now earning money outside the 
control of the elder traditional authority. 
Despite the asymmetrical relationship between ruler and ruled, 
Palestinian society received a high level of exposure to Israeli society. Many 
Palestinians learned the Hebrew language, became consumers of Israeli 
mass media, were employed by Israelis (in Israel or in the occupied territories 
themselves), and formed business ties with Israelis. In addition, generations 
of young Palestinians spent varying periods in Israeli jails and detention 
camps. Jewish-Israelis encountered Palestinians mainly during their army 
service- policing and "maintaining security" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip -
or as employers. The Palestinians learned the advantages and limitations of 
the Israeli system, while the Jews strengthened their stereotypes. As the 
political stalemate continued, the process of Jewish colonization advanced. 
The standard of living of the Palestinians rose slightly while the traditional 
family structure weakened, and the level of education rose dramatically. In 
addition, the Palestinian resistance to the occupation became more 
sophisticated. 
It should be noticed that the 1976 municipal elections brought about 
the final demise of the traditional pro-Jordanian leadership in the occupied 
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territories and its replacement by the pro-nationalist elite. Israel's decision to 
hold the elections and the consequent relaxation of its policy provided the 
Palestinian National Front (PNF)^° with opportunity to recover and to set up 
"national blocs" in most West Bank towns, while the PLO maintained a 
cautious position in light of its previously held misgivings concerning the rise 
of a strong local leadership. 
The pro-PLO mayors repeatedly declared their allegiance to the PLO 
and their refusal to emerge as an alternative to it. Concurrently, most of them 
did perceive their role as political in addition to municipal, since they conveyed 
the position of the Palestinians in their support of the PLO and their views 
were recognized by the Israeli military government and media. 
With regard to diplomatic campaign, the post-1973 peace process 
marked a growing Arab political and financial support for the PLO. Egypt's 
and Syria's common interest in recovering their lost territories from Israel by 
diplomatic means - no less than their disagreements on the appropriate 
strategy to realize this goal - underlay the Arab states system's efforts to 
boost the PLO's political status as the expense of Jordan and turn a blind eye 
to the PR's blunt violation of Lebanon's sovereignty. An immediate result of 
this trend was the acceleration of the PLO-Jordan competition of 
representation of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which 
ended in proclaiming the PLO the sole legitimate representation of the 
Palestinian people at the October 1974 Arab Summit Conference in Rabat. In 
spite of this resolution, Arafat confidently appealed to King Hussein to 
continue exercising his practical responsibilities" towards the Palestinian 
96 
population in the West Bank, due to the PLO's lack of administrative means to 
function as a political authority^\ 
In addition to the PLO's inability to exercise its political role in the 
occupied territories, there was an unbridgeable contradiction between the 
PLO's growing international recognition as the sole representative of the 
Palestinians and its rejection by Israel and the. US administration. This 
contradiction explains the impasse concerning Palestinian representation in 
the post-1973 peace diplomacy in the West Asia, that provided the Hashemite 
regime with a potential role in that diplomacy, despite all odds. 
The Palestinian Refugee Problem in the Aftermath of the 1967 June 
War 
The Arab-Israeli war that was fought in June 1967, was marked by the 
Israeli occupation of Arab territories in West Bank, Gaza Strip and some 
areas of Egypt and Syria. Except Egypt's, these vyere the areas where the 
majority of the Palestinian refugees had been settled between 1948 and May 
1967. 
One of the results of the June conflict was to make more acute a 
problem which had existed in the West Asia for almost 20 years - that of the 
Palestine Arab refugees. According to the UNRWA's report, in May 1950, 
roughly 2 years after the emergence of the Jewish state, the total number of 
Palestinian refugees was estimated at 774, 000 fled into neighbouring Arab 
countries from Jewish-controlled areas of Palestine. The majority had spent 
the 19 years since then in UN-administered camps^^. 
It was estimated that a few days prior to the outbreak of the June 1967 
war, the Palestinian refugees had numbered 1,345,000 of which 723,000 lived 
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in Jordan, 317,000 in Gaza Strip, 161,000 in Lebanon and 144,000 in Syria^l 
This figure was as on 31 May, 1967. 
By the end of the 1967 war, almost half a million Palestinians fled their 
homes, leaving 900,000 Palestinians in the areas newly occupied by Israel, a 
total of 1.2 million people were under Israeli occupation and 1.5 million 
refugees were in exHe in countries other than their own '^*. About 150,000 
UNRWA- registered refugees fled from the West Bank^^ to the East Bank of 
Jordan, causing a refugee problem of the utmost seriousness for the 
Jordanian government and 38,500 from the Gaza Strip, many of them being 
displaced for the second time^®. 
The Israelis continued perpetrating tortures and atrocities on the Arab 
population of the occupied Arab territories, which marked a further process of 
gradual exodus of the Palestinians. 
The number of Palestinian refugees registered with the UNRWA 
increased steadily between 1950 and 1972 as is discernible from the table 
given below: 
TABLE 2 
Statistics concerning refugees registered with UNRWA (1950-1972) 
Year 
(1) 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
Total No. of Refugees 
. (2) 
774,000 
904,122 
915,411 
916,761 
941,851 
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1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
969,389 
996,338 
1,019,201 
1,053,348 
1,087,628 
1,120,889 
1,151,024 
1,174,760 
•1,210,170 
1,246,585 
1,280,823 
"1,317,749 
1,346,086 
1,364,294^ ^ 
1,395,074 
1,425,219 
1,468,161 
1,506,640^ ^ 
The Security Council by its resolution 237of 1967 took steps to secure 
a cease-fire an uneasy peace. Subsequently, the Security Council urged 
Israel to facilitate the return of the Palestinian refugees affected during the 
war of June 1967 and for the application of the Central Convention of 1949 in 
the occupied territories^^. But Israel failed to comply. 
The Security Council passed another resolution 242 of 1967 which laid 
down the following condition for Israel: 
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1. The inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war; 
2. Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent 
conflict; 
3. Termination of all claims on states of belligerency and respect for the 
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, independence of every state in the 
area and their right to live in peace, secure and recognized boundaries 
free from threats or acts of wars; 
4. — a just settlement of the refugee problem^". 
Israel ignored the call of the Security Council and continued its 
occupation of the territories. The protracted occupation of Arab territories by 
Israel was followed by a permanent settlement there and perpetration of 
atrocities on the native Arab population. Such a situation was instrumental in 
further encouraging the exodus of Palestinians who were feeling insecure 
under Israeli occupation. 
In 1968, the PLO adopted a new Covenant, which committed all 
Palestinians to fight for their rights "since the international community had 
been unable for half century, to secure their natural as well as promised right 
to an independent state"^\ 
The covenant termed "Israel" as an illegal state and also rejected all 
solutions, which were substituted for the total liberation of Palestine. The 
Palestinian cause now started gaining world sympathy and support. 
In 1969, the General Assembly through its resolution recognized that 
the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees had risen from the denial of their 
inalienable rights and reaffirmed these rights. In 1970, the General Assembly 
declared that "full respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine 
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is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in 
the Middle East"^^. During 1971 and 1972, similar resolutions were passed by 
the UN. The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War further aggravated the plight of 
the displaced Palestinians. The refuge issue became a pivotal piece in the 
diplomatic chess game being played out in the wake of the Camp David 
agreement of 1978. For a while the agreement took cognizance of the need to 
settle the Palestinian question. Israel was adamantly opposed to any 
suggestion for the setting up of a Palestinian state or the return of the 
refugees to their former home's in Palestine. It is obvious that the Zionist 
programme and Israel's land usurpation policy has transformed the 
Palestinians from people living on their land and seeking liberation from 
colonization to groups of people who are scattered over the earth and have no 
right to return nor to visit their homeland of which they were stripped after the 
1948 and 1967 wars. Israel also took non-military measures between and 
following the two wars to deport Palestinians. The.Palestinian diasporas are 
now living in at least 20 countries of the six continents. According to 1998 
statistics, there are some 4,950,000 Palestinian refugees and displaced 
persons. Taking into account the fact that the Palestinian population is 
estimated at 7.8 million, there are 63.5 per cent of them labeled as refugees 
and displaced persons^^. Thus it emerges that there has been a steady 
increase in the Palestinian refugees every year. The continuous flow of 
refugees was an indication of the fact that the problem of Palestine was not 
nearing the solution. 
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Israel's Settlement and Land Policy under Labour and Likud 
The first phase of Israel's settlement effort lasted from 1967 to 1975 
and Is often referred to as the Allon Plan. Yigal Allon, one of Labour's 
prominent leaders and a foreign minister in the Rabin government (1974-77), 
argued after the 1967 war that Israel must obtain defensible borders by taking 
advantage of the topographical features of its newly conquered territories^'*. 
Allon believed that Israel could guarantee the pplitical permanence of its 
borders by placing settlements along them. He proposed that Israel establish 
its security and political border on the Jordan River, and he suggested that 
Israel annex a narrow strip ten to fifteen kilometres wide in the Jordan Valley, 
as well as the West Bank Desert and the uninhabited (or western) parts of the 
Hebron mountains. For military and historical reasons Allon also supported 
the annexation of the Etzion Bloc and the Latrun Salient, but he favoured the 
return of most of the West Bank to Jordan. 
The Labour government followed the Allon Plan in its general lines. By 
1975 two chains of settlements had been established, one on the Jordan 
River bed, the other on the eastern slopes of the West Bank mountains. All 
the settlements in this area were agricultural. When the Rabin government fell 
in May 1977, two of every three settlements in the West Bank were along the 
river. The rest were also located in areas on which national consensus 
existed: the Jerusalem areas, Latrun, and the Etzion Bloc. Kirya Arba and two 
other settlements were the exceptions to the rule, and the rule was 
"settlements for security". 
A new phase of Israeli settlement activity started in the last two years 
of the Rabin government and often against its pronounced opposition. This 
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settlement activity was implemented by a newly established radical 
organization, Gush Emunim (Block of the Faithful). The Gush, founded in 
1974, gave the settlement activity not only new activity but also new direction: 
it declared its objective to be settling all parts of Eretz Israel, and its territorial 
claims were identical to those of Menachem Begin, then leader of the 
opposition. Since Gush Emunim had a different settling objective from those 
of the government, it had to establish settlements illegally by taking advantage 
of the weakness and the disunity of the Rabin government as well as by the 
support of the opposition. By the time of the Knesset elections in May 1977, 
the young religious fanatics were able to establish a'number of settlements. 
The settling programme of the Gush was dramatically different from the 
Allon Plan. It reflected the political gap between the Labour and Likud. The 
Gush demanded the establishment of no fewer than sixty settlements in the 
central massive of the West Bank and the western foothills, assuming 
correctly that there was already a national consensus on settling other areas 
(especially the environs of Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley)^^. Following the 
1977 elections the Gush settling activity received the ideological endorsement 
of the new Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, who visited the illegal settlement 
of Alon Moreh immediately following the elections and declared: "There will be 
many more Alonei Moreh!". 
For all practical purposes, the Gush settling plan now became the 
official policy of the Likud government. The head of the Department of 
Settlement in the World Zionist Organization (WZO), Herut member Matitiahu 
Drobles, endorsed the plan. The official adoption of the Drobles (originally the 
Gush) Plan meant that the Begin government accepted the settling 
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programme of the most radical, least compromising element within the Israeli 
society. It did so exactly at the time when, for the first time in thirty years, a 
major Arab country was conducting peace talks with Israel, and despite or 
because of the fact that it was self-evident that the Gush/Drobles ideas were 
incompatible with any type of territorial compromise or even peaceful 
coexistence between Jews and Arabs in western Palestine. 
The Begin government's support for the new settlement concept was 
not only ideological, but also organizational and financial. The Drobles Plan 
dramatically changed the existing governmental priorities for settlement. The 
Gush, which started as a poor underground, now received governmental 
grants, attractive loans for housing, roads, and other needs. Encouraged by 
their success, the Gush members formed their own settlement, Amana 
(Covenant), which established no fewer than forty settlements in Begin's first 
term (1977-81). Most of these were in the central massif, an essential area for 
any political compromise. Though the settlement programme in the central 
massif was not a spectacular demographic or economic success, mainly due 
to the shortage of ideologically motivated settlers, it achieved its political 
goals: settling an obstacle to peace in the most critical period. 
As a result of the limited attraction of the Gush settlements on the West 
Bank mountains, and possibly the relaxation of the American pressure for a 
West Bank settlement, a third phase emerged during the last few years of 
Begin's rule, the suburban phase. The idea behind this phase was to use 
economic rather than ideological forces in an effort to prevent a territorial 
compromise in the West Bank. More specifically, this was an attempt to use 
the centrifugal pulls in both the Tel Aviv and the Jerusalem metropolitan areas 
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as a vehicle for channeling the Israeli population into the West Bank. The 
Likud settlement strategists believed that by using the natural demand for land 
in central Israel, they would be quickly able to form a critical mass of 
population, a sufficiently large number of people to prevent any effective 
internal or international pressure for withdrawal. 
The WZO Plan, 1983-86 (also prepared by-M. Drobles) reflected the 
new strategy of the Likud. It focused on settlement in high priority areas in a 
relatively short distance (say, a thirty - minute drive) from either of Israel's 
two major cities. The Jewish settlements were to be non agricultural (a major 
change from the Allon Plan and even the Gush Emunim Plan), but semiurban 
or suburban. The objective was clear: to form within the shortest possible time 
a powerful lobby of suburban "settlers" and other investors in the new areas in 
order to pressure all future governments not to withdraw. With apartments 
selling for 15 to 25 percent less than in Israel proper, settling on the West 
Bank became an attractive option of many Israelis. 
To sum up, the settling under Labour was slow but under Begin's 
leadership Israel moved in giant steps towards annexation or, at least, 
towards the prevention of any nonannexationfst solution. The Israeli 
government was firmly committed to the settlement of the West Bank, the 
area referred to by Prime Minister Menachem Begin as Judea and Samaria 
and an integral part of historic Israel in an attempt to change its demographic 
composition. As a result, there was a dramatic increase in settlements and 
settlers, a change in the character of settlement (from agricultural to semi 
urban and even urban), and, most importantly, a different type of settler 
dispersion. Reflecting the Israeli prime ministers thin4<ing, settlements were no 
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longer the answer to perceived strategic or military needs but reflected what 
Begin believed to be historic rights. 
In connection with land policy Israel pursued a policy of "creeping" or 
de facto annexation through the confiscation of land and the establishment of 
Israeli colonial settlements throughout the occupied territoriesS^. In addition to 
its unabashed annexation of the Old City and East Jerusalem in 1967, Israel 
has confiscated, or brought under Israeli military control, over 52 percent of 
the land in the West Bank and between 30 and 40 percent of Gaza's land^^. 
As of April 1987, confiscated Palestinian land supported 18 Jewish 
settlements in the Gaza Strip, with over 2,700 settlers, and 118 settlements in 
the West Bank, with over 65,000 settlers^^ 
To support Israeli settlements, and to preserve the deteriorating water 
supply within the borders of Israel proper, water indigenous to the occupied 
territories is confiscated. As with land confiscation, this process escalated 
under the Likud government which in 1982 transferred management of the 
water systems from the military government to Israeli's national water 
company, Mekorot. Consequently, the quality and quantity of water available 
for domestic and agricultural consumption by the Palestinian population within 
the Occupied territories have been made increasingly dependent on the 
"consumption requirements" of both Jewish settlers, and Jewish Israelis, 
requirements defined by Israel. Constraints of on water usage imposed by 
Israel on Palestinian farmers have kept the area of irrigated land unchanged 
since 1967^^. 
From 1977 onwards, it can be stated that the Israeli land policy 
became overtly anti-Arab and assumed intimidating and provocative tones. 
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The shift from an interest in the Jordan Valley alone to the entire West Bank 
created natural anxiety in the main Palestinian centres of population. But 
beyond the overall settlement policy, in a more tactical, localized manner, the 
likud planners started to restrict Arab construction outside towns and villages 
(ghettoization), placed Jewish settlements so as to separate Arab towns, 
prevented Arab population blocs, attempted to encircle populated Arab areas 
by Jewish settlements, and established other similar policies. 
Finally, under the legal guise of declaring an area "state land" the likud 
government initiated a process of almost unlimited Jewish expansion, a 
process that changed dramatically the political atmosphere in the occupied 
territories. The "State land" rationale of the likud was of questionable legality. 
It took advantage of the fact that the land situation on the West Bank was 
highly complex and unclear and that two thirds of the area had not yet gone 
through formal registration. Using this situation for political purposes, Israel's 
Land Authority issued a directive stating that if an area was not registered, 
one can assume that it could be claimed as state land if it was not cultivated. 
Thus, with a stroke of a pen the Likud government laid claim to 2.5 million 
dunums (as compared with only 35,000 dunums requisitioned and the Labour, 
for security needs) on the West Bank (May 1980), declaring it "state land"'*°. 
The settlement and land policy of the Israeli government left the 
Palestinian population on the West Bank bewildered, radicalized and anxious. 
Even the moderates lost faith in the Israeli government, a government that 
wanted every square inch of land under Palestinian feet. This policy has been 
criticized vehemently and opposed by all Palestinians, individuals and 
organizations, especially the PLO, and regional and international level, and it 
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has become a great obstacle blocking any peace attempts and initiatives 
since 1967. 
Israel's Economic Policy 
In one of major processes of internal colonization, Israel strives to 
harness the economic resoui^ ces and labour power of the indigenous 
Palestinians in the service of the Israeli economy. Although officially 
considered independent economic units, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
have been forced, through post-1967 war Israeli policies, into dependency on 
the physical integration into Israel's economic system. Obviously the 
occupation has helped transformed Israel into a state with an imperial 
economy, relying partly for its well being on the captive human and material 
resources of the occupied territories. More specifically, over the course of the 
occupation, Israel has taken control of the service infrastructure of the West 
Bank and Gaza, confiscated Palestinian land and water resources, exploited 
and degraded Palestinian labour, held the occupied territories as a captive 
market, and restricted their external trade^^. 
The physical infrastructure and the transportation and communication 
systems in the West Bank and Gaza have been recast in to Israel's. Similarly, 
the occupied territories' electric generation units have been linked to and 
controlled by the Israeli grid'*^. 
The occupied territories have become captive market for Israeli 
exports. The areas constitute Israel's second most important commodity 
export market (the USA is the first). The export of Israeli goods into the 
occupied territories was unrestricted, while Israeli-imposed tariffs and other 
barriers have circumscribed trade with the outside world. In 1986 the West 
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Bank and Gaza imported $780.3 million worth of Israeli goods, constituting 
89.4 percent of their total imports^^. 
In contrast to the unrestricted export of Israeli-produced goods into the 
occupied territories, quotas were imposed on the type and amount of goods 
that could be exported from them into Israel, and the export of some regional 
commodities to Israel and its overseas market was completely prohibited. 
Moreover, Israel protected its markets at the source through outright 
restriction production^'*. Thus, forced dependency on Israel for trade was 
exacerbated by protection of the Israeli market from competition, effectively 
distorting the productive sectors of the West Bank and Gaza in a manner that 
maximized the profitability of this arrangement for Israel. The worst of all is 
that the unrestricted flow of industrial and agricultural goods from Israel into 
the West Bank and Gaza suffocated local markets and discouraged local 
businessmen from investing their capital in economic projects, and the Israeli 
government's refusal to invest in or develop a West Bank economic 
infrastructure. 
Overall economic stagnation and concomitant low levels of productive 
investment have forced Palestinians, both skilled and unskilled, to seek 
employment outside the West Bank and Gaza, primarily in Israel and the oil-
producing Arab peninsula. Tens of thousands of men from Gaza and the West 
Bank became integrated into the Israeli economy, going every day to work in 
Israel. For the West Bank alone, their number rosed from 5,000 in 1968 to 
14,000 in 1970, 25,000 in 1971 and 37,000 in 1973 and from 6% of the labour 
force in 1968 to 12.2% in 1970, 21.4% in 1971 and 29.1% in 1973. For wage-
earners this rose from 12.2% to over 50%'*^. By official account, in 1968 over 
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94,000 Palestinian workers were crossing into Israel for work every business 
day; this number would increase by 25-30 percent if unofficially employed 
workers were included''^. 
While employment was becoming less appealing to a new generation 
of Palestinian youth, opportunities to work in the Gulf states were drying up. 
Emigration out of the occupied territories averaged 17 per 1,000 population 
during oil boom era between 1973 and 1982. By 1985 the Bank of Israel 
reported that the rate of emigration had dropped to 3 per 1000^^. Accordingly, 
cash remittances from Palestinians labouring in the Gulf have steadily 
declined since 1982. It was reported that remittances into Jordan, much of 
which were destined for the occupied territories, dropped from $ 1.5 billion in 
1982 to $887 million in 1988''^. This sharp drop had a profound impact on the 
general well-being of the people in the occupied territories, which, when 
combined with the near closure of channels of opportunity, undoubtedly 
increase perceptions of structural oppression, especially among youths 
seeking first employment. In the context of a very youthful population, this 
situation was bound to create volatile conditions, and it constituted a pivotal 
catalytic factor contributing to the timing of the Uprising. 
The October War of 1973, Its Political Consequences and Israeli -
PLO Relations 
The War of 1973 stands apart from the other wars fought in the West 
Asia. In the war of 1948 Jewish force had commenced hostilities in Palestine, 
seized several towns including modern Jerusalem, before the end of the 
mandate and before the Arab states intervened. In 1956, 1967 and 1982 
Israel was plainly an aggressor. But the October War of 1973 was 
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commenced by Egypt and Syria for a legitimate reason, namely, the recovery 
of their territories which Israel had seized in 1967. 
The October War can be quickly summarized as follows. After coming 
to power in late 1970, president Anwar Sadat of Egypt indicated to the US that 
he was willing to negotiate with Israel to resolve the conflict in exchange for 
Egyptian territory lost in 1967. When these overtures were ignored by 
Washington and Tel Aviv, Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated attack in 
October 6, 1973 against Israeli forces occupying the Sinai and the Golan 
Heights. The crisis prompted US political intervention, along with sharply 
increased military aid to Israel. US Secretary of State Henery Kissinger's 
highly publicized diplomacy brought about limited disengagement agreements 
in the Sinai and Golan. But by late 1975 these efforts had exhausted their 
potential, and no comprehensive settlement was in sight. 
Due to stalled efforts to convene an international peace conference to 
which all parties to the dispute would be invited, Sadat decided in late 1977 
that Egypt should break the stalemate by dealing separately with Israel under 
US auspices. His visit to Jerusalem on November 19, 1977 began what came 
to be known as the "Camp David Process". 
With regard to the PLO's role in the conflict, it can be stated that as 
soon as the fourth Arab-Israeli war broke out, all PLO units were immediately 
put on alert. These units consisted of guerrillas, with no training for 
conventional warfare. Their task was to open up a new front in the occupied 
areas. The Palestinian resistance guerrillas were asked to cooperate for 
launching a large-scale but timely military operation Egypt was to undertake in 
the Suez Canal front. They were told by Egypt the purpose of the impending 
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operation was to generate US pressure on Israel tosoften its obstinate stand 
towards a peaceful West Asia settlement'*^. 
A unified guerrilla command was set up somewhere in the frontier 
under the leadership of Yasir Arafat and carried out 267 guerrilla and regular 
military operations. Many of them were major operations: planting of mines, 
cutting Israeli supply lines, blowing up of the railway line to Sinai and a radar 
station at Ramallah, blowing up of Haifa old reservoir and a pipeline between 
Eliot and Asqalan; damaging grenade and weapons factories in Tel Aviv; and 
attacking the rear of Israeli army in Golan Heights. The most outstanding 
achievement of the guerrilla force was the occupation of the Ru'us Heights 
and hoisting the Palestine flag after a three-hour battle on the third day of the 
war in north Israel. Three Israeli aircrafts-Phantom, Mirage and 
Skyhawk-flying over Bekaa, al-Rafid and Arkuob were shot down by al-Fatah 
and ALF militants. Arafat supervised many military operations, and was in 
touch with Cairo and Damuscus^° till the war officially ended on 22 October 
following a second cease-fire agreed upon by all parties, but Israeli efforts to 
prevent Egypt from realizing its gains led to continued attacks that brought the 
US and the USSR to the brink of a nuclear confrontation^^ 
Israel itself admitted that the PR militants carried out 200 operations 
during the war, and wanted the guerrillas to accept the cease-fire. During the 
war Israel complained to Dr. Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary General, that 
the Palestinian guerrillas were attacking northern Israel^^. It should be noted 
that the Israeli ambassador to the UN publicly stated that the Palestinians 
attacked 43 kibbutzim in all^^. 
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Although the 1973 ceasefire was accepted by Egypt, Israel and Syria, it 
was rejected by the Palestinians who once again confirmed that the struggle 
for the total liberation of Palestine would continue till they establish a secular, 
democratic and progressive Palestinian state. 
The Participation of the PLO guerrillas and the PI_A, who moved ahead 
of the advancing Egyptian and Syrian, was quite fruitful. The Egyptian army 
did perform miracles by crossing the Suez water barrier and overrunning the 
Barlev defense line of Israel. It could repulse the Israeli air attacks through the 
Soviet supplied missiles. The Egyptian forces liberated parts of their Sinai 
desert and they could have advanced further. But the US supplied Israel 
some vital informations and pictures through the Sixth Fleet about the 
Egyptian army positions. That enabled Israel to capture some areas on the 
West Bank of Suez Canal. The Palestinian intelligence had warned the 
Egyptian commanders about the Israeli moves. But they did not take the 
guerrillas seriously for which the Egyptians suffered some setbacks despitfe 
their victory in the war. The ceasefire was imposed by the super powers. On 
the Golan Heights front the Israeli advances were repulsed by the Syrian 
army along with the three battalions of the hitting force of the PLA. 
The fourth West Asia War creafed conditions very favorable for the 
Palestinians. Yasir Arafat described the war as "a positive, historic turning 
point", despite, some of the negative aspects on the military and political 
fields. For the first time, he added, "the decision to repulse the aggression 
was an Arab one, and the myth of Israeli superiority was shattered forever"^" .^ 
Moreover, the war shattered Israeli illusions that the' Arab could be forced into 
any solution. 
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The October war established the following points: 
1. Israeli army is not invincible - a fact that the Fedayeea have been telling 
since 1965. 
2. Israelis suffered more losses than the Egyptians and Syrians which led to 
the weakening of the Israeli economy. 
3. Arabs regained their honour through the battle field victory, and their 
morale was boosted up, despite the setback they suffered towards the end 
of the War. 
4. For the first time the Arab unity was achieved to face the expansionist and 
aggressive Israel. 
5. The war proved that the central cause of the Arab masses is the 
Palestinian cause. And, because of the pressure of the Arab masses, all 
the Arab regimes were forced to participate and to join, directly or 
indirectly, in the war. 
6. The liberation of Palestine means the liberation of Arab countries and the 
path to the unity of the Arab masses. 
7. PLO is the vanguard of the Arab struggle and the main force of the Arab 
struggle against imperialism. 
8. Israel as a strategic ally of the US, could not be .successful in suppressing 
the Arab liberation movement for all time to come. 
9. The Palestine problem came to the forefront as the central issue in the 
Arab - Israeli conflict. 
It is evident that the deployment of the oil weapon by the Organization 
of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries in November 1973, had led to political, 
diplomatic and economic successes. The Arab states had gained ground with 
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the war and the use of the oil weapon. Their main interest now was to bring 
about a peaceful settlement of the West Asia problem. Thus, at their fifth 
summit conference in Algiers in November 1973, the Arab states agreed on a 
joint strategy. They demanded Israeli withdrawal' from occupied Arab 
territories and recognition of the Palestinian right of selfdetermination^^. Later, 
on October 31, 1974, the seventh Arab summit conference in Rabat, Morocco 
recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people and as the sole body with right to negotiate the future of the occupied 
territories^^. Arafat's status was made equal to that of all other Arab heads of 
state. King Hussein of Jordan bowed to this unanimous decision of the Arab 
states and declared that he would respect it. 
The PLO had gained strength as a political factor in the October war. It 
was now equal partner with Arab states. And the strikes and demonstrations 
in the occupied areas had been a supporting vote for the PLO. The PLO was 
the undisputed representative of the Palestinian people. The political 
diplomatic offensive could now begin. 
Following the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war there was a rapid 
escalation in the level of Israeli raids against Lebanon. The immediate cause 
behind this was, in part, related to the ongoing negotiations for peace being 
conducted between Israel and the front-line Arab states. The peace 
negotiations had been initiated by the American Secretary of State Henery 
Kissinger in the wake of the October 1973 war. Kissinger's diplomatic initiative 
better known as step-by-step approach was based on the following guiding 
principles: (1) to avoid the Palestinian problem and the question of their 
involvement in the peace process event though it was the central problem in 
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the Arab-Israeli conflict; (2) to deal with each Arab state separately and step 
by step thus avoiding confrontation with a collective Arab position; and (3) to 
avoid linking initial diplomatic steps with the nature of the final peace 
agreennents^^. From the very beginning of the peace negotiations, therefore, 
Kissinger assiduously sidetracked the Palestinian problem and avoided the 
PLO participation in the negotiation process trying instead to bring about a 
series of bilateral agreements between Israel and the front-line Arab States. 
The Egyptian Israeli disengagement agreements. The Egyptian Israeli 
disengagement agreements (May 1974) were in keeping with this approach. 
Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy was quite an alarming development 
for the PLO. In order to assert their presence and to maintain their cause as 
the focal point of attention, the PLO launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign 
aimed at countering Kissinger's efforts to bypass the Palestinians. The PLO's 
diplomatic initiatives met with resounding success when the seventh Arab 
Summit Conference held at Rabat in October declared the PLO to be the only 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.-The Conference was 
dominated by a dispute between Jordan and the PLO as to which of them 
should be the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in the Israeli 
- occupied West Bank. After a protracted debate the Conference resulted in a 
political victory for the PLO whose right was recognized not only to be the 
"sole and legitimate" representative of the Palestinians but also to lead them 
in establishing a "national Palestinian authority" on any part of liberated 
Palestine^^. The Rabat Summit decision was a seyere setback for Kissinger 
who was trying to restore sovereignty over the West Bank to Jordan. As the 
PLO was now the sole representative of West Bank Palestinians, this 
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effectively debarred Jordan from arriving at any understanding v\/ith Israel with 
regard to the fate of the West Bank. 
The Rabat Summit was soon followed by another major Palestinian 
milestone with considerable international impact. In November 1974 the UN 
General Assembly adopted two resolutions with regard to the Palestine 
problem. The first one declared "the inalienable right of the Palestinians to 
return to their homes and property from which they had been displaced and 
uprooted". It further declared the Palestinian "right to self-determination 
without external interference" and to "national independence and 
soverignty"^^. The second resolution granted the PLO a permanent observer 
status at the UN General Assembly and at other international conferences 
sponsored by the UN. These major political and public relations gains not only 
enhanced the prestige of the PLO but made its participation practically 
indispensable in any overall peace settlements. 
Hand in hand with this diplomatic offensive, the PLO escalated its war 
against Israel for the PLO knew fully well that forcing Israel to join the 
international recognition could not be achieved by diplomatic means only and 
that the armed struggle should continue alongside the diplomatic activity. 
Thus as quiet began to prevail on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts the PRM 
began to escalate its operations against Israel. There was a new pattern in 
the operation, namely that they took the form of suicide missions undertaken 
by three or four commandos at a time. The first of these operations took place 
in April 1974 which a suicide squad of at three guerillas from the PFLP-GC 
carried out an attack on the settlement of Kiryat Shrnonah near the Lebanese 
border leaving behind eighteen dead. The PFLP-GC in its statement about the 
117 
operation said that the purpose was to strike at the American sponsored 
submissive plans for a settlement^". This was followed by an attack on the 
Israeli border village of Maalot on 15 May by the DFLP, on Kibbutz Shamir on 
13 June by the PFLP-GC, and finally a sea borne raid on the Israeli towns of 
Nahariya by al-Fatah on 24 June. In all, fifty-three Israelis were killed between 
11 April and 24 June as a result of the four suicide missions into northern 
lsrael^\ 
Meanwhile within Lebanon radical Palestinians and their Lebanese 
allies loudly denounced the ongoing peace negotiations as a "surrender plan". 
They launched an intense agitation against it, branding all Arab governments 
who showed on inclination to accept Kissinger's initiatives as traitors. In 
December 1973, radical student groups in Beirut organized a strike to protest 
the first visit of Kissinger to the region in connection with the proposed peace 
settlement. In February the following year there were more strikes and 
demonstrations in protest against the second of Kissinger's visit to the region. 
Soon it led to violent conflict with the security forces and long-scale rioting^^. 
The diplomatic gains scored by the PLO and the voices being raised in 
Lebanon at the behest of radical Palestinians against the American-
Sponsored peace process caused considerable alarm to Israel. From the very 
beginning of the negotiations Israel had been adamant in its insistence that 
the PLO could not be a party to the negotiations. In order to defeat the 
Palestinian demand to be included as a party in its own right, it became 
imperative for Israel to crush the PRM in Lebanon which was its principal 
base of operation and silence its Lebanese allies into submission. There was 
thus an all-time escalation of Israeli military operations against Lebanon. 
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Israeli violation of Lebanese territory which had occurred at the rate of 1-4 
violations per day for the period 1968-74 registered.a quantum jump to seven 
violations per day during 1974-75". Israel's heavy-handed raids created a 
state of chaos and disorganization on an unprecedented scale. In view of the 
acute polarization between Lebanese Christians and Muslims the new round 
of stepped-up Israeli raids led to total breakdown. 
Kissinger's Peace Initiative and its Fallout 
The fourth Arab-Israeli war had undoubtedly shown the US that Israel 
was not, in the long term, able to guarantee US interests in the West Asia. 
The US now began to look for Arab support. As a result, Henry Kissinger, 
Secretary of state since August 1973 while also remaining national security 
adviser, was sent to West Asia to bring peace to the war. He was in full 
control of US foreign policy. He strove to establish his and the US dominance 
of the negotiations, through which he hoped VD move the Arab-Israeli 
questions towards some resolution. 
Unlike the negotiations involving Vietnam and China, in which the US 
had been committed to specific policies, Kissinger would act only as a 
mediator between the Arabs and the Israelis. Such mediation would be 
directed towards psychologically preparing both parties, especially the 
Israelis, for final settlement. As a trusted mediator, Kissinger would be able to 
explain the domestic and foreign constraints that each party had to consider if 
it wanted the negotiations to progress. Both Nixon and Kissinger hoped this 
(step-by-step) approach would increase US leverage over both sides and 
maintain US control of the negotiations '^*. 
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Kissinger began his renowned shuttle diplomacy that in the end 
produced two disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel (18 
January, 1974) and one between Israel and Syria (31 May, 1974). Kissinger's 
peace effort continued and with his mediation, Egypt and Israel initialed on 1 
September and signed on 4 September, 1975 an agreement providing for a 
limited Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. It was agreed that any future pact 
between Israel and Egypt would be a final peace" agreement by means of 
negotiations. Kissinger also assured Israel that the US would push for only 
minor territorial concessions in any forthcoming negotiations with Syria and 
would not press Israel towards any partial treaty with Jordan. Only full treaty 
would be acceptable there. Finally, Kissinger assured that the US would not 
talk to the PLO unless it specifically recognized the former's right to exist 
under Resolution 242, something he assumed unlikely if not possible^^. 
The Sinai Disengagement Agreement of t975 did not provide for 
complete Israeli withdrawal nor formally end the war of 1973. This was done 
in the case of Egypt in further, negotiations that led to the Camp David 
Accords (1978) and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty (1979). As for Syria the 
position is still governed by the Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement 
signed on 31 May, 1974. 
The Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace treaty have 
achieved a peace of sorts between Egypt and Israel; their effect on the 
Palestine question was negative, even prejudicial. 
The Camp David Accords worked out two agreements: a framework for 
peace between Egypt and Israel, and a general framework for resolution of 
the West Asia conflict—i.e., the Palestinian question. This latter agreement 
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proposed to grant autonomy to the Palestinians in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, to install a local administration for a five-year interim period, and 
to decide the ultimate status of the territories after that period. 
Obviously, only the Egyptian-Israeli part of the Camp David agreement 
was ever implemented. The Palestinians and other Arab states rejected the 
autonomy concept as contrary to the self-determination, and Israel 
immediately sabotaged negotiations by continuing to confiscate Palestinian 
lands in the occupied territories and build new settlements. 
On the Palestine question, Israel's stand was very clear, even before 
the signing of Camp David Accords. In response to Sadat's visit and his 
peace proposal, Israel indicated a willingness to effect a partial withdrawal 
from Egyptian territory but would retain the settlements which it had 
established these since 1967. Israel did not envisage any withdrawal from the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip and suggested that the Palestinians in those 
occupied territories be granted on obscure kind of "autonomy" under Israeli 
rule. On 28 December, 1977 Manechem Begin, the Israeli Prime Minister, 
submitted to the Knesset a plan for the West Bank and Gaza which he 
described in biblical language as Judea and Samaria. The Plan envisaged 
autonomy for Palestinian residents without statehood. The Palestinian Arab 
resident would elect an administrative council which would be charged with 
education, finance, commerce, agriculture, justice and control of a police 
force. A commission composed of representatives of Israel, Jordan and the 
administrative council would lay down rule for the return of Arab refugees in 
reasonable numbers, provided its decisions were adopted unanimously. 
Security and maintenance of public order would remain in Israel's hands. The 
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Israelis would have power to buy land and to settle in the occupied territories. 
As to the future, the plan stated that Israel maintained its right and its claims 
of sovereignty over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but in view of the 
existence of other claims, it proposed that the question of sovereignty remain 
open^^ 
This coincided with the Camp David formula of 1978 which embodied a 
framework for peace in the West Bank and Gaza as well as for the Egyptian-
Israeli Peace Treaty that follows and was signed on 26 March, 1979. 
In accordance with the Peace Treaty, Israel agreed to return the whole 
of Sinai to Egypt and to withdraw within three years behind the international 
boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine. It also agreed to dismantle 
all 17 settlements it had established and to withdraw its armed forces and 
"civilians" from Sinai (Article I (2) of the Treaty). The price paid in return was 
Egypt's recognition of Israel, its abandonment of its original position on 
Palestinians rights (self-determination and a Palestinian State) and it 
acceptance of Begin's "autonomy" plan for the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip^^ 
After close examination it can be clearly seen that the Camp David 
Accords provided that Egypt, Israel, Jordan and representatives of the 
Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the 
Palestinians problem in all its aspects. It may be observed that neither Jordan, 
nor the Palestinians were consulted concerning their willingness to participate 
in such negotiations. In fact, they condemned the Camp David Accords and 
never participated in such negotiations. The Accords stated that to achieve 
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such objective, namely to resolve the Palestine problem, negotiations relating 
to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages. 
In a first stage, transitional arrangements would be set up for a period 
not exceeding five years. Under these arrangements, the inhabitants would 
enjoy "full autonomy" and elect a "self-governing authority" (which was 
described as an administrative council). Upon such election, the Israeli 
military government and its civilian administration would be withdrawn but 
Israeli forces would be redeployed into specified security locations. In a 
second stage, Egypt, Israel and Jordan would agree on the modalities for 
establishing the self-governing authority and would define its power and 
responsibilities. Finally, when the self-governing authority was established, 
the transitional period of five years would begin to run. As soon as possible 
but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, 
negotiations would take place to determine the final status of the West Bank 
and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors. 
Both Egypt and the US did not subscribe to .Israel's conception of 
autonomy for the Palestinians. .Egypt maintained that autonomy should lead 
eventually to the establishment of a Palestinian state. A part from the conflict 
on the meaning and scope of autonomy, there were other points of difference: 
Israel's demand to retain military control over the occupied territories, its 
insistence upon the creation of new settlements, its claim to control water 
resources and the status of the Old City of Jerusalem. The autonomy 
negotiations foundered over these differences and were suspended by Egypt 
as a result of Israel's invasion of Lebanon 1982. In fact, they have died a 
natural death. 
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As for Israel, it withdrew completely from Sinai in accordance with the 
Peace Treaty on 25 April, 1982. 
Despite the collapse of the autonomy negotiation, the three protagonists of 
the Camp David Accords have continued to cling to them: Israel clings to 
them because they pave the way for its usurpation, of the whole of Palestine 
and the liquidation of the Palestine question. The.US government clings to 
them to satisfy Israel and the Jewish lobby. Egypt clings to what it describes 
as "the Camp David peace process" because it does not wish to jeopardize 
the evacuation of Sinai, even though it does not subscribe to Israel's definition 
of autonomy and its denial of Palestinian national rights. 
The failure of the Camp David Accords in connection with efforts to solve 
the Palestinian problem was, thus, due to their inappropriateness, which can 
be explained as following: 
1. Although the Camp David Accords constituted a great diplomatic 
achievement (in the eyes of Egypt, Israel and the US) which will go 
down as a landmark in history. The real facts are however, otherwise, 
for the Camp David Accords did not constitute a contribution to peace, 
but a sham by which Israel sought to liquidated the Palestine question 
and to legitimize its territorial conquest. 
2. The limitation of the Palestine problem in the Accords to the West 
Bank and Gaza is in line with the Israeli position that after Israel's 
occupation and annexation of the territory of Palestine, except the 
West Bank and Gaza, the Palestine question was, or should be, in its 
opinion, limited geographically and poltically to those two areas. As to 
the territories which Israel seized in 1948 and 1949 in excess of the 
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boundaries of the Jewish state as defined by the UN in 1947, they 
should not be the subject of any discussion. 
3. The three authors of the Accords did not possess any competence or 
capacity to decide the Palestine question or even the future of the West 
Bank and Gaza. 
Israel is the military occupier of the West Bank and Gaza. The status of a 
military occupier is well defined under international taw: an occupier does not 
acquire sovereignty and can only act as an administrator; he cannot colonize 
the occupied territory, nor establish settlements, nor implant immigrants, nor 
expropriate or confiscate property. These are well-settled principles of 
international law and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August, 1949. 
Similarly, Anwar Sadat of Egypt possessed no right or power to decide the 
future of the Palestinians or to barter away their national rights and territory. 
He was not their guardian, nor did he hold a mandate to represent them. 
As to President Jimmy Carter, one fails to see on what basis he purported 
to negotiate with Begin and Sadat the future of Palestinians and of Palestinian 
territory. It is obvious that President Carter had as much a right to decide the 
future of the Palestinians and Palestinian territory as the Palestinians have a 
right to decide the future of US citizens or of US territory. 
The conclusion is obvious that the three parties who were the authors of 
the Camp David Accords concerning the West Bank and Gaza were neither 
qualified nor competent to do so 
4. The Acords must alos be rejected because they violate the 
fundamental and inalienable rights of the people of Palestine. The 
Palestinians are the masters of their own destiny and no state, much 
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less an aggressor, possesses the power to decide their future or to 
prevent them from the exercise of their sovereignty. 
5. The Camp David Accords violate UN resolutions, particularly, 
resolution 181 of 1947 which called for the establishment of a 
Palestinian state, resolution 194 of 1948 which called for repatriation 
the refugees, and numerous other resolutions which affirmed the 
national and inalienable rights of the Palestinians. 
The Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty were 
denounced and condemned by the Palestinians and by all Arab states with 
the exception of Somalia, Sudan and Oman. They .were also condemned by 
95 states at the conference of Non-Aligned Nations at Havana in September 
1979 as being a sell-out by Egypt of Palestinian rights. All the Arab states -
except Somalia, Sudan and Oman - severed diplomatic relations with Egypt 
and excluded it from the League of Arab States whose offices were moved 
from Cairo to Tunis. The Camp David Accords were also denounced and 
declared invalid in several resolutions of the General Assembly of the UN as 
being inconsistent with the inalienable rights of the Palestinians people. 
FLO in the Context of the Camp David Peace Process 
Following the October crisis of 1973, the PLO realized to its dismay that 
the Egyptian leader had not intended to liberate Palestine, but only to create 
the conditions that would prompt the Israeli government to negotiate with him 
for the return of the Sinai to Egyptian Sovereignty. It became clear to the PLO 
leadership that the Arab states were either unable or unwilling to defeat Israel 
through armed force and that it would have to achieve its objective through 
either war or the peace process itself. 
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But the Camp David Accords produced a situation in which the PLO was 
effectively excluded from participating in any peace arrangement with Israel 
involving the Palestinians, specifying that the Palestinians living in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip would govern themselves in all areas except for 
defense and foreign affairs. The Accords did not specify the fate of either the 
PLO or the Palestinians living outside those areas^^. More over, the Accords 
and the 1979 Peace Treaty dealt a heavy blow to the PLO in a sense that 
they deprived it of vital Egyptian support and broke the unity of the Arab front 
in the confrontation with Israel. 
The Camp David Accords were rejected unanimously by the PLO's 
Executive Committee and that even the more moderate PLO figures who had 
been hoping for some role in the peace initiatives launched by Sadat, were 
convinced by the terms of the Camp David declarations that the initiative 
offered them no benefits. In March 1979, al-Fatah's Salah Khalaf rejected the 
Camp David formula even more emphatically, stating: "It's not just that we 
won't participate! We will sabotage the self-rule scheme and we will sabotage 
the whole results of the Camp David"® .^ 
It should be noted that the period of diplomacy that culminated in the 
Camp David Accords was marked by major developments elsewhere, on the 
West Bank and Lebanon. Under Begin, settlement projects in the West Bank 
were increased, at times in apparent violation of commitments given to the 
Carter administration. In Lebanon, the aftermath of a vicious civil war saw the 
south caught up in a struggle among Palestinian groups, Israeli proxies, and 
Israel itself, acting at times in direct alliance with Maronite politicians and 
paramilitary forces. This struggle, and the increased PLO commando activity 
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in Israel designed to forestall progress in Kissinger's diplomacy, became a 
rather weak excuse of Israeli invasion of south Lebanon in mid-March 1978^°. 
But the Israeli attack did not solve the question of the PLO in Lebanon, which 
became increasingly tied to the sentiments of the Palestinian population in the 
West Bank and Gaza following Camp David. 
For the West Bank Palestinians, the Egyptian-Israeli agreement 
seemed to confirm continued Israeli rule over them, declared openly by begin 
himself, whatever the expectations of Carter and Sadat. This in turn bolstered 
Arafat's prestige, as he seemed the only leader able to achieve recognition of 
Palestinian rights. PLO strength in southern Lebanon and continued unrest in 
the West Bank, often spawned by Israeli attempts to destroy nationalist 
sentiments there, led finally to a long-planned Israeli attack into Lebanon in 
June 1982. It was designed both to eradicate the Palestinian presence in 
Lebanon and by doing so to erase any hopes among the West Bank Arabs 
that they had an alternative to Israeli rule. Unfortunately Israel failed in this 
connection because relationship between the PLO and the West Bank was 
generally intensified. This can be seen clearly when Kissinger's Peace 
Initiative threatened to exclude the PLO from a settlement of the Palestine 
problem, the organization could resort to the West Bank Palestinian 
leadership in order to thwart the process. Concurrently, the PLO did not shy 
away from assassinations as a means to deter the limited support for the 
Camp David Accords in the occupied territories. As in past cases, however, 
local opposition to the Accords did not require much external prodding, taking 
advantage of considerable Israeli tolerance towards political activity at the 
time. The National Guidance Committee (NGC) was established following a 
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conference in the West Bank village of Beit Hanina'on 1 October, 1978, as a 
coordinating and leadership body against the Camp David Accords. It 
consisted of twenty-two members, including nine, mayors and representatives 
of various organized interests. The NGC was a charismatic body, since its 
authority was not based on an organizational structure or on direct 
subordination of the PLO but on the prestige of its members. That was also a 
source of weakness, since the NGC lacked a widespread institutional 
infrastructure and the resources, it needed the Exterior's support^\ 
Following the appointment of Ariel Sharon as defense minister in June 
1981, Israel sought to uproot PLO influence in the occupied territories. During 
1982 twelve radical mayors were dismissed from their posts by the Israeli 
administration. Sharon's attempt to cultivate a more malleable rural leadership 
in the form of the village leagues, as opposed to the pro-PLO urban 
leadership, failed when both Jordan and the PLO came out against them^^. 
The village leagues scheme also aroused strong West Bank Palestinian 
resistance, which was accompanied by an "iron fish" policy of retaliation and 
harassment encouraged by the chief of staff, Rafael Eitan. As a result, the 
West Bank became a scene of intensified repression during the first six 
months of 1982, with military officials tolerating if not encouraging settler 
violence towards Arab residents.^^ The suppression of the public PLO 
leadership in 1982 created a political vacuum that enabled the youth and 
student organizations to become the dominant political factor in the occupied 
territories. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
ISRAEL'S LEBANON WAR 
Israeli Military Policy towards PLO Presence in Lebanon before 
1982 
With the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in the mid-1970, the 
collapse of the central Lebanese government, and the dismemberment of its 
army, the value of holding the Lebanese government responsible for PRM 
attacks diminished^ From an Israeli perspective, the onset of the civil war in 
Lebanon was not overly distressing because PLO troops were tied down in 
the conflict and PRM raids upon northern Israel were affected. In addition, 
Syrian intervention in the civil war, initially on the side of the Christian 
Maronites, tipped the local balance of Power against the Palestinians and 
Lebanese Leftists. This new situation forced the Israeli government to modify 
its tactics to meet the e){igencies of the new order in Lebanon. In addition to 
continuing its policy of military reprisals against Palestinian positions, Israel 
initiated a policy of promoting local allies to fight the PRM groups; the policy 
took the form of overt military aid, training and backing for some local 
Chhstians in southern Lebanon. At the same time, Israel began covertly to 
support the Christian Phalang party of Pierre Gemayil and the national liberals 
of former Lebanese President - Camille Chamoun in the north.^ Between 
1975 and 1977, the Israeli Labour government invested $150 million in 
building up Maronite forces^. 
The overriding goal of Israel's new policy was to unify and strengthen 
the Christian troops vis-a-vis the PLO and its allies; however, Israel avoided 
136 
direct military intervention on belialf of its Maronite friends. It hoped that its 
new alliance with the Maronites would further weaken the PLO and present 
vehement opposition to Syria's designs to establish hegemony over Lebanon. 
Israeli attempts to create local Christian militia allies in the south were further 
sustained by a decision to keep the Israeli-Lebanese borders open under the 
"Good Fence Policy" in which Lebanese Christians were encouraged to seek 
job opportunities and medical treatment in northern Israel". 
Under the Good Fence arrangement the inhabitants of the southern 
Lebanon were able to obtain five basic services at the Lebanese-Israeli 
border: (1) they could receive medical aid, (2) participate in trade and 
commerce, (3) send and collect mail via the regular Israeli postal service, (4) 
visit relatives in Israel and (5) seek employment within Israel. Medical clinics 
were established along the Lebanese - Israeli border at Metulla, Dovev and 
Hanita and serious cases are transformed to Israeli hospitals^. 
With the coming to power of the Likud coalition in May 1977, Israeli 
links with the Maronites were further consolidated. At the same time, Syria's 
relations with the Christian Maronites began to deteriorate whereas relations 
with its former adversaries, the Palestinians and the Lebanese Leftist forces, 
improved. As a result, the new Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, 
extended a moral commitment to protect the Christians in Lebanon against 
what he termed "the war of annihilation" and pledged to increase military 
support to them. In other words, Israel's aid to the Maronites from now on was 
no longer on the dimension of "helping them help themselves", but had taken 
on the dimension of "helping the Maronites to help the Israelis eradicate the 
PRM threat"^. Israeli troops participated more actively in fighting against PRM 
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forces in southern Lebanon and joined Christian mifitia forces in patrolling the 
area. In response, the PRM militants joined their troops with those of the 
Lebanese Leftists, outnumbering the Christian forces. PRM fighters stepped 
up military activities against Israeli targets in the wake of the Begin 
government's intensification of settlement policies in the occupied territories 
and Begin's declaration that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were "liberated 
territories" and integral parts of Israel. Such military operations culminated in 
an PRM attack upon an Israeli bus on the coastal road between Haifa and Tel 
Aviv, where in the ensuing battle with Israeli security forces thirty-four Israelis 
and six PRM commandos were killed, and seventy-four more wounded^. 
Operation Litani - 1 9 7 8 
Against this background (the bus attack), Israel launched its first 
massive invasion of Lebanon. On March 14, 1978, the Israeli government 
ordered its armed forces to occupy a 10 kilometres strip in southern Lebanon 
to create a "security belt", free from PLO forces along its northern borders^, 
and by March 19, Israel expanded its military operation northwards to the 
"Litani River". The Prime Minister Begin justified the invasion as a "retaliation", 
a policy, saying that "those who kill Jews in our time cannot enjoy impunity 
and that Israel will cut off the evil arm of the PLO^. 
The Litani Operation took place just before dawn on 14 March, when 
Israeli artillery opened up on Lebanese villages held by the Palestinians and 
Leftists. The shelling was followed by a ground attack with approximately 
20,000 Israeli soldiers advancing on five axes^°. The Israeli forces consisted 
mainly of regular infantry and paratrooper units. Command of the operation, 
code-named "Even Hachochma" (Stone of Wisdom), was given to the infantry. 
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The IDF did not encounter any significant resistance except in two places, 
Bint Jubayl and Taibi, where the Palestinians briefly engaged the advancing 
Israeli troops^ \ The PRM militants simply evacuated their positions and fled to 
safer zones in the north. The objective of the invasion was to wipe out all 
PRM concentrations along the entire length of the Israeli-Lebanese border 
and to destroy all their special bases from which the PRM commandos set out 
on missions deep inside Israeli territory^^. 
According to Ezer Waizman, the Minister of Defence, Israel had 
extended its military control all the way to Litani River to define the zone that 
UN-Peace-Keeping Troops would monitor^^. Both Israel and the PLO 
accepted UN Security Council Resolution 425, which called upon Israel to 
withdraw its troops, demanded that the PLO cease its military operations, and 
proposed the introduction of UN Peace-Keeping Forces '^*. By July Israel had 
withdrawn its troops and turned over the 10 kilometre security strip to its 
Christian allies led by Major Sa'ad Haddad^^. The UN force was not allowed to 
enter Haddad's lOkilometre Christian enclave, and Israel itself maintained a 
military presence in this buffer zone. 
Israel's systematic and calculated bombardment of southern Lebanon 
during and after the invasion was intended to create a wedge between the 
Palestinians and the Lebanese civilians. Heavy bombing, in addition to vast 
destruction, led to the influx of tens of thousands of refugees to the crowded 
areas of Sidon, Tyre, and Beirut. Despite the presence of UN forces, 
Palestinians and Lebanese troops remained in southern Lebanon. 
By April 1979, General Rafael Eitan was appointed Chief-of-Staff of the 
IDF by the "first" Begin Government. As a result, Israel's strategy and tactics 
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underwent further change. The "reactive strategy" adopted since the 
beginning of Litani Operation, was replaced by a continuous campaign of 
harassment of Palestinian forces, on the ground and from the air and sea. 
The new objective was the destruction of the opponent, or at least putting him 
on the defensive in order to prevent him from conducting attacks on Israel as 
Israel could no longer rely on deterrence for its security. 
The IDF was primarily trained to defeat a conventional threat based on 
the principle of counter-attack and ensuring that wars should not be fought on 
Israeli soils^^. Before 1979 Israeli military doctrine included a reprisal policy 
which dictated that any reprisal should be disproportionate to the attack. One 
of the underlying reasons for this was Israel's view that violent behaviour by 
Arab states, in committing or condoning attacks against Israel, was a form of 
delinquency. Arabs were as implacably hostile to Israel's existence and bent 
on its destruction. Consequently, a threat had to be met with a decisive 
military response. This military response, however, was not an end within 
itself. Rather, Israeli reprisal strategy exemplified "coercive diplomacy", 
intended to sap the opponent's wilf^. 
From 1978 onwards, Israel included the pre-emptive strike in its policy 
towards Lebanon. The IDF attacked any known PRM command training base. 
The result of this new policy was increased attacks against both military and 
civilian targets^^. On tactical level, Israel's pre-emptive strike policy under 
Rafael Eitan had only limited effectiveness in achieving "negative 
compellence, that is persuading the PRM commandos to stop taking actions. 
However, no decrease whatsoever occurred in Palestinian armed operations. 
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Instead, the increase in Israeli attacks led to a radicalization of the 
Palestinians. 
In late 1979 the PRM comnnandos began a process of entrenchment in 
Lebanon. Guerrilla-type operations, which had constituted a nuisance for 
Israel, were replaced with establishing long-range potential through the 
deployment of Katyusha rocket launchers and artillery. The FLO had started 
to change its strategy to concentrate on establishing an intensive civilian and 
military infrastructure. It was creating what came to be referred to as its "state 
within a state", including a semi-regular army. 
A real conceptual change in Israeli's security policy, however, did not 
occur until Begin's second Likud government in 1981. This was due to a 
change in the composition of the government in general, and to the 
appointment of Ariel Sharon to the post of defense minister in particular. The 
first Begin government had been split ideologically with Defense Minister Ezer 
Waizman, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and the coalition partner 
Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) representing the left of the political 
spectrum, flowever, Dayan and Waizman resigned for personal reasons in 
1979 and 1980 respectively. The 1981 elections brought a further shift with 
replacement of the DMC by the right-wing Agudat Israel. The result of these 
changes was that the hawkish contingent within. the Likud had been 
strengthened^^. 
The one change, which Begin did introduce, and which was a sign for 
the future, was that Israel could conceivably assist the Maronites on the battle 
ground as weiP°. As a result, in spring and summer, 1981, the Begin 
government noticeably increased its military pressure against the PLO and 
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stepped up military assistance to its Christian allies. In reaction to Syria's 
attempt to implement a limited programme for national reconciliation inside 
Lebanon, which would allow more power for Lebanon's Muslim majority Israel 
deployed some of its troops to preserve the privileged position of its Christian 
friends and to protect them from Syrian military moves initiated to end 
Phalange opposition. Begin's government did not welcome Syrian moves and, 
as a warning, shutdown two Syrian helicopters carrying their supplies in the 
Bekaa Valley. The Israeli operation was codenamed "the French Corridor". In 
response, the Syrian government installed anti-aircraft missiles (SAM-6) in 
central Lebanon and additional batteries were placed on the Syrian border 
with Lebanon. Scud surface-to-surface missiles were placed on the outskirts 
of Damascus bringing within their range much of Israeli territories. The Syrian 
action brought Israel and Syria on the brink of war^\* Meanwhile, the Israeli 
government maintained its pressure upon the PLO in an attempt to force it out 
of southern Lebanon and launched a large ground assault in June. A month 
later, the Israeli Air Force (lAF) waged a massive aerial bombardment against 
the PLO's headquarters in West Beirut. In return, the PLO began shelling 
Israeli's northern settlements in the Galilee region. Israel's air raids resulted in 
hundreds of civilian casualties, prompting the administration of Ronald 
Reagan to dispatch Philip Habib as a presidential envoy to mediate a cease-
fire agreement between Israel and the PLO. The US appealed for immediate 
ceasefire in south Lebanon and Habib attempted to reach one, with the help 
of Saudi Arabia. Israel initially refused to go along reiterating its long-standing 
refusal to deal with the PLO and claimed that it was Syria, which instigated 
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the PRM attacks. Yet, in the end, Begin had to yield to American pressure and 
agree to a ceasefire negotiated by Habib on 24 July,-1981^^. 
The ceasefire proved to be a political setback for Israel. One of its 
terms forbade both Israel and the PLO from attacking each other across the 
Israeli-Lebanese border and more important "constituted de-facto Israeli 
recognition of the PLO, despite Israeli denials and Habib's inventive 
obfuscation that the truce was concluded between Israeli territory and 
Lebanese territory"^^. This undoubtedly amounted to handing Arafat a political 
victory, which Begin could hardly swallow. Thus, although Israel accepted the 
ceasefire agreement, it never abandoned its goal of evicting the Palestinians 
from southern Lebanon. 
Throughout the 1977-81 period, several forces combined to restrain 
Israel's military behaviour towards the Palestinians in southern Lebanon and 
check Begin's extremism. Despite providing massive aid to Israel, the Jimmy 
Carter administration exerted a moderating influence upon Israeli military 
operations inside Lebanon. Although the US government supported the aims 
of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1978, such support was not unqualified^''. 
The US opposed an indefinite Israeli presence in southern Lebanon, which 
became explicit in the UN Security Council's swift endorsement of Resolution 
425. The Carter administration was critical of Israel's use of anti-personnel 
weapons, such as cluster bombs, against civilians; such weapons prohibited 
by US military sales agreements'^. Carter also repeatedly criticized Israel's 
settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, considering it illegal and 
an obstacle to peace; he was the first US president to advocate the creation 
of a "home land" for the Palestinians. 
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US qualified support to Israel from 1977 through 1981 was also 
motivated by US interests to move forward in the peace process. The 
momentum generated by Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in November 1977 and by 
the signing of the Camp David accords in 1978 further restrained Israel's 
military behaviour towards the Palestinians in Southern Lebanon. In this 
context, Israel might have wanted to avoid jeopardizing its relations with both 
Cairo and Washington. 
Another restraining factor was Israel's desire not to ignite on all-out war 
with Syria over Lebanon. In response to Egypt's.unilateral moves with Israel, 
a coalition - the Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation States - was 
created and an alliance was in the making between Syria and Iraq^^. 
By 1981 these constraints were no longer present. The Arabs had 
become bitterly divided, and the momentum for peace did not survive Sadat's 
assassination. The new Egyptian President, Husni Mubarak, although 
adhering to his country's peace treaty with Israel, was also concerned about 
rectifying his relationship with the other Arab states. Moreover, the new 
Republican Administration in the US did not treat the Arab-Israeli dispute and 
the Palestinian problem with any sense of urgency-. These developments 
coincided with the formation of the most militant and hawkish government in 
Israel's history; a government that resolved never to relinquish its control over 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip and harboured no illusions about its implacable 
hostility towards the PLO and Palestinian nationalism. These developments 
formed the immediate background against which the Lebanese war in 1982 
was planned and orchestrated. 
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Towards the Mounting Crisis of 1982 
As has been seen the second Likud government, which came to power 
in June 1981, was the most hawkish regime since the creation of the Jewish 
State. Prime Minister Begin, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, Foreign Minister 
Yitzhak Shamir, Israeli Chief-of-Staff Rafael Eitan-the four men who 
determined Israel's foreign and security policies - strongly believed in finding 
military solutions to Israel's security problems. They shared an unyielding 
hostility towards the PLO, a propensity towards adopting extreme military 
solutions, a belligerent foreign policy, and distrust and hatred of the Arabs^''. 
According to their shared view, "the PLO was Israel's greatest enemy and 
should be destroyed by military means". They did not believe in the ceasefire, 
which they saw as providing only an excuse for the PRM militants to rearm^°. 
These four men were also convinced that the policy of limited retaliatory 
strikes, followed in the 1970's, was not a viable means to halt the PLO's 
guerrilla activities. In their view, continuation of this policy would perpetuate 
PLO's ability to threaten northern Israel. From the viewpoint of Israel's military 
planners, the PLO's acquisition of long-range artillery and multiple-rocket 
launchers further compounded Israel's security problem: the PLO was 
perceived as becoming a conventional military • force in its equipment, 
deployment and organisation^^. 
This militaristic orientation of the Israeli government was exemplified by 
the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981, the massive Israeli 
aerial bombardment of West Beirut a month later, and the annexation of the 
Syrian Golan Heights in the same year. Mild Arab and world reaction, 
particularly that of the US, to these provocations encouraged Israeli policy 
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makers to go ahead with their decision to wage a war against the PLO. 
Israel's intentions to launch a war against PLO bases were known long before 
the actual outbreak of hostilities on June 6, 1982, as the debate over the 
military operation was conducted in the open^°. Indeed, Ariel Sharon declared 
that he had been planning the operation since he took office in summer 
1981^\ In addition, the need to destroy the PLCs political and military 
infrastructure was advanced by senior Israeli military officers who wanted to 
establish a strong central Maronite government that would closely cooperate 
with Israel to expel the PLO and the Syrians from Lebanon. 
On December 2, 1982, Sharon was reported to'have discussed his plans 
to destroy the PLO in Lebanon with Philip Habib, but the State Department in 
Washington did not take Sharon seriously. A month later, Sharon secretly 
visited Beirut where he discussed with his Christian allies his plan for the 
forthcoming war against the PLO^^. Shortly after Sharon's trip. Chief of Israeli 
Military Intelligence Yehoshua Saquy visited the US and met with senior 
military and civilian officials in the Reagan administration, including Secretary 
Alexander Haig. The aim of the meeting was to inform US officials about a 
possible military operation against the Palestinians in Lebanon and to define 
what constituted a breach of the July 1981 ceasefire agreements between 
Israel and the PLO. Saguy also hoped to convince the US officials that the 
t. 
ceasefire agreement should not only be applied to the Israeli-Lebanese 
borders. Around the same time, Israel's former ambassador to the US, Moshe 
Arens, announced that the Israeli invasion was a "matter of time"^^. In spring 
1982, Journalists used various scenarios, maps, and commentaries in the US 
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media to speculate about the scope, nature, and intensity of the inevitable 
Israeli military operation in Lebanon^'*. 
The timing for the invasion caused controversy inside Israeli ruling class. 
Before April 25, 1982, the date for the final Israeli pullback from Sinai, a group 
of Israeli policy makers led by Sharon and Israeli Chief of Staff Eitan wanted 
to send the Israeli army into Lebanon^^. In their view a large-scale military 
operation against the PLO in Lebanon would probably trigger a hostile 
reaction in Egypt that would countervail the peace treaty. Israel could then 
use this reaction as a pretext to perpetuate its control of Sinai. Sharon did not 
want to delay implementation of his war plans or wait for clear PLO violations 
of the ceasefire. Form this perspective, any provocation emanating from 
Palestinian sources anywhere would suffice. Another group of Israeli policy 
makers, led by Prime Minister Begin, was more cautious about the timing of 
the war and favoured returning Sinai on time because the war against the 
PLO could be waged at a later date to compensate Israel for the "national 
trauma" that it experienced as a result of its evacuation from Sinai^^, 
On several occasions, Israel tried to provoke the Palestinians in Lebanon 
into a breach of the 1981 ceasefire agreement by striking at Palestinian 
positions. On April 21, 1982, the lAF bombed PLO bases in response to a 
landmine explosion in southern Lebanon, which resulted in the death of an 
Israeli soldier. As similar bombing raid took place on- May 9. In both cases, the 
PLO exercised considerable restraint so as not to provide the advocates of 
the war in the Begin government with the pretext to implement their military 
plans. Through different channels, PLO leaders were well aware of the details 
of Israel's plan to invade Lebanon and instructed their forces in the front to 
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refrain from responding to Israel's provocations. When the PLO failed to 
clearly breach the agreement, senior Israeli officials, as has been noted 
before, insisted that the ceasefire agreement should not be confined to Israeli-
Lebanese borders but should include Israel proper, the occupied territories, 
and the world at large. This loose interpretation widened the opportunities for 
Israel to strike back at the PRM, as this arrangement was bound to be 
violated by any radical group within or outside the PLO that was dissatisfied 
with the agreement. 
The shots fired, on June 3, at the Israeli Ambassador, Shlomo Argov in 
London were extremely tenuous grounds for justifying the "retaliatory" 
bombings of June 4 on the Lebanese capital, Beirut and on Palestinian 
refugee camps in the south of the country. Two hundred dead against one 
man seriously wounded - this awoke memories of punitive mass executions 
in the Third Reich '^^ . The justification for a large-scale invasion was even 
thinner-and the Israelis realized this. So the Israeli government used the PRM 
reaction to their air-raids, i.e. the attacks on settlements in north Galilee on 4 
and 5 June 1982 (only one Israeli Killed) as the pretext and explanation for 
their invasion of Lebanon. 
The operation was codenamed "Peace for Galilee" and the watchword 
was "40 kilometres (25 miles) north"^^. 
Operation Peace for Galilee, June 1982 
The 1982 Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon was not an accident, nor was it 
launched in response to a major military provocation or crisis. The Israeli 
invasion could be termed as a "flagrant and barbaric" aggression against the 
PLO, which Israel attempted to disguise under the spurious label of a "Peace 
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for Galilee" operation. In actuality, the invasion under active preparation since 
August 1981 when Aerial Sharon, architect of the war, was appointed Israeli 
Defense Minister^^. General Eitan, the Israeli Chief of Staff, disclosed that "the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon had been planned to take place in July 1981 and 
had been postponed after the ceasefire arranged by Philip Habib, the US 
envoy'"*". Israel's belligerent intention was seen clearer when the General, in a 
well-publicized speech to a school gathering in Tiberias, said: "only a military 
operation can give us peace it is not true that there is no military solution of 
the problem of the terrorists'"*^. 
In addition to the destruction of the PLO as a military and political force, 
and crushing Palestinian nationalism, Israel also sought to achieve the 
following objectives: 
1. To eliminate the PLO influence in the West Bank and Gaza in the 
expectation that, being deprived of PLO support, the Palestinians in the 
occupied territories would drop their opposition to Israeli rule, submit to the 
Camp Dave formula of autonomy and facilitate Israel's annexation of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
2. To expel the PLO, its armed forces and the Palestine refugees from 
Lebanon. This objective was shared by Israel's Phalangist allies. 
3. To inflict a humiliating defeat on the Syrian army in Lebanon so as to effect 
its total or partial withdrawal. 
4. To install Bashir Gemayil as the President of Lebanon and impose 
Lebanese Front control throughout the Lebanese polity. 
5. And to sign a peace treaty with Lebanon, similar to that which was made 
with Egypt. 
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It should be noted at this point that the invasion was ambitiously 
conceived as triggering a chain reaction, each stage leading logically and 
inevitably to the next. The destruction of the PLO infrastructure in Lebanon 
and the defeat of the Syrian army there was expected to pave the way for the 
reconstruction of the Lebanese state and political system under the 
hegemony of Israel's allies. The Israelis calculated that once the PLO was 
crushed and the Syrian military power in Lebanon destroyed, the internal 
balance of power would tilt in favour of the Christians. The Lebanese Front led 
by the Phalangists would emerge as the predominant force in the country and 
with the leverage provided by the IDF's presence it would be in a position to 
install Gemayil as the President of Lebanon. 
The government of Gemayil, dependent as it would inevitably be on 
Israel, would then sign a formal peace treaty with the latter. This treaty would 
satisfy two-long standing ambitions with regard to Lebanon. First, it would 
accord Israel full diplomatic recognition and second, it would provide effective 
Israeli control over south Lebanon"*^. 
Although officials of the Israeli government repeatedly asserted that 
Israel had no territorial ambitions in Lebanon, economic and territorial 
considerations may not have been entirely absent iri the calculations of Israeli 
policy makers. Professor Eval Ni'man, leader of the Tchiah Party and member 
of Begin's cabinet, stated: 
The IDF must be prepared for a long stay in Lebanon - (T)he 
Israeli army in Lebanon will preserve our security more faithfully 
than any other force—In the interim, Israel will reach a stage of 
social-economic development in the nearby region which 
geographically and historically is an integral part of Eretze Israel. 
Israel could possibly reach an agreement on border rectification 
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- it's also possible that Israel could integrate a strip south of the 
Litani, with its friendly citizens, into Israel's development plan'*^. 
Israel's control over southern Lebanon would give it access to the 
Litani River, which could be exploited to meet Israel's water needs'*'*. Further, 
Lebanon could serve as a market for Israeli products and a bridge for 
economic penetration into the Arab world. 
Finally, domestic political considerations were also operative in the 
Israeli decision to go to war. The support given to Prime Minister Begin by the 
Israeli public following the Israeli strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor and 
Begin's reelection in June 1981 emboldened the hawkish elements in the 
Likud administration to launch a campaign against the PLO, particularly as the 
overwhelming majority of the Israeli public harboured no sympathy towards 
the PNM. 
Beginning of tlie Invasion 
The war began by massive aerial bombardment of Beirut and south 
Lebanon on 4 and 5 June 1982. These bombardments were followed by a 
land invasion on 6 June. On the same day the Security Council issued 
resolution 509 which demanded that Israel withdraw its military forces 
"forthwith and unconditionally" to the internationally recognized boundaries of 
Lebanon. Israel stated it would not comply and the IDF continued to blast its 
way towards Beirut destroying towns, villages and Palestinian refugee camps. 
The invasion took the form of a four-pronged attack that aimed at Beirut, the 
Beirut -Damascus road, Syrian Position in Bekaa valley and alongside Mount 
Hermon"* .^ 
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It is estimated that the Israelis rapidly deployed in Lebanon a force of 
120,000 with 1,600 tanks, 1,600 armoured personnel carriers, 600 multiple 
rocket launchers (including at least 500 self-propelled howitzers or field guns). 
The Israelis also put into operation modern combat aircraft with intensive 
naval support'*^. Compared to this the PLO with only 14,000 guerrillas was 
poorly equipped and its heavy weapons included obsolete T-34 tanks, 122 
mm, 130 mm, and 155 mm howitzers, BM-21 mobile, 30 or40 - tube multiple 
rocket launchers, BRDM-2 scout cars, BTR-152 personnel carriers, SA-7 and 
SA-9 missile launchers, and ZSU-23-4 mobile radar-guided anti-aircraft it 
guns'*^. Unlike Israel, the PLO did not have the resources to fight such a war, 
which was no less than the 1956, 1967 or 1973 Arab-Israeli war. 
It is firmly evidenced that the US not only supplied the Israeli forces with 
the latest cluster bombs, incendiary phosphorous bombs and vacuum 
(suction) bombs but also the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean 
collaborated in the war. Some of the war's much heralded F-15s and F-16s 
flew missions from the air bases in Negev, Uvda and Ramori was US 
financed. The US transferred some of extremely lethal anti personnel 
weapons such as cluster bombs and phosphorous bombs to the lAF from the 
Pincintinny Arsenal before the war''®. 
Main Phases of the War 
Israel's Northern Command under Major General Amir Drori committed 
to battle a total of six divisions in addifion to two independent task forces 
below the division level. Of the six divisions four.were designated for the 
western and central sectors. The remaining two divisions and the two task 
forces were designated for eastern sector. The objective of the two divisions 
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operating in the western sector was the destruction of the PLO and 
establishing links with the Lebanese Forces in East Beirut. The two divisions 
operating in the central sector were responsible for cutting off the Syrian 
troops stationed in the Bekaa Valley from the PLO and Beirut area. Once this 
was achieved the Syrian troops in the Bekaa would be faced with the threat of 
an encirclement from the west. The two divisions and the two task forces 
earmarked for the eastern sector would then begin their assault on the Syrian 
army from below, i.e. from the south northwards into the Bekaa'*^. 
For analytical purposes and as a way of ordering the rapid succession of 
events the invasion can be divided in four distinct phases each with its own 
particular emphasis. 
(a). The First Phase: Sweep Across Southern Lebanon. 
During the first three days of the invasion Israel's major war effort was 
confined to the western and central sectors. In the western sector the Israeli 
army joined by special IDF units landed from the sea rapidly advanced 
towards Damour, a PLO stronghold. The coastal towns on way to Damour 
were bypassed, besieged and then captured • later on - a strategy 
necessitated due to the twin requirements of rapid advance and keeping 
Israeli casualties down to the minimum. The PLO put up only a limited 
resistance and sought to withdraw as much of its men and material to the 
north as possible^°. 
As compared to the western sector, the advance of the Israeli army in 
the central sector was relatively slower due to the rugged mountainous 
terrain. The aim was to reach Beirut-Damascus highway and then to cut off 
the Beirut area and central sector from the main body of Syrian forces 
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stationed in the east of Bekaa Valley. An important landmark of this phase of 
fighting in the central sector was the capture of Beaufort castle by the men of 
the elite Golani Brigade. The massive fortress, situated 717 metres above sea 
level had over the years become a symbol of Palestinian resistance. The lAF 
had in the past bombed it time and again, but the Palestinians defending the 
fortress fought to the last man even though they knew that there was no hope. 
Soon after the fall of the Beaufort, Begin and Sharon arrived at the castle and 
in a brief ceremony handed it over to Haddad^^. 
(b). The Second Phase: War with Syria 
By the fourth day of the war the whole coastal region of Lebanon had 
become under Israeli control. The army in the western sector had reached the 
outskirts of Beirut's southern suburbs and established links with the 
Phalangists controlling East Beirut. In the central sector, the Israeli army had 
reached very near the Beirut-Damascus highway thought it had yet to take 
control of this strategic road. The Israeli forces in the eastern sector now 
began to exert pressure on the Syrian troops stationed in the Bekaa Valley 
taking full advantage of the fact that the latter had already been encircled from 
the west by the advancing Israeli column in the central sector^^. The aim was 
to dislodge or at least neutralize the Syrian army stationed here. Once this 
was done, the Syrian capability to influence political developments in Lebanon 
would be severely curtailed. 
On 9 June at 2 pm, the lAF went into action attacking the Syrian air 
defense missile system in the Bekaa. The Syrians responded by sending out 
scores of interceptors into the sky in a bid to protect their missiles from the 
Israeli attack. "The result was one of the biggest air battles in history. Some 
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supersonic jet fighters targeting, dodging and firing at each other over an area 
of approximately 2,500 square l<ilometres. The Syrian Air force was no match 
to the lAF. The Syrian lost ninety of their Soviet-built Mig 23s and 21s with no 
loss to the lAF and nineteen of the SAM 2,3 and 6 batteries were destroyed^^ 
the air attack on the Syrian missile batteries was accompanied by a ground 
attack against the Syrian army stationed in the Bekaa. Shorn of its air support 
and heavily outnumbered the Syrian army soon found itself in a very 
precarious situation. In three days of intensive battle, the Syrian army was 
pushed back several kilometres, lost a large number of T-72 tanks and the 
IDF was on the verge of taking control of the Beirut-Damascus highway^"*. In 
this moment of crisis, President Hafez al-Assad' (Assad) secretly flew to 
Moscow and appealed to his soviet allies for immediate help and protection. 
This prompted Leonid Brezhnev to contact President Ronald Reagan on the 
hotline urging the American president to restrain Israel. On 11 June under 
American pressure Israel ultimately agreed to a ceasefire in the eastern 
sector negotiated by Philip Habib^^. The acceptance of the ceasefire was a 
tactical move on the part of the Israelis. Israel had already inflicted a crushing 
defeat on the Syrian army in Lebanon. Had it continued its drive against the 
Syrians, there was a likelihood of the war spreading to the Golan Heights and 
Soviet intervention. Israel wanted to avoid such unnecessary complications 
since it had already neutralized the bulk of the Syrian forces in Lebanon. 
Hostilities between Israel and Syrians ended temporarily with a 
ceasefire which came into effect on 11 June. The ceasefire did not apply to 
the PLO. The ceasefire, however, prevented the IDF from gaining control over 
the Beirut-Damascus highway and the hills overlooking Beirut which were 
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Syrian hands. To over come such a drawback, Israel's Defense Minister Ariel 
Sharon instructed his officers in the field to "creep" hill by hill in order to seize 
the Syrian positions at Aley and Bhamdoun. This was called the "creeping 
ceasefire". However, the "creeping ceasefire" did not creep fast enough to 
satisfy the defense Minister and Israeli forces were ordered to disregard the 
ceasefire and to attack Aley and Bhamdoun and to secure the highway as for 
as those two towns. After this was done another and more lasting Israeli-
Syrian ceasefire was concluded on 25 June. 
(c). The third Phase: Terror Bombing and Siege of Beirut 
Having thus ended its offensive against the Syrians, the IDF could now 
concentrate on the PLO which was completely surrounded in West Beirut. 
On 10 June Israeli troops, which had moved along the coast road and 
bypassed Tyre and Sidon, penetrated one of Beirut's suburbs and linked with 
their allies, the Phalangists who controlled East Beirut. PLO forces were thus 
completely surrounded in West Beirut and then commenced their siege which 
was to last two and a half months. 
Israel's military leaders imagined that they would be able to reduce 
PLO forces and force them into surrender by massive terror bombing by land, 
sea and air. Accordingly, millions of bombs were poured on West Beirut 
between 10 June and 12 August 1982. It was estimated that on certain days 
170, 000 to 180,000 shells and bombs fell on West Beirut, including 
residential quarters. It was said that the TNT equivalent of explosives directed 
at West Beirut by Israeli forces in 1982 was equal to that used in the two 
nuclear attacks on Japan in 1945. 
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The bombardments were carried out with the latest deadly and 
destructive American weapons: air-burst bombs, fragmentation bombs and 
shells, cluster bombs, phosphorus bombs and suction (vacuum) bombs . The 
bombing was indiscriminate: Palestinian refugee camps, residential quarters, 
apartment buildings, schools, air raid shelters, hospitals and embassies were 
hit spreading death and destruction everywhere in the city. 
To increase the terror, the bombing was accompanied by the dropping 
of leaflets warning the inhabitants to leave the city to save their lives. The 
International Commission stated that it considers that the Israeli plan was to 
terrorize the population, so as to make the situation for the PLO untenable by 
bringing to bear on it the wrath of the population for the horrors of the siege. 
But although 200,000 of the 500,000 living in West Beirut left, the terror 
bombing failed to break the spirit of those who remained of the PLO 
defenders^^. 
What is incredible is that the Israeli authorities made of the terror 
bombing of Beirut, with its death scenes, raging fires and collapse of 
buildings, a tourist attraction. Two Israeli journalists reported that: "the Israelis 
took to busing delegations of honoured guests from abroad to an observation 
point in East Beirut to watch as planes dropped their bombs from high 
attitudes and plumes of black smoke billowed up from the city - treating the 
war a spectator sport ^ .^ 
Simultaneously with the terror bombing, the Israeli army imposed a 
blockade on the city: water, foodstuffs, electricity and petrol were cut off. 
Contrary to all civilized rules, even the entry of medicines, blood and medical 
equipment for hospitals, and, on certain occasions, of doctors, surgeons and 
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nurses was not allowed into West Beirut^ ®. And this, happened despite the 
protests of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRS) and UN 
resolutions. A complete famine was avoided by reason of the few convoys 
allowed to pass and because the PLO distributed free the food stuffs, 
especially flour, taken from its stocks^°. Like the bombardments, the blockade 
affected the civilian population above all. For this reason, it was contrary to 
the laws of war and to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 which prohibits 
the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. 
Although the PLO was the declared target of the siege strategy and a 
number of its fighters were killed and its installations destroyed in the 
bombardments, the strategy did not directly secure the'PLO evacuation. 
The bombardments did riot do the trick, not even during the stepped-up 
raids and shelling, which began on 1 August and ended on 12 after an 
uninterrupted 11 hours of pounding. It was reported that the bombardments 
had 
Had little effect on the Palestinian guerrillas in and around West 
Beirut - while large sections of the city - have been pounded 
into rubble, the guerrillas are emerging from basement shelters, 
holes and sandbagged positions almost unscathed - where the 
guerrillas have lost men, it has been mainly in fixed, exposed 
positions - Doctors at hospitals and first-aid centres say the 
overwhelming majority of victims are civilians"^\ 
Nor did the blockade , after nearly a month of its imposition, it was 
reported that: 
The Israeli blockade has yet to have any effect on the guerrillas. 
While visiting position I (in the Ouzai area) a truck drove up 
dropping off piles of freshly baked loafs of Arabic bread, fresh 
figs, water and tinned meats and fish. The guerrillas said they 
have enough canned food and rice to last for six months and 
insisted that a visitor take some figs back with him to West 
Beirut^^. 
158 
Nor did the psychological warfare. It was apparent that the morale of 
PLO fighters had been always high, even in one of the most exposed and 
heavily attacked positions, at Tahwita near the Lebanese international airport. 
Unlike in the city proper, the Palestinians have- built no artificial 
defences here. Lush vegetation provides all the cover they 
need. There was an Israeli position just 200 yard away. "Just 
think of it as 600 feet - It sounds safer", said Youssef, a 
volunteer from the Palestinian diaspora who had returned to 
Beirut from a comfortable job in Phoenix, Arizona. The picture 
the guerrillas convey (of the IDF) is that of a great military 
machine hamstrung by fear of high casualties, and reliance on 
high technology. 
The commander, Abu Khalid, and his men, it was stated, "have 
no illusion like any body else, about Israel's ability to defeat them 
(PLO) by destroying Beiruf'^l 
The whole world which followed the horrors of the war in press reports, 
on radio and television was appalled by Israel's barbarity during its siege of 
Beirut. Denis Walters, British Member of Parliament, expressed the revultion 
felt everywhere in a letter to the times in which he said; 
For seven weeks now the Israeli Air Force, equipped with the full 
and latest might of American air power, has been pouring its 
high explosives and cluster bombs on military and civilian 
targets alike while the Israeli artillery and the navy bombard the 
city from land and sea. Cruel psychological warfare, involving 
the cutting of water and electricity, shooting up food conveys 
and holding up medical supplies, have all been used^. 
It must be noted that during this phase of Israeli campaign, there were 
elementary decency and humanity call for immediate action. The Security 
Council demanded from Israel on 19 June (resolution 512), 4 July (Resolution 
513), 22 July (resolution 515) and again on 12 August (resolution 518) to lift 
the blockade on vital facilities, such as water, electricity, food and medical 
supplies for the civilian population. Israel, however, flounted those resolutions. 
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Negotiations for PLO withdrawal 
Negotiations for the PLO's withdrawal from Beirut began at the outset 
of the Israeli invasion. They were initiated by US Ambassador Philip Habib 
who was sent by President Reagan to arrange for the withdrawal of the PLO 
from Beirut such withdrawal was a basic Israeli demand to which the US had 
agreed. The negotiations with the PLO were conducted by the Lebanese 
government. 
The terms which Israel sought to impose without a ceasefire and under 
the fierce bombardments were the laying down by the PLO of its arms and its 
unconditional surrender. Although the Palestinians were fighting one of the 
strongest armies in the West Asia, single-handed, without air power and 
without any assistance from the Arab states, they rejected Israel's terms. 
Yasir Arafat declared that the PLO would make of Beirut another Stalingrad. 
Arafat's declaration was no empty threat. Despite the huge disparity in 
numbers, weapons and armaments, the Palestinian fighters displayed 
exceptional courage in standing up to the Israeli army. 
However, because of huge civilian losses and .large-scale destruction 
of Beirut, the Lebanese government suggested that the PLO withdraw from 
the city. In the second week of July 1982 the PLO agreed with the Lebanese 
government to pull out of Beirut subject to agreement on the conditions of 
withdrawal and subject also to guarantees for the safety of Palestinian 
civilians remaining the Lebanon. The conditions of withdrawal were the 
subject of prolonged negotiations between the American envoy Philip Habib, 
Lebanon, Syria, Israel and the PLO. On 29 July the League of Arab States 
endorsed the principle of the PLO withdrawal once the PLO was guaranteed 
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safe passage out of Beirut and the security of Palestinians remaining in 
Lebanon was assured. 
As the negotiations for the PLO withdrawal were about to produce 
agreement, they suffered a severe setback. Israel's military leaders favoured 
a military solution: the storming of Beirut and the destruction of the PLO. The 
Israeli cabinet discussed this option at several meetings and on 24 July the 
cabinet was split over the question. The military however, took matters into 
their own hands and intensified the bombing of West Beirut by land, sea and 
air. The intensification of the bombing of West Beirut led Saef Salan, a former 
Lebanese Premier in charge of negotiations with the PLO, to declare on 31 
July that Israel did not want a PLO pull-out, but planned to destroy it as a 
military and political force. 
The Israeli plan to storm West Beirut was reportedly finalized on 30 
July. On 1 August residential areas and refugee camps in West Beirut were 
subjected to continuous fifteen-hour fierce bombardment by land, see and air 
^ .^ On 2 August the IDF concentrated tanks around West Beirut and an entire 
armored brigade was stationed at the Museum Crossing. Then on 3 August 
and the following day IDF armoured units attempted to force their way into 
West Beirut. The PLO and its Lebanese allies put up a fierce resistance and 
inflicted heavy losses on the assailants^^. After losing a number of men and 
tanks, the IDF abandoned the attempt to storm West Beirut and resumed its 
fierce bombardments. 
On 4 August the Security Council adopted resolution 517 in which it 
declared it was shocked and alarmed by the deplorable consequences of the 
Israeli invasion of Beirut on 3 August. It reconfirmed its previous resolutions. 
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reiterated once again its demand for an immediate ceasefire and the 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. It also censured Israel for its failure 
to comply with its resolutions. The US abstained from voting on this 
resolution. 
Israel paid no heed to the Security Council Resolution and pursued its 
massive bombardments. As this military pressure intensified in early August 
the PLO leadership came round to the conclusion that there was little point in 
holding out any further. It began to gradually give in to all Israeli demands. It 
insisted on only one point-the deployment of a multi-national force before 
withdrawal commenced. The insistence was a reflection of PLO suspicion that 
the IDF would not hold its fire during withdrawal.. Israel, on the other hand, 
suspected that the PLO would not leave Beirut once a multinational force had 
been interposed as a buffer. It, therefore, rejected Habib's suggestion that a 
Multi-National Force (MNF) consisting of French, Italian and US troops take 
up positions simultaneously with commencement of PLO withdrawal^^. 
During those penultimate days of the siege as Habib shuttled between 
Jerusalem and Beirut to find a solution to the vexed question of the 
deployment of a multi-national force, Israel's bohibing of Beirut reached 
apocalyptic Dimensions. On 12 August the lAF carried out an eleven hour 
non-stop bombardment of the capital. The 200 sorties flown on this day 
resulted in over 500 deaths. During the day President Reagan telephoned 
Begin twice demanding an immediate suspension of air strike^^. Reagan 
himself was "torn between instinctive sympathy for Israel and increasing 
shock at the civilian casualties and worldwide alarm caused by Israel's 
invasion of Lebanon". Following Reagan's personal intervention a ceasefire 
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came into effect that evening. Shortly after, Israel declared its formal 
acceptance of the planned multi-national force deployment and on 19 August 
the Israeli Cabinet approved the US- backed evacuation plan. This plan which 
subsequently came to be known as the "Departure Plan" provided the grand 
rules for the evacuation of Palestinian and Syrian forces in West Beirut and 
for the deployment of a MNF under whose auspices the evacuation was to 
take place. 
The basic goal of the "Departure Plan" was to secure the safe 
withdrawal of the PLO leadership and combatants from Beirut to pre-arranged 
destinations. The PLO was made responsible for the organization and 
management of the assembly and the final departure of the PLO personnel, 
and for ensuring that departing personnel were accompanied by a 
proportionate share of the military and political leadership in all stages of the 
operation. The departing PLO fighters were permitted to carry one side arm 
each and all remaining heavy weapons were to be turned over to the 
Lebanese army. The PLO was also required to turn over Israeli prisoners 
captured during the war to the IDF through the Red Cross. The plan finally 
stipulated that if the PLO failed to depart as scheduled, the MNF would be 
immediately withdrawn from Lebanon® .^ 
Lebanon made a formal request to US, France and Italy to contribute 
troops to the proposed MNF. On 21 August a 350 strong advance group of 
French elements of the MNF arrived in Beirut and took up positions in the port 
area on the same day the first group of about 400 Palestinian fighters set sail 
for Cyprus. Over the next few days 800 US marines and 600 Italian soldiers 
arrived in Beirut as part of the MNF. The evacuation of Palestinians and the 
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remains of Syria's mechanized brigade proceeded with clockwork precision 
and was completed on 1 September. Altogether a total of 8,300 Palestinian 
guerrillas and 3,600 PLA and Syrian troops left Beirut during the twelve days 
of evacuation^". 
(d). The Fourth Phase: Assassination of Bashir Gemayil and the 
Massacre at Sabra and Shatila 
While the evacuation of Palestinians was underway, the Lebanese 
Parliament was convened on 23 August, 1982 under the shadow of Israeli 
guns to elect a new President. Hectic preparations had been going on during 
the weeks of siege for the presidential elections. Gemayil's candidacy was 
opposed by a formidable alliance of Sunni leaders from West Beirut, 
parliamentary representatives from Tripoli and northern Bekaa and deputies 
owing allegiance to Suleiman Franjieh. They gave a call to boycott the 
elections, which according to them was being held under conditions of 
occupation. 
In order to be successful Gemayil (then Commander of the Maromite 
militia) needed the support of sixty-two deputies (two-thirds of the total 
strength of the Chamber) which was also the number that constituted a 
quorum necessary to start the election procedure. Since deputies openly 
opposed to the holding of elections numbered thirty, it became imperative for 
Israel and the Phalangists to ensure the presence and support of every one of 
the remaining sixty-two deputies from the south not to boycott the election 
while Gemayil's campaign manager Zahi Bustani sought to mobilize support 
by offering liberal suns of money as bribe. 
The venue of the election was shifted from the Parliament building in 
West Beirut to the Military Academy at Fayadiya barracks located in firm 
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Christian territory. On the day of the polling Israel and the Phalangists 
managed to assemble sixty-two deputies. Squads of heavily armed 
Phalangists were seen escorting some of them while the IDF airlifted some 
from the south^\ In the first ballot Gemayil failed to win the support of all the 
sixty-two deputies. In the second ballot he required only a simple majority to 
win and this he got easily. Fifty-seven of the deputies voted in his favours 
while five abstained''^. 
With Gemayil elected to the presidency of Lebanon, Israel was well on 
its way towards achieving its ambitious goals in Lebanon. Within a few 
months Israel had inflicted a humiliating defeat on the Syrian army, forced the 
FLO to withdraw from Beirut and managed to get its foremost ally elected to 
the highest office in Lebanon. Later developments, however, were to prove 
that the hopes engendered by these eariy successes were at best premature. 
The first setback to Israel's elaborately conceived grand design came 
in mid-September. On September 14, the President-elect Gemayil was 
assassinated in a tremendous explosion in his party's headquarters in East 
Beirut^^. His murder came as a major shock to the Israelis. There were fears 
that his death might throw the Israeli position in Lebanon into turmoil and 
place question marks overall the Israeli success. A situation of uncertainty 
was created and Israel's immediate reaction was to occupy West Beirut so as 
to be in a position to control subsequent developments'"'. Thus, within hours 
of Gemayil's death, the IDF moved into West Beirut in contravention of the 
agreement with Habib. Begin and Sharon justified the decision in terms of 
maintenance of law and order. The Israeli cabinet subsequently issued a 
statement claiming that the occupation had been- carried out "in order to 
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prevent the danger of violence, bloodshed and anarchy, while about two 
thousand Palestinian commandos equipped with modern and heavy weapons 
remained in West Beirut, thus blatantly violating the departure agreement"^^. 
On 15 September as the occupation of West Beirut was under way a 
meeting was held between Chief of Staff Eitan and Phalangist officers in 
Beirut. It was decided that the Phalangists would enter the Palestinian refugee 
camps of Sabra and shatila to clear the camps of Palestinian guerrillas, 
capture the PLO headquarters and collect arms. The following day General 
Amos Yaron, Divisional Commander of the IDF co-coordinated the details of 
the Phalangist entry into the camps with Elie Habeika, the Intelligence Chief of 
the Phalangists and a man with long-standing reputation for violent acts 
against Palestinians. At night the Phalangists entered the Shatila camp 
passing through the positions of the IDF. 
Following the entry of the Phalangists into the camps there were 
numerous signs that they had become quickly engaged in the killing of 
civilians. 
On Friday 17 September General Yehoshua Saguy was notified that 
the Phalangists were carrying out the massacre of civilians. On the same day 
Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir was informed by his cabinet colleague 
Mordechai Tzipori that the Phalangists had killed a large number of civilians 
in the camp. Both Saguy and Shamir completely ignored the information. 
When General Eitan received the same information he not only agreed to the 
continuation of the Phalangist operation until 5 am the next day but also 
allowed the entry of another Phalangist unit into Sabra. Sharon who was 
notified by the Chief of Staff by 9 pm on Friday that the Phalangists had 
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indulged in large-scale killing of civilians also did not order the immediate 
removal of the Christian forces. By the time the Phalangists were finally 
ordered to leave the camps about a thousand men,- v\/omen and children had 
been slaughtered/^ 
The news of the massacre at Sabra and Shatila led to a storm of 
criticism through out the world. More important, it touched off a tremendous 
outcry within Israel. Spontaneous demonstrations took place in Jerusalem, Tel 
Aviv, Heifa and Eilat. The Labour party accused the government of indirect 
culpability and demanded a judicial commission of enquiry. In response to a 
call by the Labour party a massive demonstration against Begin government 
took place in Tel Aviv on 25 September. An estimated 400,000 people 
participated making it one of the largest protest demonstrations ever to be 
held in the country''^. 
Faced with this upsurge of unprecedented public criticism Prime 
Minister Begin was forced to appoint a commission of enquiry on 1 October to 
investigate the responsibility for the massacres in the refugee camps in West 
Beirut^^ 
Embarrassed by the massacre and the reactions it had elicited, the 
Begin government hastened to withdraw the IDF from West Beirut. The MNF 
which had withdrawn from Lebanon after the evacuation of Palestinians was 
reassembled and again deployed in various parts of the city''^. Meanwhile, 
presidential elections were held once again in Lebanon to elect a successor to 
the outgoing President Elias Sarkis. Amin Gemayil, elder brother of 
assassinated Bashir Gemayil was chosen to be the Phalangist presidential 
candidate. Unlike his brother, Amin Gemayil had remained untainted by close 
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relations with Israel. He was, therefore, more acceptable to the Lebanese 
Muslims. On 21 September he was elected President of Lebanon by a near 
consensus vote of 77-3°°. 
Results of the War of 1982 
Clearly, Israel's military presence in Lebanon had resulted in 
tremendous losses in terms of life and material both for the Lebanese 
although the Israelis, like many previous attempts, could not destroy and 
eradicated the PLO and Palestinians' identity as a nation. The obvious results 
of the war in connection with "Israel versus PLO and Palestinians "can be put 
as follows. 
1. In 1982, Israel failed in its new attempt to destroy the PLO and to 
Likudate the Palestine Question. On the contrary, the savage 
bombardment of Beirut, the systematic destruction of Palestinian refugee 
camps, the huge losses in civilian lives, tragically crowned by the Sabra 
and Shatila massacre, brought more vividly to the world's attention the 
tragedy of a people forcibly displaced from its homeland. 
2. Although the PLO withdrew from Beirut and thus lost its territorial base in 
Lebanon, it retained its political structure and its international status. If by 
its war against the PLO in Lebanon, Israel did not succeed in destroying 
the Palestinian national movement, it did succeed in "tarnishing its image 
in world public opinion". In the words of two Israeli journalists: "The war 
had not crowned their country with a great political and military victory but 
had —stained its honour indelibly"°\ 
The 1982 Israeli incursion into Lebanon weakened the PLO by denying 
it a base from which to direct its operations. Al-Fatah's relocation to Tunis and 
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the PFLP's move to Damascus distanced both organizations from Israel's 
northern border, although their units continued to operate in the country, and 
Lebanese Shi'ite groups-which had hitherto been hostile to the Palestinians 
and tolerant of Israel-attacked and shelled northern towns more zealously 
than the PLO had over done. 
From 1984 untill 1986, Arafati who was left with few options, explored 
the possibility of establishing a Palestinian Confederation with Jordan on the 
West Bank. The PFLP, however, regarded this as treason and took steps to 
torpedo the process by denouncing Arafat as a traitor and by carrying out a 
campaign of intimidation and assassination against West Bank Palestinian 
leaders who favoured the concept® .^ 
The Palestinian cause appeared inert; its leadership apparently weak 
and divided. This began to change at the beginning of 1988, when world 
attention shifted to the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
who by then were rioting on a massive scale agairist the Israeli presence in 
those territories. 
These riots differed from those which confronted Israel in the past in 
that they were guided by an underground leadership composed of the four 
predominant secular Palestinian groups in the area (al-Fatah, the PFLP, the 
DFLP, and the Palestine Communist Party) and a separate Islamic wing, 
under the leadership of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement or 
HAMAS. They were to be commonly known as the Intifada, Uprising. 
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CHAPTER-V 
INTIFADA AND ISRAELI RESPONSE 
One of the most important landmarks in the history of Palestinian 
revolution was the beginning of a Palestinian Uprising, an Intifada (shaking off 
or uprising) against the Israeli occupation in the Gaza strip on 9 December, 
1987. The eruption of the Intifada was a function of a combination of root and 
immediate causes as well as catalysts. 
Causes and Catalysts 
The root causes of the Intifada were embedded in twenty years of 
Israeli occupation and Israeli policies aimed at undermining the material and 
national existence of the Palestinians in their own land. The Palestinians 
believed that under the guise of maintaining its security, Israel had pursued a 
host of policies detrimental to Palestinian society. Israel had confiscated Arab 
land and launched an aggressive settlement policy that had left the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip fragmented both geographically and demographically. 
Israeli "iron fist" policies - marked by repressive measures and human rights 
violations - had resulted in loss of life, imprisonment, detention, house or 
town arrest, demolition of dwellings, deportation, fines, interrogation, travel 
restrictions, curfews, closures of educational institutions, unjust taxes, 
economic hardships and the like. Hardly a single Palestinian household had 
been left untouched. 
Unlike classical patterns of colonialism, the Israeli occupation failed to 
win the sympathy or support of any meaningful sector of the occupied 
population. Even those social classes that have traditionally allied themselves 
to foreign occupation in other colonial settings found themselves in the 
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Palestinian context at constant odds with the Israeli occupation expressing 
itself in a state apparatus that ruled an estimated 1.4 to 1.73 million 
Palestinians living the West Bank and Gaza Strips 
It is obvious that national and political awareness among the 
Palestinians had gradually evolved throughout the twenty years of Israeli 
occupation. The Palestinian national movement (PNM) and the process of 
Palestinian national building had contributed to the evolution of this 
awareness. When harsh Israeli occupation policies entered a collision course 
with this heightened state of national awareness among the Palestinians, 
twenty years of seething discontent ripened into an Uprising. 
The Intifada did not happen in a vacuum. It was dormant, awaiting the 
appropriate historical moment to erupt. In fact its manifestations and attributes 
were already somewhat visible and indicated that the Intifada itself was 
imminent. 
The tactics and forms of confrontation employed by the Palestinians in 
the Intifada and Israeli retaliatory measures were in fact in place before the 
eruption of the Intifada. One can find evidences in both Israeli and Palestinian 
sources. 
In his 1987 report, Israeli researcher Meron Benveniti, director of the 
West Bank Data Project, indicated that in period between April 1986 and May 
1987, 3,150 violent demonstrations had taken place, of which 1,870 included 
stone throwing, 60 involved the setting of stone roadblocks, and tire burning, 
and 665 involved the raising of Palestinian flags, leaflet distribution, and 
writing of nationalist graffiti on walls. During the same period there were 65 
incidents involving firearms use, explosives, or stabbings, and 150 cases 
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involving Molotov cocktails. All in all, 9 Palestinians were killed by the Israeli 
army (7 of them during demonstrations) and 65 were injured. Two Israelis 
were killed and 62 injured. On the other hand 3,000 Palestinians were 
arrested for their participation in demonstrations, and 1,550 others were 
arrested because of their involvement in guerrilla attacks^. Palestinians 
sources indicated that between 1985 and 1987, 115 Palestinians were killed 
and 828 were injured while resisting Israeli occupation^. These figures seem 
to include Palestinian casualties inside and outside the occupied territories. 
No less important also is that a number of developments in the 
Palestinian, Arab and Israeli arenas found their way into the consciousness of 
the Palestinian people under occupation. These developments came to 
provide the immediate cause for the Intifada. 
In the Palestinian arena, the PLO and its leadership were unable to 
deliver on their promises. Just prior to the Intifada, the PLO had reached its 
lowest ebb. Armed struggle was reduced to empty slogan. The evacuation of 
the PLO's military forces from Lebanon highlighted an unprecedented degree 
of weakness. Splits and lack of meaningful national unity among the PLO 
factions only exacerbated this weakness. The Palestinians in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip gradually began to realize that they could no longer count on 
the Palestinian "exterior" alone for their solution, and that they had to be more 
self-reliant. 
Worse is that the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were further 
alienated by the PLO's persistent attempts to bypass them politically and to 
abort whatever national gains they had achieved over the previous twenty 
years. American notions of "improving the quality of life" for Palestinians in the 
177 
West Bank and Gaza and the "Jordanian Developnnent Plan""* were viewed in 
this light and therefore rejected. 
In the Arab arena, the Palestinian problem sank for a number of 
reasons to a position of secondary importance. Among these reasons were 
the weakness of the PLO itself, the problem of Lebanon, the Iraq-Iran war and 
the Arab preoccupation with it, and a variety of particular problems facing 
each Arab nation-sate. The Amman Summit Conference of November 1987 
fully reflected growing Arab negligence of things Palestinian. Although the 
Palestine question was later added to the agenda, no major solutions 
regarding Palestine were issued. 
In the Israeli arena, Israeli intentions regarding the future of the 
occupied territories had become crystal clear, as manifested in the active 
Jewish settlement of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Palestinian 
frustrations, doubts, and fears were perpetuated and reinforced by the clear 
and significant Israeli voices calling for the "transfer" of Palestinians in the 
occupied territories to the East Bank of Jordan or for the establishment of an 
"alternative homeland" (Watan Badil) for them in Jordan. The "transfer" and 
the "alternative homeland" were perceived as Israeli attempts to confront the 
Palestinian demographic factor that threatened the homogeneity of the Jewish 
state and its Zionist nature should Israel decide to annex the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip^. According to Benvenisti, Palestinians and Jews In "Eretz Yisrael" 
would reach demographic parity in year 2010^. 
Apart from the causes - both root and immediate - a number of 
developments acted as catalysts in precipitating the outbreak of the Intifada.. 
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On November 25, an incident occurred that cast some doubt on the 
capacity of Israeli military intelligence to forecast danger signals. A brigade 
headquarters near the Lebanese frontier was attacked by Palestinians 
(belonging to PFLP-GC, led by Ahmad Jibril, who flew two motorized hang 
gliders from Bikaa region in Lebanon. One glider landed within Israel's self-
declared "security zone" on the Lebanese side of the frontier; the other landed 
next to the military base. One Palestinian entered the base, killing six Israeli 
soldiers and wounding seven before he was shot and killed. The incident led 
to reprimand of a brigadier general and disciplinary actions against other 
officers'^. But for the Palestinians it stirred feelings of pride among them. The 
operation demonstrated that Israel - even with its strong army - was not 
invincible. It further served to highlight the Palestinian courage. The attack 
was termed "courageous" and as "a painful and powerful blow" on Israel®. The 
event quickly became an inspiring and arousing legend piquantly narrating 
about "the lone Palestinian hero" who won the battlfe against the whole Israeli 
army^. 
The most important catalyst of the Intifada was as predicted by the UN 
officer in Gaza, a road accident of December 8, 1987. 
Escalation of Intifada 
The birthplace of the Intifada is Jabalya, in the Gaza Strip. It broke out 
first in this densely populated camp on December 9, 1987, in response to the 
December 8 incident in which a truck driven by on Israeli swerved into a line 
of cars carrying Gaza workers, killing four, including refugees from Jabalya^^. 
The next day, another refugee from Jabalya camp, Hatem al-Sisi, was shot 
dead, making the beginning of a long-lasting Intifada. The news was initially 
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broadcast over the Israeli radio as a matter of routine - another incident that 
was expected to freeze the Palestinians only. The funeral of the deceased 
Palestinian workers that night in Jabalya refugee camp exploded into mass 
demonstration. Palestinians surrounded and stoned the Israeli polices post 
inside the camp and the soldiers used lived ammunition as well as tear gas to 
quell them^V Since an Israeli had bean stabbed to death on the main street of 
Gaza city two days earlier, on 6 December, Palestinians believed that it was 
an Israeli act of retaliation. Israeli soldiers then shot dead a 20 year old in the 
funeral demonstration and Gaza erupted like a volcano^^. Refugee camps 
throughout the Strip were centre of the turmoil. 
The Arabic newspaper Al-Fajr pronounced the death of the four 
Palestinians to have been "maliciously perpetrated"^^. Even the major of 
Nablus, Hafer Toukan - an Israeli appointee - protested the murder of the 
four innocent workers and declared a day of mourning in the city. A Week 
long curfew fold not calm the situation in Jabalya camp. Demonstrations 
quickly spread like wild fire to the West Bank refugee camps, particularly, 
Balata, where four people, two men and two children, were shot dead on 
December 1V*. The other West Bank camps then joined the struggle, 
especially the over active camps Jalazone, Am'ari, and Dhesheh, where 
Palestinians expressed open defiance of Israeli military rule. 
It was argued that the December phase of the Intifada was primarily a 
war of the camps versus the Israeli army^^. It is more accurate, however, to 
say that the whole first phase of the Intifada, from December 1987 to 
February 1988, was primarily a refugee camp phase. Later on the Intifada 
spread outside the camps into towns and villages. Israeli patrols even 
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besieged the main government hospitals in the Gaza Strip, seizing wounded 
Palestinians from the wards and drooping tear gas from helicopters onto 
hospital buildings. 
The Intifada took both the PLO headquarters, in Tunis and the Israeli 
government by surprise. As for the PLO, they hurried to take charge of this 
spontaneous explosion of Palestinian resistance and turn it into a PLO-
directed civil resistance movement so that it would not fall into radical hands. 
In earlier days restless Palestinian youths had been motivated by the armed 
struggle but this was to be a civil movement. 
As for Israel, Yehuda Litani's observation gave a clear-cut picture of 
the government as follows: 
Since the politically paralyzed government cannot provide an 
answer (to the Intifada), the army and civil administration 
authorities will once again have to act. But their answer will 
provide a short-range solution, if any thing at alP^. 
He also commented: 
Even IDF officers admitted that their 'remedies' were short-term, 
and that continued 'disturbances' could be expected, probably 
the next on al-Fatah Day (January 1), commemorating the 
founding of the largest Palestinian guerrilla organization, led by 
Yasir Arafat. As long as the (Israeli) government does not 
provide the Palestinians with some answer, we are just 
dispensing aspirin, instead of serious treatment, Litani went on 
to say^^. 
Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres was deeply worried about the 
situation. On 6 October, 1987, just after the stabbing incident, he had 
proposed to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that the 
Gaza should be demilitarized but remain under Israeli supervision, and that 
thirteen Jewish settlements should be dismantled This should be part of 
eventual peace negotiations, not an immediate or unilateral move. Peres had 
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argued that Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip did not provide any security 
or benefit to Israel and they should be dismantled^^. The 2,000 Israeli settlers 
were much chagrined and angry. 
Shamir attacked Peres for the suggestion, calling him a "defeatist with 
a scalpel who wants to put Israel on the operating table so he can give away 
Gaza today, Judea and Samaria tomorrow, and the Golan Heights after 
that"^^ 
The Palestinians of Gaza interpreted Peres's statement as "a fruit of 
their acts of resistance". It also indicated that Israel could be forced to yield. 
It took about a month for an Israeli consensus to emerge, a consensus 
that the "disturbances" were not a flash in the ipan, a passing series of 
incidents that could be suppressed in routine • fashion by the normal 
complement of occupation forces. The consensus was that this was a 
spontaneous Uprising, politically inspired - an Uprising whose origins were 
within the territories, not abroad. Army commanders agreed with Defense 
Minister Rabin that a political rather than military resolution would have to be 
found. Still, they insisted, tough new measures would be necessary to 
maintain law and order and to keep the situation in hand, and larger doses of 
force would be required. This would necessitate more arrests, more 
expulsions, destruction of more homes belonging to "rioters", extended 
curfews, and rougher physical treatment of demonstrations. Unless the IDF 
could assert "complete control" of the (occupied) territories, it would not be 
possible to find a political solution, stated the IDF Chief of staff Dan 
Shomron^°. By early January 1988, the army had nearly doubled its forces in 
the West Bank and tripled them in the Gaza Strip. The area (Gaza) looked like 
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a war-zone, with armoured vehicles and tanks rolling over the barricades of 
stones and burning tires placed every few yards along the main high ways. 
Shomron acknowledged that there were more troops in the Gaza Strip alone 
than had been used to occupy all the territories in 1967. His officers began to 
worry that if the troop division continue for long, their best frontline units would 
be kept from training schedules and border duties "to play policeman to the 
population of the (occupied) territories".^^ 
Actors in the Intifada 
The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) 
In January and February of 1988 Abu Jihad (Khalil Wazir) quickly 
formed a nucleus of a leadership of the Intifada (UNLU). This leadership was 
drawn from former political prisoners and the representative of al-Fatah, the 
PFLP-GC, the PFLP, the PDFLP, the local communists, and the Islamic 
movement. The leaders of the UNLU operated in a clandestine manner, away 
from foreign media exposure and political visibility. Their style of leadership 
was managerial and organizational as they preoccupied themselves with the 
task of perpetuating the Intifada and expanding its scope. Their access to 
mass organizations, including workers unions, women's organizations, and 
youth groups and committees, facilitated their task^^. 
In line with the aim of Palestinian self-sufficiency, its first task was to 
form local "people's committee" in refugee camps, towns and villages to deal 
with food distributions, health, education, security and local affairs on a mutual 
self-help basis. Al-Fatah played the main part in appointing local leaders and 
controlling and co-coordinating the people's committees, which were the 
building blocks of the Intifada and ensured the PLO leaderships^. The UNLU 
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managed to transform the spontaneous demonstrations and strikes into 
organized ones and to introduce different forms of protest, including collective 
resignation by Palestinians working in the Israeli civil administration and the 
police force in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. .In their repeated public 
appeals, or calls, the leaders of the Intifada urged the local population td 
refuse to pay taxes to the Israeli authorities and to boycott Israeli products. 
Self-sufficiency and avoidance of the lethal weapons were also central in the 
tactics of the leaders of the Intifada.^'*. 
According to Daoud Kuttab, the UNLU became responsible for the 
major national decisions and for producing and distributing the periodic 
leaflets (bayanat) that directed the Intifada^^. 
Demonstrations and protest rallies were to be regulated, disciplined 
and mounted according to an ordered programme on specific places, with 
quiet intervals in between. Demonstrators would be permitted to throw stones 
and petrol bombs, to block roads and hinder Israeli security forces, but not to 
use firearms. 
It should be noticed that in the Gaza Strip, the left groups and Islamic 
Jihad, along with al-Fatah, comprised a regional unified leadership. In the 
area both the communists and the Islamists had more militant reputations for 
confronting the Israelis in the streets than their counterparts in the West Bank. 
"The impression was that the Islamists were going off on their own a bit in 
places where they were particularly strong, such, as Khan Yunis, calling 
demonstration and the like. On the West Bank the Islamist students seemed 
more diffuse and lacking cohesion and organizational competence".^^ 
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As a matter of fact, the structure of the UNLU was not publicly known 
or widely discussed, and secrecy had doubtless been one factor behind its 
success. The UNLU appeared to be located physically in the 
Jerusalem/Rannallah area, if several seizures of freshly printed leaflets were 
any indication. All that was known was that each of the four major 
organizations was represented. This was one reason the Israeli military 
regime had resorted to indiscriminate, mass arrests by adopting a tactic called 
"trolling" which could probably nab a few high-level cadres but clearly failed to 
put the UNLU out of business^^. 
Most important was that the Intifada transformed the interstate dispute 
between Arabs and Israelis into an international conflict between Israelis and 
Palestinians. Such a phenomenon was in the making since the mid-1980s. By 
seizing the initiative to promote the Palestinian cause. West Bank Gaza 
Palestinians put an end to the so-called Jordan option. Henceforth, Israel 
would have to deal directly with Palestinians, both those within the occupied 
territories and those living elsewhere. In any case, the West Bank and Gaza 
Palestinians would increasingly shape the direction of the PNM, but as a 
component of the PLO, not as an alternative to it. 
The PLO in the Context of the Intifada 
During the first few weeks, as has been seen, the Intifada was led by 
individuals inside the occupied territories without direction from or consultation 
with PLO chiefs abroad. The leadership in Tunis (after evacuating from 
Lebanon) was taken by surprise at the events, and it was a while before they 
became orientated to the new situation. After a few weeks, lines of 
communication were set up between directors of the Intifada in the territories 
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and PLO headquarters so that the two sets of leaders could co-ordinate their 
political statements and strategic planning. 
Contrary to the expectations of many outsiders, the PLO abroad did not 
take over management of the Intifada, nor did the leaders within the territories 
became mere agents subservient to the headquarters in Tunis. Rather, a 
partnership evolved in which the UNLU assumed a much more prominent role 
in the decision-making processes of the PLO. Since neither the PLO outside 
Palestine nor the UNLU within could veto the actions, statements, or plans of 
the other, the Palestinians in the occupied territories were now a political 
weight at least equal to those in the diaspora and to the PLO leadership. 
According to many observers, their importance as frontline combatants in the 
struggle for a Palestinian state gave them far more importance than 
Palestinians abroad and made their leadership more significant than the 
combined leadership of diverse factions outside the country^^. Thus, when 
Israel attempted to lop off the head of the Intifada by assassinating Abu Jihad 
on 16 April, 1988 in Tunis, it failed to undercut the UNLU^^. Instead, the 
assassination while an immediate blow to the PLO, only intensified the 
resentment and hostility of the Palestinian community at large and played into 
the hands of the most militant factions of the PLO the and UNLU. 
In retrospect, in early weeks of the Intifada, it was the UNLU, which 
took on the political leadership of the revolt. By most accounts it enjoyed the 
full as well as voluntary support and confidence of the vast majority of the 
Palestinians under occupation, and this was precisely because it was 
indistinguishable from the PLO^°. 
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In other words, there was a symbiotic relationship between the 
Palestinians of the occupied territories and the PLO. While th UNLU directed 
the mass revolt and received the required assistance from outside, the 
Executive Committee of the PLO took political decisions and made diplomatic 
moves at the international level with a view to achieving the shared goal of the 
two - "an end to the Israeli occupation"^^ Both were originally inter-related 
and complementary to each other. The relationship between the two was like 
relationship between the bedroom and the kitchen (Intifada) on the one hand 
and the drawing room (PLO in exile) on the other. While the UNLU was doing 
the domestic chores the PLO was talking to the quests in the drawing room. 
The Palestinian modus operandi became most obvious during the PNC 
session in Algiers in November 1988, when the "external branch" proclaimed 
statehood. - PLO behaving very much like a government -in-exile launching 
an international diplomatic offensive for recognition while the "internal branch" 
organized demonstrations in defiance of Israel's tightest security measures 
and prolonged curfews. A 20 year old young refugee put i t : "The Intifada has 
become the voice of the Palestinians people. The world can no longer remain 
deaf to it"^^. 
Islamic Jihad- Palestinian (UP) in the Context of the Intifada 
In February 1987, a border Israeli Policeman on duty at a police post 
on the Green line in the old city of Jerusalem was wounded by a grenade 
explosion. Responsibility was claimed by the "Islamic Jihad for the Liberation 
of Palestine", which seemed to be the first mention of this group in action 
against the Israelis^^. 
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On 7 March, 1988 a grenade was thrown at a border policeman in a 
village near Hebron, seven Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces 
in the clashes that followed. This incident was unusual in that weapons such 
as guns and grenades had hardly been used by Palestinians during the 
Intifada as Arafat wanted to conform to the sloganof "stones against guns". 
Islamic Jihad - (Palestinian) (so designated to differentiate it from the high 
profile Islamic Jihad - operating in Lebanon) was the suspect in this one ^^. 
The year 1980 is considered to be the official date of the founding of 
the Islamic Jihad-Palestinian (UP). The founders of this movement were two 
men from the Gaza Strip, Fathi al-Shaqaqi and abdui 'Aziz Auda. Al-Shaqaqi 
is one of the IJP's thinkers, while 'Auda is the movement's spiritual leader. 
Another leader of the UP is Ahmad Mahanna, a former officer in the PLF. 
Most of the UP leadership and membership are religious Islamic militants who 
do not hesitate to carry out actions that they know in advance are 
dangerous^^. 
Khalid al-Ju'aidi, a jihad member who took part in killing two Israelis, 
said during his triail: "We the members of the Islamic Jihad movement, show 
more interest in death than we do in life. We shall either liberate our land or 
die bravely in the attempt"^^. 
Ideology of the UP was derived from the Islamic tradition in general. 
The movement considers three Islamic figures worthy of emulation. They are 
Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Izzaddin al-Qassam, in addition to the 
Ayatallah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Al-Qassam is 
the main source of inspiration for the movement. 
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The UP theoreticians believed that the danger lies not only in its 
occupation of Palestine, which is part of "Dar al-lslam" (House of Islam), and 
the humiliation of its people, but also in the spread of Jewish corruption in it. 
Israel is a central part of a plan to fragment the Islamic Umma, to westernize 
it, to subjugate it, to paralyze its will, and to cast an eternal yoke over its neck 
- the planners wanted Israel to be a military power from which the (Arab) 
governments of partition will recoil and will wish to have a truce with, so these 
governments would surrender leadership to America to avoid Israel's evil -
until this surrender brings subordination and even leads to implement the 
plans of the East and West in fighting Islam and the Muslims^^. But the UP 
concludes that Israel is condemned to destruction and that it was born to be 
annihilated^®. The movement agrees with Khomeini that the Islamic states, 
and all the Muslims in general, must "eliminate the elements of corruption, 
Israel"^^ 
Israel regarded the UP as potentially dangerous, suspecting it had links 
with the Islamic Jihad in Lebanon and that it was in receipt of Iranian money 
and arms. 
During the course of the Intifada so far the UP had generally refrained 
from "acts of guerrilla attacks", and was seemingly content to abide by the 
instructions provided in the UNLU's leaflets. However, on March 1988 two 
leaflets appeared in the Gaza Strip - one signed by the UNLU as usual, the 
other by the UP-giving contradictory opinions regarding a demonstration. The 
quarrel emerged because of difference in tactics used during the Intifada 
against Israel between the UP and the Palestinian moderates (PLO), 
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The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) in the Context of the Intifada 
One of the Palestinian organizations to enter the Palestinian revolution 
- outside the PLO framework is HAMAS, which was born out of the Intifada. 
Following negotiations with Mujama's Muslim Brotherhood counterparts in the 
West Bank, HAMAS was established in the late February 1988 by Sheikh 
Ahmad Yassin and his closest Mujama associates such as Ismail Abu 
Shanab, Ibrahim Yazouri, Dr. Abdul Aziz and Dr. Mahmoud Zahar'*". 
The emergence of HAMAS marked the beginning of the true political 
revival of the Islamic forces in the face of Israeli occupation on the one hand, 
and the national secular forces led by the PLO on the other. 
For a long time. Islamic militants were dominated by the Muslim 
Brotherhood - Ikhwan al-Muslimin - the only organization of its kind which 
had its roots in Egypt. According to its teaching, liberation from occupation will 
happen only when the people have true Muslims and God, the Almighty, will 
then help the committed Muslims to rid themselves of foreign or secular rule 
and establish an Islamic state'*\ The Muslim Brotherhood had shied away 
from active resistance against the Israeli occupation. That was the reason 
why it could not emerge as a popular Palestinian organization'*^. 
The situation underwent cataclysmic change with the outbreak of the 
Intifada. For the first time Brotherhood played an active role in the resistance. 
This was done through HAMAS, the organization it created from its own ranks 
especially for that purpose '*^ . 
HAMAS soon overshadowed its parent organization, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and became a dominant political organization in the occupied 
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territories, especially in the Gaza Strip with a magnitude that parallels that of 
al-Fatah. 
The first period of HAMAS activity in the Intifada was characterized by 
reaction to the immediate situation rather than the initiation of anti -
occupation policies and an attempt at a national leadership role. HAMAS had 
to catch up with the nationalists (UNLU) and the UP. In its fourth leaflets, for 
example, it called all the Palestinian people to rally together under the banner 
of Islam to end the occupation: 
At this time the Islamic uprising has been intensified in the 
occupied territories. In all the villages, all the refugee camps, our 
martyrs have fallen - But they have died in the name of God and 
their cries are those of victory - In the name of God, God is 
Great, the hour of Khayber has arrived. Death to the 
occupation'*''. 
It should be noted that by the sixth month of the Intifada, HAMAS was 
still shadowing the initiatives of UNLU, making the similar appeals, calls and 
demands through its communiques. However, the language in which HAMAS 
cloaked such calls was purely Islamic and designed ta strengthen the myth of 
the Islamic nature of the Intifada. 
For sometimes after the Intifada began HAMAS seemed quietly to 
follow the instructions laid down in the UNLU's leaflets, but in August 1988, it 
issued a lengthy covenant. Among other things the covenant declared a Jihad 
(holy war) against Israel, stating that the objective was to form an Islamic 
state in Palestine by means of the armed struggle, and commenting that "all 
initiatives, conferences and other proposals are a waste of times""*^ This 
covenant was designed to coincide with HAMAS original - view of the Intiftada 
as a way to mobilize the masses to form the jeel Jihadi (holy war generation), 
and at one time as one form of jihad, as an introduction to armed jihad"*^. 
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HAMAS joined in the "leaflet war" and issued a leaflet calling for a 
general strike on 25 August, in contradiction to one issued by the UNLU. 
HAMAS' main success was in the Gaza Strip, where it soon became second 
only in strength and influence to al-Fatah^^. 
HAMAS's aggressive attitude, coming as it did when other PRM groups 
seemed to have become apathetic, attracted many young recruits to its 
banner. Israel tried to arrest and suppress HAMAS activists. In addition, 
HAMAS had provided Israeli propaganda with two levers: (1) that there was a 
deep split in the UNLU, and (2) that Islamic militancy was on the increase. 
The programme of activities publicly espoused by HAMAS from August 
1988 on largely paralleled that of the UNLU, though with some significant 
differences. Like the UNLU, HAMAS laid out periodic timetable for its own 
strike days. After some early resistance in some West Bank communities to 
following HAMAS strike calls, the West Bankers - Christians as well as 
Muslims - all apparently joined the Gazans in observing both sets of strike 
days, though some analysts of the local scene cautioned that this should be 
interpreted more as signaling support for the idea of confronting Israel 
whenever possible, rather than as a measure of support for the Brotherhood 
as such. On some issues, HAMAS's programme was markedly different from 
the UNLU's. for example, after the military administration in the West Bank 
decreed the reopening of the schools in July 1989, the UNLU consensus at 
first called on school students to observe the schedule of general strike days, 
but HAMAS argued that the children had lost so much education that they 
should be exempted from the strikes. HAMAS was able to win the internal 
argument over this issue"* .^ 
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The HAMAS of Sheikh Yasin had nevertheless moved a considerable 
distance from the long-held positions of the Brotherhood. This was evident at 
the level of its political programme - a marked softening in its view of the 
PLO's secular-nationalist leadership. In a crucial interview, Yasin said that he 
wanted to see the establishment of Palestinian state and that this state "must 
be established on every inch of Palestine that we liberate, but without 
relinquishing our other rights". Asked if he supported the political steps taken 
by the PLO in late 1988, by which it announced its support for the partition of 
historic Palestine into Jewish and Arab States and its recognition of Israel, 
Yasin said, "I support and I oppose. I approve of the establishment of a state, 
but I refuse to relinquish the remaining territory of my homeland, Palestine". 
He also stressed that HAMAS "will not negotiate as a substitute for the 
p|_0"49 
HAMAS could thus be seen to have moved significantly closer to the 
mainstream PLO position at the political level. Yasin's late-April interview was 
particularly significant, since at the time he gave it the Israelis were putting the 
finishing touches to the elections proposal Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
announced in the middle of May 1989. The elections plan was aimed 
precisely at encouraging the emergence of a Palestinian leadership based in 
the occupied areas that would replace, rather than work with the PLO in any 
negotiations. Yasin's refusal to play that role constituted one of the most 
important political victories that the PLO leaders won in 1989. 
In May, Yasin was arrested, and the Israeli authorities for the first time 
declared that HAMAS was "a terrorist organization". Over the following 
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months, he was charged with having caused the deaths of two Israeli soldiers 
and four Gazans accused of collabourating with the occupation^". 
The Israeli Government's Response to the Intifdcla 
Of all the aspects of the Intifada, it is undoubtedly the government 
response that is best known. Since Israel is an open society, it has been 
unable to prevent an avalanche of information about Israeli policies and 
actions, despite efforts to restrict and censor the media. Moreover, both 
civilian and military critics with Israel have been bashful when it comes to their 
thinking about the Intifada. 
Israel had relied on a combination of political, economic, and military 
measures to quell the Intifada. Politically, it sought to identify West Bank and 
Gaza leaders who might be willing to ignore the PLO and negotiate with 
Israel. This effort failed for two reasons. First, the PLO retained strong support 
in the territories and had warned of and carried out reprisals against those 
suspected of independent political dealings with Israel. Second, there were 
anticipated gains commensurate with the risks of separate discussion with 
Israel because the Likud had ruled out any territorial concessions in advance. 
Basically, there was a deep chasm between the likud's aim of permanent 
retention of the occupied territories and the widespread support for an 
independent state among inhabitants of the territories^^ 
Since Israel was unable to placate the Palestinians on the political 
level, it had resorted to harsh punitive measures to contain the Intifada. In 
other words, the uprising exposed the Israeli army's excessive use of military 
force against an unarmed civilian population^^. These have included curfews, 
detentions without trail, destruction of homes, mass arrests, beatings, and 
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various forms of economic punishment. While the first four measurers were 
used in the past with some success (i.e., in the late 1960s and early 1970s), 
reliance on them during the Intifada has been much greater and frequently 
indiscriminate. The violent excesses are well known to all those who follow 
foreign affairs and have met with sharp criticism inside and outside of Israel. 
Growing numbers of officers and men of the IDF have been among the 
internal critics. Not only have they voiced concern about increased Palestinian 
animosity towards Israel as a result of excessive violence, but they also worry 
about the long impact on the moral fiber of the IDF and the Jewish population. 
Equally troubling was the increased international criticism of Israel and 
sympathy for the PLO. The Israelis did not have to look to the experiences of 
the others (e.g., the British in Northern Ireland in the seventies, and the Sri 
Lankan and Peruvian military policies in recent years) to learn the painful 
lesson that violent excesses intensify hatred and create support for 
opponents^^. 
Economic and Political Impact of the Intifada on Israel 
The Intifada has had various effects on the landscape of the West Asia. 
Most public attention has been on the periodic riots and Israeli efforts at 
suppressing the disturbances. There has been little attention paid to the 
economic consequences of the Intifada, in part because these are more 
difficult to measure. The Intifada has placed real.economic costs on both 
Israelis and Palestinians, and these costs lend another dimension to 
discussions concerning any settlement in the region. 
In other words, the struggle against the Israeli occupation has 
essentially been a political conflict with important economic, social and 
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cultural aspects. It Is not an economic, social and cultural aspects. Strikes, 
boycotts, and refusal to pay taxes - these are primarily political tactics to 
mobilize as many people as possible into the struggle against the occupation. 
But the results have indeed transformed the occupation into an economic loss 
and burden for Israel in addition to the moral and political costs worldwide, 
which have already produced considerable criticism-within Israel itself. 
The economic costs of the Intifada to Israeli economy were estimated 
to be over a billion dollars annually^'*. These costs are concentrated in certain 
sectors in the economies of Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. During its 
first two years, the Intifada has probably cost the Israeli economy 2-2.5 
percent of its Gross Domestic Product^^ 
The economic consequences of the Intifada have been unevenly 
distributed among the various parties. Within the Israeli economy the costs 
have been concentrated in construction, agriculture, tourism and the labour 
market. Israeli military expenditures during years of the Intifada were also very 
important because they reflected the escalating level of the uprising. These 
broader effects have been over shadowed by a longer-term adjustment to 
stabilization efforts in the Israeli economy. Most of the effects of the Intifada 
were felt at the outset in 1988. in contrast, the economic consequences of the 
disturbances on the economies of the West Bank and Gaza appeared to be 
increasing as the Intifada continued. 
It should be noted that one of the greatest handicaps in estimating the 
economic costs of the Intifada is the lack of quality statistics measuring 
economic activity in the West Bank and Gaza. It is due to the Palestinian 
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boycott of Israel and security concerns that few economic data on Palestinian 
activities since December 1987 are available. 
Economic Impacts of the Intifada on the Israeli Economy 
(a). Agriculture 
For Israeli agriculture, 1988 was not a good year. To begin with, the 
sector continued to feel aftershocks from the near collapse and continued 
financial woes of many kibbutzim and Moshavirn over the preceding few 
years. Many of these operations remained constrained by their outstanding 
debts and had little cash on hand to make the necessary improvements in 
equipment. Adverse weather conditions during the crucial planting season 
also had a negative effect on agricultural output in 1988. Finally, a nine 
percent drop in agricultural employment between 1987 and 1988 was due in 
large part to a decline in Palestinian employment. In 1987 Palestinians 
accounted for 45 percent of paid employees in agriculture^^. 
The Intifada presented Israeli farmers with several problems. First, they 
had to secure their fields and equipment from vandalism and fires. Second, 
assuming that their crops were not destroyed by weather or fire, they had to 
find workers to pick their produce. Unannounced and erratic work stoppages 
gave farmers little time to find alternative means to pick produce before it 
spoiled. Finally, once the product was picked and marketed, there was a 
reduction in the share of output exported, due in part to international 
conditions, which in turn reduced the farmers' income from exports. 
Two examples of downward trends in agriculture can be presented as 
follows: (1) Citrus production following the outbreak of the Intifada dropped 
rather significantly during critical months in 1988 and 1989; (2) Vegetable 
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production in 1988 and 1989, was also lower than its 1987 level, though it 
does not appear to have experienced the same magnitude of decline^''. 
(b). Construction 
It is clear that the construction sector has been in long-run decline 
since 1975. It is due in part to general growth and investment conditions over 
the period, as well as the inability of the Israeli financial market to support this 
sector properly. 
Another trend in this sector has been the increasing dependence on 
Palestinian workers from the West Bank and Gaza. While the inflow of a 
cheaper and more flexible work force from the occupied territories has helped 
ease the downward trend in construction, the dependence on Palestinian 
workers was questioned at the outset of the Intifada^^. According to the 
Ministry of Industry, in the first three months of 1988, industrial production 
dropped by 3.5 percent, and over 70 percent of the decrease (2.5 percent) 
was related to the "disturbances" in the occupied territories - work absences 
and loss of sales^^. The loss of production in the construction sector caused 
mainly by the absence of Palestinian workers - is estimated at 16 million 
dollars monthly, equivalent to 8 percent of the economic activity in this 
sector®°. Before the Uprising, approximately 40,000 - 50,000 Palestinians, 70 
percent from Gaza, were working in the Israeli construction sector^V 
In the first few months of 1988, when absenteeism was reported at 
almost 50 percent of the Palestinian work force, it was unclear how the 
construction on sector would adjust^^. By raising the total number of both 
Israeli and Palestinian workers, builders and contractors were able to 
overcome the effects of sporadic work stoppages. As a result, the Palestinian 
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share of labour input into the Israeli construction industry remained constant 
between 1986 and 1988". 
(c). Tourism 
Tourism appears to be the one sector in which the effects of the 
Intifada are relatively unambiguous and pronounced. Tourism is important to 
Israel for many reasons. First and foremost, Israel depends on it as its most 
important source of hard currency income, which is crucial in helping Israel, 
offset its international financial obligations, like interest on outstanding foreign 
debts. Beyond balancing its service account, Israel must also attract foreign 
currency to help finance its dependence on imported materials and capital 
goods. Income from tourism had been increasing in importance relative to 
Israel's international income from all service transactions. This trend stopped 
between 1987 and 1988, as foreign currency income from tourism fell from 28 
percent to 26 percent of total services income^''. 
This is not the first time that Israel has experienced a slowdown in 
tourism. Tourism arrivals in Israel fell sharply between 1981 and 1982, 
primarily because of the Lebanon war, and again in 1986, following several 
PRM attacks on tourists in Europe and the Mediterranean region. In 1987 
tourism reached its historical peak, approximately 1-4 million people. This 
upswing may have been due to postponed visits scheduled in 1986, 
international economic conditions, and Israel's strong economic recovery 
since 1986". 
A significant drop in tourists entering Israel occurred between February 
and May 1988. This decline was particularly worrisome in the eyes of the 
Israeli government, as it occurred precisely as the government was preparing 
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to celebrate the country's fortieth anniversary. The. government had hoped 
that a gala celebration would help attract tourists and hard currency, as well 
as help stimulate the economy. These dreams were not realized, and the 
Intifada seems to have been the primary cause^^. 
It is evident that through March 1988, tourist reservations registered a 
drop of only 4 percent because reservations had been booked before the 
uprising. In April, Jerusalem Hotel reservations were down 40 percent 
compared with the previous year. The Ministries of Finance and Tourism in 
August 1988 set up a special team, which allocated $ 2.2 million for publicity 
and marketing and postponed all payments due to the government from hotel 
owners. For all of 1988 the decline in reservations compared to 1987 was 
expected to total 15 percent - a direct loss of $ 110-150 million to the hotel 
industry alone. The comprehensive loss to the tourist industry in 1988 was as 
high as $500 million^^ 
(d). Military Expenditures 
Following the military pullout from Lebanon and the implementation of 
economic stabilization efforts in 1985, there was a slowdown in the growth of 
total Israeli military expenditures, and even declines in some areas. This trend 
has been affected by the outbreak of disturbances in the occupied territories. 
There is no doubt that military expenditures are the most important 
because they also, as has been said, reflect the escalating level of the 
Intifada. In March 1988, Finance Minister Moshe NIssim said that the Ministry 
of Defence had asked for a budgetary supplement for the construction of 600 
new police and border police posts in the territories. Three months later, the 
army requested an additional $ 450 million to cover the expenses of its 
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activities in the territories. Reserve service was increased from forty five to 
sixty days per year, at an estimated cost of $ 100-200 million. Four months 
after the Intifada began, the army had increased the number of troops in the 
territories by up to five times^^. 
(e). The Labour Market 
Probably the most significant direct effect that the Intifada has had on 
the Israeli economy has been experienced in the labour market. Prior to the 
outbreak of the disturbances, the number of Palestinians from the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip working in Israel had been steadily increasing, reaching 
approximately 110, 000 in 1987. This inflow of predominantly low skilled and 
low wageworkers had enabled the economy to continue growing, albeit 
moderately, in spite of rising domestic labour costs^^. 
During the first half of 1988, when the meniber of hours Palestinian 
worked in Israel fell by approximately one-third, Israeli unemployment 
remained relatively unchanged and real wages continued to rise. These 
trends suggest that Israelis did not immediately begin replacing Palestinian 
workers from the administered territories with the onset of the boycott. 
There are reports that individual business concerns have brought 
foreign workers into Israel to perform jobs held by Palestinian workers prior to 
the outbreak of the Intifad. Since there is no official approval of such action, it 
is difficult to get accurate statistics concerning the member of temporary 
workers and in which industries they are employed. There are estimates that 
as many as 15, 000 workers have been brought from places like Portugal and 
Turkey. These workers are predominantly employed in Labour intensive 
industries, including textiles and footwear. There is also evidence that firms 
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have been recruiting craft workers from abroad for such activities as book 
publishing^". 
The Economic Consequences of the Intifada-on the West Banl< and 
Gaza Strip 
In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, several economic actions were 
central to the Intifada's initial design. On general strike days all commercial 
activity in the two occupied areas was closed and Palestinians refused to 
show up for work in Israel. The Israeli army initially responded by trying to 
force Palestinians to open their shops, in the hope that normal economic 
activity would restore stability to the areas. This policy was not effective and 
was soon stopped. 
There are no statistics on commercial activity within the West Bank and 
Gaza. Given their sizes and importance, Israeli exports to the territories, 
which in 1987 accounted for 60 percent of their GDP, can be used as a proxy 
to measure the effect of commercial strikes in the occupied territories. Israeli 
exports to the West Bank and Gaza Strip fell by 30 percent, or $ 278 million 
between 1987 and 1988, and there appeared to be little recovery in 1989. 
This decline in sales is a result of a drop in Palestinian income and their 
boycott of Israeli products^\ 
Palestinians boycotted Israeli product whenever an alternative local 
product was available and tended to buy only necessities. Demand for fresh 
beef dropped by 70 percent, creating a crisis for Israeli ranchers, because 
Arabs were the main consumers of fresh (as opposed to imported, frozen) 
meat. In response, the army considered providing troops with fresh meat 
instead of the frozen meat they usually consumed. Dubek cigarette company 
sales decreased by 16 percent. By May 1988, the purchasing power of Arab 
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residents of the territories had decreased by 35 percent due to diminished 
income and the boycott of Israeli products^^. 
Initially it was reported that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza 
were being financially supported by the PLO and other organizations outside 
of Israel, although the sums reported seemed modest''^. In an effort to restrict 
outside financing of the Intifada, the Israeli government reduced the amount of 
money per trip that individuals could bring into the West Bank from Jordan 
from 2,000 Jordanian Dinars to only 400 Dinars, or approximately $650 at 
current exchange rates^"*. The real effect of these controls was greater since 
the value of the Jordanian Dinar fell by about 50 percent between 1987 and 
1988. Prior to the outbreak of the Intifada, over one-fourth of the income of the 
West Bank originated in Jordan or from Palestinians working in Israel. The 
reduction in the number of Palestinians working in Israel and the tighter limits 
on foreign currency brought in from Jordan, as well as the fall in the Dinar's 
value , together placed severe pressure on the West Bank's economy. As a 
result, the business community placed demands on the Intifada's organizers, 
and by mid-1988 commercial strikes were shortened "and Palestinians were 
permitted to open their shops for several hours each day. 
On July 21, 1988, Jordan's King Hussein announced that Jordan was 
canceling a $ 1.3 billion development plan which was under way for the West 
Bank and that Jordan would cease payments to 20,000 civil servants, health 
care employees, and teachers in the West Bank. Untill this announcement 
Jordan contributed $ 60 million annually for West- Bank administration and 
economic development. Most economists suggested that King Hussein took 
these actions in order to give the PLO more control in the West Bank, but 
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these steps also served to increase economic pressure on the population in 
the occupied territories^^. 
As the Intifada continued, the economic consequences for the 
Palestinians intensified. Realizing this, the local leadership began relaxing 
various aspects of the economic boycott. Strikes had become more sporadic, 
and Palestinians returned to work in Israel. Changes in Israel's policies 
tended to keep economic pressure on the Palestinians in the occupied 
territories. The introduction of ID cards, reduced border crossings, and military 
- imposed curfews made it harder for the Palestinians to travel to Israel for 
work. 
There has been no official or semi-official estimate of the impact of the 
Intifada on tax collection. Tax payment dropped in response to the political 
call to refrain from paying taxes and because diminished income reduced 
people's capacity to pay them. The Israeli civil administration announced it 
would reduce its service paid for by the Palestinian taxpayer - because of the 
decreased in tax collection^^. 
Impacts of the Intifada on Israeli Politics 
The Intifada generated political debate and party frication (within Israeli 
politics), manifestations of public dissatisfaction and media criticism, as well 
as opposing political pressures on the government and the army from the 
radical right and radical left. The uprising has also stripped away the credibility 
of Israel's external propaganda and its internal ideological defense 
mechanism, as political rationality has steadily retreated before the state's 
frantic response to the anticolonial revolt in the occupied territories. This has 
led to a polarization which has penetrated all of Israel's political parties, burst 
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the existing boundaries of the national political consensus and raised the real 
questions facing Israeli society. As the Intifada continued, the cleavages in 
Israeli society became deeper over two basic issues: negotiations with PLO 
and recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination, including the 
establishment of a state. This made the Palestine question the primary 
agenda item for the first time ever in an Israeli electoral campaign in 1988. 
During the course of 1988 some groups in Likud moved closer to 
Tehiya (Renaissance) and others to the right wing of Labour. Similarly, some 
groups in Labour moved closer to Mapam (the United Workers' Party, 
formerly Labour's junior partner in the Alignment) and the Citizens' Right 
Movement (CRM), others to the Likud. This polarization within each block 
created a new centre in the Israeli political structure comprising groups from 
both the Likud and Labour who oppose negotiations with the PLO and a 
Palestinian State but also refuse to annex the occupied territories. This is the 
political foundation of the "national unity" government. 
(a). Political Convergence 
Ariel Sharon articulated the programme of this new center in March 
1988, when the Labour Party began to speak of "American pressure" in the 
form of the Shultz initiative. Sharon drew a line which, he said, no amount of 
US government pressure could breach. According to Sharon, the Likud and 
Labour agreed on the most important points concerning the future of the 
occupied territories: (1) United Jerusalem is the eterrial capital of Israel; (2) 
The Jordan River will remain forever Israel's eastern border; (3) No non-Israeli 
military force will be allowed to enter the West Bank of the Jordan River; (4) 
Israel is responsible for the internal and external security of the land to the 
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West of the Jordan; (5) There will be no foreign sovereignty in "Judea, 
Samaria and the Gaza Strip; (6) There will be no Palestinian state west of 
Jordan; (7) Settling the refugee problem should be part of any solution; (8) 
The Golan Heights are an integral part of Israel; (9) the Arabs of the occupied 
territories should maintain their present nationality. and should be given 
relatively broad authority to administer their internal affairs without 
interference^^. 
The election campaign saw some convergence of Likud elements and 
Labour Party hawks. Thus, during discussions between Labour and Likud 
branches in Jerusalem, Labour supported annexing the satellite settlements 
around Jerusalem, while the Likud rejected this on the grounds that the time 
was not ripe. At the start of the electoral campaign, Sharon, who appears to 
be the most hostile towards Labour, proposed annexing parts of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the Allon Plan, using the 
demographic threat argument favoured by Labour. Rabin responded that 
Sharon's distinction between important and unimportant occupied areas 
brought him very close to Labour's thinking^^ 
It must be kept in mind that Labour's majority position recognized the 
Palestinians aspirations for self-determination but not their exclusive right to 
determine its scope and form. It considered the Intifada as illegitimate and a 
threat to Israel's security and advocated essentially a strategy of containment, 
maintaining that in the final analysis there was only a political solution to the 
Intifada. On one hand, Israel could not afford to lose this violent confrontation 
in order to save the option of a negotiated settlement; on the other hand, 
putting down the Intifada by the use of excessive force would not solve 
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anything but further alienate the Palestinian population and isolate Israel in 
the world^®. By contrast, the Likud mainstream position emphatically rejected 
the legitimacy of the Intifada and viewed it in the context of the continued 
Palestinians struggle against Israel. It did recognized, however, the rights of 
the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to some measure of 
autonomy within the framework of the Camp David agreement. At first, both 
Shamir and Moshe Arens (who were leading the Likud) had reservations 
about the Camp David agreement and did not vote for its approval by the 
Knesset (1979). Nevertheless, upon gaining position of responsibility in 
government , they made the concept of autonomy and the Camp David 
agreement the cornerstone of the official policy of their government®°. 
The re-composition that has drawn together fractions from Likud and 
Labour to form this new centre has driven others from Labour to the Zionist 
left and from the Likud to the extreme right. The new right, thus, became the 
second bloc in Israeli politics after the Intifada. It consists of groups from the 
Likud Mafdal the National Religious party (NRP), Tzomet (Crossroad, which 
called for the "transfer" of the Palestinians), Moledet (Homeland) and, finally, 
Tehiya - the classic Greater Israel party with both religious and secular 
elements. They all fevoured the annexation of the occupation territories and 
referred to Jordan as the Palestinians state. They also rejected the Camp 
David autonomy plan and wanted to harden living conditions in the territories 
until the Palestinian would leave. These groups included the settlers' lobby, 
and led the Likud to insist upon and obtain a provision in the coalition accords 
for the establishment of forty new settlements in the following four years in the 
occupied territories. The new right wing circles disagreed with Rabin on the 
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impossibility of totally eliminating the Uprising. Their message was simple: the 
Intifada could be totally crushed, and life must be made more difficult for the 
Palestinians, that is, the policy should be more convincing to them that they 
should leave®\ 
The new Zionist left is the third bloc including groups from Labour, 
Mapam (the United Workers) and Ratz [the Citizens' Rights Movement 
(CRM)]. They were ready to negotiate with the PLO under certain conditions, 
accept Israeli withdrawal from most of the occupied territories and recognize 
the principle of Partition. 
A fourth political bloc, the non-Zionist ultra-orthodox parties (Agudat 
Yisrael, Shas and Degel Hatorah), put political issues as a third or fourth 
priority, this resulted in a flexible position on the territories which currently 
reflected the prevailing right-wing atmosphere. 
The fifth bloc in Israeli politics is composed of the non-Zionist left 
parties - the Communist Party and the Progressive List for Peace. Before the 
Intifada, these parties were the only parties that called for a two-state solution 
and for recognition of the PLO. Under the impetus of the Uprising, Ratz and 
Mapam moved dose to this position. Only since December 1988 can it be 
said that there was a significant left-Zionist camp that called for the 
establishment of a Palestinian State. 
The Uprising's impact on the Israeli protest movement was more rapid 
and intense than in the case of the political parties. Some of them such as 
Peace Now (shalom Akhshav) emerged after Sadat' visit to Jerusalem in 
1977, among reserve officers of the Israeli army while dozens of others came 
into existence after the outbreak of the Intifada. Most of them were local or 
208 
confined to specific professions: university professors, students, lawyers, 
psychologists, soldiers, and so on. Their activities were confined principally to 
the big cities of Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa. Their constituency is middle 
class and intellectual, and many of their members are active in more than one 
group. Their function is to force the Israel public to face up to the Palestinian 
issue and attempt to create a new national consensus, which is a very difficult 
task. 
The programme of these groups goes from the adoption of a clear 
political line (as in the case of Stop the Occupation, a coalition of left groups 
calling for negotiations with the PLO and a two-State solution, or Ad kan, a 
movement of Tel Aviv university professors seeking the same end) ^^  to a 
general activist approach concentrating on a specific issue, such as human 
rights violations in the occupied territories, to call for specific actions [as in the 
case of Yesh Gvul (There is a Limit), which promoted the refusal to serve with 
the army in the occupied territories]. The activities of these groups, during the 
Intifada, took the form of information campaigns, protest actions, the 
circulation of petitions, demonstrations, and specific solidarity actions after 
particularly harsh measures had been taken against a village or refugee 
camp. 
(b). Security and Anxiety 
The Intifada has sparked an unprecedented.debate over the strategic 
importance of the occupied territories for Israel. Hundreds of high-ranking 
officers have contributed to this discussion through dozens of interviews and 
symposia. Military arguments were widely used in the election campaign by 
two major parties. One group of senior officers believed the occupied 
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territories would be the most important strategic defense factor for Israel in a 
coming war and should be kept under Israeli controleven if this would prevent 
peace. In any case, peace with the Arab world was not on the agenda, and 
Israel should adopt Henry Kissinger's notion that no-war arrangements are 
better than peace agreements. This doctrine was best articulated by 
Yehoshua Sagi, former head of military intelligence. 
A second group would give up most of the occupied territories with 
certain security arrangements (observation points, disarmament etc.). 
Proponents of this view advocated a wide range of political positions, from 
autonomy to confederation with Jordan. It was best presented by former chief 
of staff Mota Gur, Uri Or, former commander of the central region, and 
Avraham Ben Gal, former commander of the northern region, all were 
supporters of Labour, as were high-ranking officers. 
A third group of officers regarded the occupied territories as a burden, 
which threatened internal security and increased the likelihood of a future war. 
They called for negotiations with the PLO and did not object to the 
establishment of a Palestinian state if that was the only solution. They were 
best presented by Yehoshafat Harkabi.^^ Organizations like the Labour-
leaning Committee for Peace and Security, which includes more than 130 
senior officers, were careful not to cross the line from the second to the third 
positions. 
The prevalence of national security discourse in Israeli political culture 
confused the analytical categories of the protest movement and those of the 
military establishment. This hindered the development of the protest 
movement because peace groups expended great energy trying to prove their 
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patriotism at the expense of effective opposition to atrocities in the occupied 
territories. Peace Now wasted a lot of time contributing to the security 
discussion within the Labour Party. On since November 23, 1988, after a year 
of the Intifada and much criticism of its supporters, has Peace Now called for 
negotiations with the PLO. Militant organizations like Stop the Occupation, 
Yesh Guvul, Women in Black, Women for Political Prisoners and other 
movements in solidarity with the Palestinian struggle did not employ the 
security discourse®'*. 
The Intifada has highlighted the failure of Israeli democracy when it 
clashed with the national question. This is evident in the closure of the 
newspaper Derech Hanitzotze and Tariq al-Sharara, imprisonment of those 
who refused to serve in the occupied territories for reasons of conscience, 
confiscations of foreign reporters' press credentials, restrictions on radio and 
television reports and politicization of the judicial system. Anti-democratic 
norms common in the occupied territories have been transposed to Israel. 
This together with all harsh measures used to crush the Palestinians led to a 
psychological problem spreading throughout the Israeli society in the form of 
anxiety. 
Declaration of Palestinian State (November 1988) in the Midst of 
the Intifada 
The eruption of the Intifada had engendered major changes in 
international politics relating to the West Asia and to the Palestinian future. 
The PLO, moribund on the eve of the Uprising, took on new life, inspired if not 
forced by the initiatives coming from the occupied territories to alter its 
hesitant posture towards peace with Israel. Arafat, through his deputy Bassam 
al-Sharif, presented a position paper at the Arab League Emergency Summit 
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that met in Algiers in June 1988 to consider tine Uprising. In it, he called for 
mutual recognition of the rights of Palestinians as well as Israelis to peace 
and security. Sharifs paper argued that the PLO's "raison d'etre is not the 
undoing of Israel but the salvation of the Palestinian people and their rights, 
including their right to democratic self-expression and national self-
determination".^^ The paper generated a muted response. The League did call 
for an international conference to reach a settlement but League members 
refused to contribute a fund to support the Intifada and to sustain workers who 
had lost jobs. 
Despite the tensions between Arafat and Arab heads of state, those 
leaders with close ties to the US worked to restore contacts with the PLO 
leader and to encourage a dialogue between him and Washington. Husni 
Mubarak of Egypt was particularly instrumental in establishing a 
rapprochement between Arafat and Jordan's King Hussein in October. In 
November, at a meeting of the PNC in Algiers, The PLO proclaimed the 
existence of "the State of Palestine, with Jerusalem as its capital". In addition, 
the PNC announced its readiness to negotiate with Israel on the basis of 
resolutions 242 and 338 under the aegis of an international conference, with 
the condition that mutual recognition occur, that Israel recognize Palestinian 
rights also^^ 
This is the second of the three implicit moves that the PLO had done 
up to the end of 1988 towards coexistence and recognition of Israel. The first 
was the twelfth PNC resolution (July 1974), "establish a Palestinian national 
authority in any liberated area from Israel" - the so-called "mini-state option". 
The third move was made in December 1988 when Arafat declared in Geneva 
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that the PLO recognized the rights of all parties concerned in the West Asian 
Conflict, including the State of Palestine, Israel and-other neighbours, to exist 
in peace and security; denounced "militant operations", and accepted UN 
resolution 181.^'' Later at the UN General Assembly on 13 December, Arafat 
presented a three-point peace initiative: (1) The establishment of an 
international peace conference under UN auspice; (2) a UN peacekeeping 
force to supervise Israeli's withdrawal from the occupied territories; and (3) a 
comprehensive peace settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338. He also 
stated that "I as Chairman of the PLO, hereby declare once more that I 
condemn terrorism in all its forms''^ ®. 
It is clear that a strong impetus to these decisions was provided by the 
eruption of the Intifada. This popular Uprising did more to redeem Palestinian 
dignity and self-esteem than two and a half decades of PRM actions. 
Frustrated with the longstanding negligence and manipulation of their cause 
by Arabs and Israelis alike, the Palestinians in the occupied territories proved 
capable of becoming self-reliant and rebuffing the Israeli occupation in a 
fashion they had never done before. This, in turn, brought the Palestinian 
problem to the fore of the Arab-Israeli conflict and enabled Arafat to overcome 
his hard-line opponents within the PLO. With the Palestinians in the occupied 
territories anxious to see progress on the diplomatic front that would make 
their sacrifice worthwhile, the PLO could hardly afford to remain entrenched in 
its rejectionist posture which had led it to nowhere. But this stance was 
strongly criticized by Islamic groups ae> indicating a willingness to settle for 
part of Palestine. Islamic groups, like Likud on the Israeli right, rejected the 
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idea of "Land for Peace" in favour of controlling all the land they believed 
belonged to them by divine right. 
Arafat's more moderate stance and efforts to gain international 
recognition of his peace proposal found success in December 1988 when 
Washington agree he had met their conditions of renouncing terrorism and 
accepting Resolution 242. He had done so by responding to an American 
draft of a PLO declaration written by the US Secretary of state, George 
Shultz, which referred to "the democratic Palestinian state which (the PLO), 
seeks to establish in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip"^^. The PNC 
Declaration of Palestinian Independence of November had been recognized 
by many Arab and Muslim states and by the Soviet Union. In the same 
months (7 December) a group of American Jews had met PLO officials, 
including Arafat, in Stockholm to encourage the US-PLO rapprochement. 
They issued a joint declaration in early December arguing that the PNC 
renounced terrorism in all forms and recognized Israel's existence. By the end 
of December, 76 states had recognized Palestine. 
In West Asia, there was a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the new PLO 
line in many quarters. Both Likud and Labour Party leaders condemned it. 
Naturally the Israeli caretaker government was less than pleased about this 
diplomatic blow, which it had hoped would never happen. For several weeks 
Israel had been conducting a diplomatic campaign in a number of countries, 
urging them to ignore any such PNC decision. Palestinian nationalism was 
something Israel pretended did not exist. It also seemed that this might 
weaken the hitherto unconditional support that Israel received from the United 
States and had come to expect almost as a right. Hafiz Assad of Syria also 
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vehemently criticized it. He had backed al-Fatah opponents of Arafat since 
1983. within the PLO various factions expressed reservations. The PFLP's 
George Habash opposed any peace overtures that gave av\/ay recognition of 
Israel without the latter's reciprocal recognition of a Palestinian State. Nayif 
Hawatmeh's DFLP also objected. In their view Arafat was staking his 
reputation on false promise, the US could bring Israel to the table and that 
Israel would recognize Palestinian self-determination. 
With the advent of 1989 many new factors had emerged. The US had 
agreed to talk to the PLO, at a time when a new administration headed by 
George Bush was about to take office^°. Pressure on Israeli Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Shamir, whose obstinacy had angered George Shultz, could be 
expected. On the other hand, Shamir had been strengthened by Knesset 
elections in early November 1988. Although Likud barely beat Labour in the 
polls, the strength of religious parties helped Shamir to form a new National 
Unity Government in which Likud controlled the most important cabinet posts. 
Rabin of the Labour party remained as Defense Minister, responsible for 
quelling the Intifada, but Shimon Peres was demoted to the Ministry of 
Finance, with Likud now directing the foreign ministry^^ Faced with requests 
from Washington for proposals to talk to the PLO, and with strong hints from 
the American Jewish community that steps should be taken, Shamir proposed 
on election plan for the occupied territories that were designed to stall the 
negotiating process and enable further consolidation of Israeli power in these 
areas. The stalemate would last until June 1990. 
Shamir and Likud, gained Knesset approval in May 1989 of a plan 
calling "free and democratic elections" among Palestinian Arabs in the 
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occupied territories, with the ultimate goal of autonomy that would grant them 
authority over their (unspecified) "affairs of daily life". Israel would retain 
control of security, foreign affairs and all aspects of policy pertaining to the 
settlers in the occupied territories^^. 
Palestinians in the occupied territories rejected the plan, as did the 
PLO in Tunis. Both groups affirmed their goal of coexistence, which required a 
state. The US, however, welcomed the proposal as a working document; it 
established linkage between elections in the occupied territories and 
resolution of the final status of the occupied regions in subsequent 
negotiations. The administration looked to the ending of Israeli occupation of 
the territories, something Israel would not accept, but decided to give Shamir 
a year to find Palestinian leaders in the West Bank or Gaza to find Palestinian 
leaders in the West Bank or Gaza who would discuss his proposals: the PLO 
was excluded. 
As expected, no Palestinians offered to participate. This gave Israel a 
year to suppress the Intifada and expand more settlements while fending off 
American efforts to broaden the scope of Shamir's offer. Despite Shamir's 
bellicose statements in Israel, the administration apparently deluded itself into 
thinking he would be forthcoming if given the chance. This, of course, was the 
impression Shamir wished to impart while pursuing his own goals (like settling 
more Soviet Jews in East Jerusalem etc.) 
By March 1990 the plan was dead, although Shamir did not reject it 
officially until June, when he took office as head of a new Likud government, 
without reliance on Labour participation. In the meantime, however, regional 
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developments combined with events within the territories to end the US-PLO 
diaiogue^^. 
The three-month period of mid-March to mid-June 1990 was a crucial 
one for Palestinians and Israelis. With Labour out the- coalition, Likud ran an 
interim government alone and used the opportunity to press it policy of 
settlements, in the occupied territories and in East Jerusalem. At the same 
time, Arafat, sensitive to criticism of his policy of rapprochement, began 
strengthening his ties with Iraq's Saddam Hussein in the hope of forcing 
negotiations based on power rather than the conciliation advocated by Egypt's 
Husni Mubarak. Saddam Hussein himself, in early April and at an Arab 
summit in Baghdad from 28-30 May, would call for a more militant posture 
towards American tolerance of Israeli intransigence, especially in light of the 
massive Soviet Jewish immigration in to Israel. By this time other 
developments had seriously poisoned the negotiating atmosphere^'*. 
The most critical one occurred in the spring of 1990, when the PLF, a 
PLO faction, attacked a crowded Tel Aviv beach with automatic weapons. 
When the PLO failed to denounce the attack, the US interpreted this as 
advocacy by the PLO of terrorism as a legitimate rrieans to achieve its aims 
and broke off direct contact with the Organization^^. 
The PLO's political position was further weakened that year when it 
openly supported Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August. The PLO continued its 
support for Iraq even after the US began its armed offensive to restore Kuwaiti 
Sovereignty. 
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CKA^Fm^- ^ / 
C H A P T E R - V I 
GULF CRISIS AND OSLO PEACE ACCORDS 
Kuwaiti Crisis 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990\ generated a very deep 
concern botli at regional and global levels. At West Asian level, the Crisis 
proved to be a "temporary silencer of the cry for peace between Palestinians 
and Israelis an one side, and other Arabs and Israelis on the other. On 
international level, the development was both a threat and an opportunity. It 
endangered the oil reserves of Kuwait and potentially those of Saudi 
Arabia-major components of Western and Japanese economic stability. But it 
was an opportunity for the US to assert American power with jurisdiction and 
to destroy the challenge that Saddam Hussein posed rn the post cold war era 
not only to the Arabian/Persian Gulf (hereafter Persian Gulf) region but also to 
American influence in the region and over its allies, European as well as Arab. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait followed a confrontation in mid-July 1990 
where Iraq threatened Kuwait unless the latter agreed to raise oil prices that 
had been lowered through generally acknowledged overproduction by Kuwait 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)^. On 18 July, 1990, Iraq's President, 
Saddam Hussein, accused Kuwait of stealing his country's oil and building 
military installations on Iraqi territory. Two weeks later, despite an intervention 
by the US Ambassador, Saddam directed his armed forces to invade its 
neighbor, prompting the UN Security Council to condemn the invasion and 
demand an immediate and unconditional withdrawal. The invasion also led 
the US divert an aircraft carrier battle group to the Arabian sea and to begin to 
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Lobby its allies to participate in a naval blockade of Iraq. On 6 August, the 
Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Irsiq and Kuwait^. 
Gulf War: US Intervention; Positions of the PLO and Israel in the 
Conflict. 
Once Iraq had invaded Kuwait the US under Bush's administration, 
responded swiftly with military aid to Saudi Arabia, the dispatch of Secretary 
of Defense Richard Cheney to the region to gain Arab agreement for the 
positioning of large numbers of American troops and the calling of emergency 
session of the UN Security Council to condemn the aggression. As early as 6 
August, 1990, press report noted President Bush's determination to overthrow 
Saddam Hussein. The administration refused to talk to the Iraqi leader and 
decided not to send its ambassador, then in London, back to Baghdad for 
discussions because "We don't have anything to say to him"^. Then after 
extensive preparations, coalition forces led by by the US recaptured Kuwait 
and destroyed much of Iraq's military and civilian infrastructure in a campaign 
that began on 16 January, 1991. The scale of the military triumph was 
unquestioned: less clear was the anticipated political resolution of the conflict, 
with respect to both the Persian Gulf and Arab-Israeli issues. 
It must be stated that most witnesses and evidences suggested that 
"self-interest, more than protection of the new world order or concern for the 
injured sovereignty of a small nation was behind the motive of the US military 
intervention in the recent Gulf war". US assessment of its requisite role seems 
to have been influenced by three major considerations: First, Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait endangered the tenuous political balance which had historically 
enabled the US to preserve its dominant role in the region. The balance. 
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which rested supposedly on the strength of the moderate Arab states was 
being threatened by Iraq in two ways. On the one hand it was fast becoming 
militarily too powerful for other local powers, and a formidable biological, 
chemical and perhaps, nuclear arsenal was suspected to be at its disposal; on 
the other, it suddenly went the radical, anti-western, anti-imperialist way, 
holding the banner of a pan-Arab upsurge. This could be the worst thing to 
happen to the US after the loss of Iran^. 
Secondly, the last thing the US could not accept an imminent threat to 
its access to oil in this region, which it wanted for itself as well as its allies in 
such quantity and at such price as must be satisfactory to the taker. The oil 
producing Gulf Arab nations, especially Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have been 
most obliging in this respect. Hence it was imperative for the US to see that 
the Capitulation of Kuwait was undone; or else, the Saudis might succumb to 
a similar fate^. In addition, Kuwait possessed additional importance in 
American eyes because of its investment assets in the US, totaling between $ 
45 to $ 50 billion with major gold holdings and treasury securities, although 
this was only a fraction of total Kuwaiti holdings in Britain^. In fact as the 
saying went round, the US would not have felt the least disturbed by the Iraqi 
action had Kuwait been an orchard rather than an oil field of immense value. 
Thirdly, under the rubric of freedom of navigation, the US had been 
steadily pursuing objectives that went much beyond and amounted to 
securing a permanent military surveillance over this region. Though the 
doctrinal posture for an extended use of the freedom was formulated earlier in 
the context of the Afghan crisis it continued to be reiterated in more emphatic 
terms by subsequent administrations^. 
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The initial American explanation for its reaction to the invasion was to 
defend Saudi Arabia from an Iraqi attack, and then to force Iraq out of Kuwait. 
Over time, other reasons appeared, from an early claim to be defending the 
"American way of life", to staving off the threat to the economy, to destroying 
the Iraqi military machine and, if possible, Saddam Hussein himself. In other 
words, although "liberation" of Kuwait was the Western declared objective, the 
unstated goal that motivated the policies of the principal actors was the 
establishment of Western dominance over the region, which is estimated to 
contain more than half of the world's proven oil reserves. 
The Arab response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was 
nearly unanimous. Most heads of state condemned it and called for his 
withdrawal. The motives of Washington's principal Arab partners in the 
coalition, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Syria, were clear-cut, if diverse in 
inspiration. Neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia could accept the sudden 
escalation of Saddam's power.^ Saudi Arabia in particular could not tolerate a 
challenge to her own oil fields, let alone a new contender for dominance in 
Gulf affairs. Egypt viewed Saddam as a rival for primacy in the Arab world and 
as recreating the Iraqi-Egyptian axis that had split that world in the 1950s. 
Syrian incentives were equally clear. Saddam's dpwnfall would be Assad's 
triumph over his old adversary, relieving him of pressure from his own 
northern flank as he turned to seek a peace agreement with Israel under 
American auspices. In return, major arms sales were promised to the Saudis, 
later scaled down because of Israeli opposition^". 
During the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the ensuring 1991 Gulf War, all 
of a sudden Israelis and some Arabs found themselves in the same boat, as 
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Saddam sought to legitimize his predatory move by portraying it as a noble 
attempt to promote the liberation of Palestine from "Zionist occupation". While 
the falsehood or dishonesty of this linkage was eminently transparent, the 
widespread emotional outburst it aroused, particularly when Saddam began 
firing his missiles (scuds) at Israel, underscored the explosiveness of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, if left unattended^\ 
This exceptional convergence of destinies let to tacit collaboration 
between Israel and the Arab members of the anti-Iraq coalition during the 
crisis. The former kept low profile, even refraining from retaliation for Iraq's 
missile attacks^^, while the latter highlighted the hollowness of Saddam's 
Palestinian pretensions and participated in the war operation against Iraq. 
This, in turn, made it easier for US Secretary of State, James Baker, to kick 
off the Madrid Peace Process shortly after the Gulf War. 
It should be emphasized here that among the PLO factions the reaction 
to the invasion and the ensuing Gulf War was similar in one form and 
different in another. All factions were unanimous in their protest and 
condemnation against the presence of foreign forces in the troubled region. 
The different side between them was doubtless as most sources suggested 
the same situation. The PLO frankly announced support for Saddam's stand 
and his "theory of linkage". Yasir Arafat held that "the days through which 
Baghdad is passing are our nation's days of glory, pride and steadfastness"^"^ 
Farouk Kaddoumi, the PLC's Foreign Minister, put it even more strongly: We 
are not neutral, we stand with Iraq 100 percent against the United States"^'* 
HAMAS, by contrast, condemned the presence of American and allied 
forces^^. Yet, several weeks later it called on Saddam Hussein to withdraw his 
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troop from Kuwait. Because HAMAS had to maintain support for its Gulf 
funders and at the same time respond to the Palestinian sentiment expressed 
in the street. It was careful to express a balanced view^^. HAMAS preferred to 
define the confrontation in the Gulf as one between the Muslims and the West 
and take the lead itself following the pan-Arab line^^. 
Paradoxically, PLC's siding with Saddam gave an important boost to 
Arab-Israeli reconciliation. Either in response to strong pro-Saddam 
sentiments among Palestinians in Jordan and the occupied territories, or due 
to frustration with Israel's indifference to its 1988 decisions, the PLO 
leadership hedged its bet on by siding with Iraq. This was manifested by 
assiduous attempts to defuse the crisis on Saddam's terms - such as the 
dethronement of the Kuwaiti royal family and the. complete satellization of 
Kuwait-something that was anathema to all Gulf regimes. When these efforts 
failed to produce results and the specter of war loomed large, Arafat threw in 
his lot with Saddam. Should war break out, he told a cheering audience in 
Baghdad, a week before the actual outbreak of hostilities, the Palestinians 
would be in the same trench with the Iraqi people to confront the US -Zionist-
Atlantic-build-up of invading forces, which are desecrating Arab land^^. His 
deputy, Salah Khalaf resorted to even more fiery rhetoric. "The Palestinian 
and Jordanian people will stand by fraternal Iraq in any aggression against it", 
he announced at a public rally in Amman, "We shall not abandon Palestine. 
We renew pledge to liberate Palestine inch by inch from the sea to the river"^^. 
The PLO 1988 recognition of Israel and its acceptance of a two-state solution 
seemed to have been expediently forgotten on t-he spur of this euphoric 
moment. 
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This mistake (siding decision) cost the PLO dearly. With the defeat of 
Iraq in the Gulf War, the PLO was held responsible by Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia. It was plunged in to financial crisis by the withdrawal of its wealthy 
Gulf backers. In May 1991 it was reported that the US $28 million a month 
from Saudi Arabia that the PLO had routinely received before the Gulf Crisis 
was going to HAMAS instead^". 
Though less noisy and with more carefulness, other Palestinian leaders 
echoed Arafat's predications of glory. George Habash of the PFLP opined that 
"the Gulf War will continue for many months and hundreds of thousands of 
Americans will be killed"^\ As'ad Bayyud at-Tamimi of the Islamic Jihad-
Palestinians (UP) chose to ignore the realities of modern conflict and return to 
the conventions of knightly battle. "The enemy is afraid of facing them (the 
Iraqis) on the battlefield. Therefore the enemy is sending its planes. Let the 
enemy come out of his bunkers to find the grim fate". An it was Tamini who 
predicted "Saddam will enter Jerusalem on the back of his white horse"^^. 
As for Israel, it was equally desirous of American-led military action that 
would destroy the Iraqi military machine and Saddam Hussein personally, and 
encouraged American military plans calling for Saddam's overthrow. 
However, the Bush administration eyed the Israeli stance warily. Officials 
feared that Israel would intervene in the war, thereby undermining the Arab 
coalition backing the US This fear increased once Iraqi Scud missiles landed 
in the Tel Aviv - Haifa coastal strip, and resulted in visits to Israel by 
Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to ensure that Israel did not 
respond. In return, the US promised Israel $13 billion - $3 billion for damages 
incurred by these attacks and $10 billion to be paid over five years to aid in 
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the settlement of Russian Jews; the Bush administration warned Shamir that 
these Jews should not be settled in the disputed territories^^. 
Despite Bush's warning statement and plea; the Israelis were 
intransigent and bent on more West Bank settlements. On July 3, 1991, 
Housing Minister Arial Sharon declared; "We will .continue to build in the 
occupied territories — I don't see any possibility to stop building"^'*. 
Defense Minister Moshe Arens, in support of Sharon's statement, said 
a few days later: "We are not ignoring his position, but would try to convince 
Mr. Bush to change his views".^^ 
It was reported also that the Housing Minister had plans for 500,000 
more Israelis to eventually move to the occupied territories in addition to about 
100,000 settlers now living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.^^ 
Bush's statement, from his vacation home in Kennebunkport, reiterated 
a US policy urging Israel to give up lands captured in the 1967 West Asian 
War in exchange for peace with the Palestinians and Arab nations. However, 
they are home for 1.7 million Palestinians and have been the scene of a 42 
month revolt (Intifada) to demand an end to occupation and the founding of an 
independent Palestinian state.^^ 
Madrid Peace Process: October 1991 - Summer 1993 
There is no doubt that the most tangible result of the Gulf Crisis was a 
renewed American effort to resolve Arab-Israeli matters, including the future 
of the Palestinians. Washington's Arab allies expected US intervention as 
compensation; their participation in the coalition had legitimized the American 
military presence on Arab Soil. Israel anticipated American pressure and the 
Shamir cabinet prepared itself to resist it. Shamir brought the head of the 
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Moledet Party^^ into his cabinet; it advocated the forcible ouster of Arabs from 
the territories. Shamir would negotiate but categorically rejected the idea of 
"territory for peace" . 
As for the Palestinians, US-Secretary of State, James Baker, from the 
beginning, told West Bank leaders that the PLO must be excluded from any 
talks, but that Palestinians linked to the PLO and from East Jerusalem might 
be part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. 
In short, major decisions faced Palestinians and Israeli leaders, but Arafat 
was on record as supporting American peace efforts. He and the PLO agreed 
to remain aloof from talks so long as Palestinians from within and without the 
territories were permitted to represent Palestinian interests. 
Palestinian delegation to the Madrid talks was led by Haydar Abd al-Shafi, 
a Gaza physician, and included Faisal Huseini and Hanan al-Ashrawi. They 
consulted frequently with the PLO in Tunis, but came to achieve a prominence 
beyond that accorded Arafat at times, especially Hanan al-Ashrawi, who held 
a Ph.D. in literature from the US. Her articulation of Palestinian grievances 
and negotiating positions attracted wide attention. Additionally, Arafat's and 
the PLO's financial fortunes faded as reliable sources of funds dried up. The 
Gulf states, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in the forefront, cancelled their 
contributions, which had buttressed PLO activities for years. Coupled with this 
penalty was that added by the Kuwaiti expulsion of Palestinians whom they 
suspected, often, erroneously, of backing Saddam; this community, and 
others like it, had sent back sizable remittances to the PLO and to support 
Palestinian families. The loss amounted to at least $ 100 million annually; by 
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spring 1993, the PLO would be closing offices at its headquarters in Tunis for 
Iackoffunds^°. 
Arafat's decline in prestige was matched by further increases in the 
reputations of Islamic groups. The idea of p^ace talks between the 
Palestinians and Israel, supported by the U.S, led to the re-emergence of the 
public dispute between HAMAS and al-Fatah and marked and continues to 
mark the most recent phase of the organization's development after the Gulf 
War. The dispute was over proposals to hold a peace conference between 
Israel and the Palestinians. By September 1991, conflict between the 
Islamists and nationalists in the Nablus area had reached crisis point. Dispute 
still centered on the peace process and the issue of Palestinian 
representation. By this time it had been agreed that Israeli and Palestinian 
representatives (although not the PLO which Israel refused to recognize) 
would meet along with other Arab parties in the Spanish capital of Madrid for 
peace talks. Just one month before the Madrid Conference in October 1991, a 
HAMAS leaflet ordered a general strike to protest against the decision by the 
PLO's ruling body (PNC), to support a Palestinian delegation from the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. HAMAS later went a step further issuing a "Fatwa" 
condemning the Palestinian delegates to the Madrid Conference. The HAMAS 
stance was rejectionist, arguing that no part of Palestine should be ceded in 
exchange for peace with the Israelis^V HAMAS also drew closer to rejectionist 
groups within the PLO, notably those that had criticized Arafat's concessions 
to United States' terms in 1988; HAMAS, PFLP and DFLP issued a joint 
statement in October 1991 condemning Arafat's willingness to sanction 
233 
Palestinian participation at Madrid. Witli this tlie Madrid talks began in late 
October 1991. 
The Madrid Conference, held on 31 October, 1991 was convened with 
the following in attendance; Israel, a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, 
Syria and Lebanon. The process embarked on would consist of a series of 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the aim of achieving peace treaties 
between Arab parties and Israel. From October 1991 to August 1993 Israel 
and the Palestinians (under Jordanian umbrella) engaged in eleven sessions 
of negotiations. Between Israel and other Arab parties nine rounds of talks 
took place before being pre-empted by the Palestinian - Israeli Accord of 
September 1993^1 
The Madrid Process, as it was popularly referred to, was historic in that 
the participants engaged in official direct negotiations for the first time. They 
were based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, as well as the Camp David 
Accords of 1978. The UN resolutions declared the principles of land in 
exchange for peace and the need for direct negotiations. The operative Camp 
David points involved the idea of "interim" stages for ironing out differences 
prior to final negotiations, especially regarding Palestinians and the fate of the 
occupied territories. Beyond Madrid, great power sponsors established 
multilateral talks on topics of regional significance such as water, arms 
control, and trade, discussions intended to establish bases for practical 
cooperation in the entire West Asia. 
Despite their significance, the talks produced little discernible progress, 
except between Israel and Jordan. The Palestinians'and the Israelis remained 
far apart. The Palestinians, with PLO approval, had agreed to interim stages 
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for deciding the fate of the occupied territories, as stated in Camp David, but 
insisted that self-determination, meaning a Palestinians State, should be the 
final outcome. The Shamir government in Israel adhered to its position of 
autonomy for the Palestinian people but continued Israeli control of the land 
and all major functions, including security and foreign affairs. Shamir's intent, 
as he admitted after leaving office in June 1992, "was to drag out talks on 
Palestinian self-rule for ten years while attempting to settle hundreds of 
thousands of Jews in the occupied territories", thereby creating the 
appearance of accommodation while working to ens'ure Israeli retention of the 
territories^^. 
The rigidity of these stances caused increasing despair among 
Palestinian in the territories and intensified violence after promoted by Mamas 
and a revived UP. Shamir's bellicosity ultimately led to American sanctions in 
February 1992; because of Israel's settlement activity, amounting to a 
reported 18,000 new housing units since June 1990, the Bush administration 
withheld the $ 10 billion in loan guarantees promised during the Gulf War^". 
Shamir responded with more settlements and the US began efforts to 
undermine Likud credibility and to assist a Labour party victory in elections 
scheduled for June. In those elections Labour won the mandate with Yitzhak 
Rabin as prime minister and Shimon Peres as foreign minister; the coalition 
included representatives of parties on the left that supported peace and 
territorial compromise more openly than Labour, analogous to the rightist 
factions that had collaborated with Shamir and Likud but were even more 
militant. With the Labor victory came the Bush adniinistration release of the 
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loan guarantees in return for Rabin's promise to halt settlement construction 
nonessential for security. 
On the Palestinian arena, HAMAS capitalized on difficulties in the peace 
negotiations and joined other groups, such as the PFLP, rejecting the peace 
process. By spring 1992 a show between HAMAS and the pro-peace al-Fatah 
faction of the PLO looked imminent. In Gaza Strip, where reconciliation 
became harder after each incident. With Palestinians increasingly frustrated 
by the lack of progress made at the negotiating table, HAMAS gained popular 
support by stepping up the activities of the Izzedin Qassem Brigade with a 
number of increasingly armed attacks against Israeli soldiers and settlers. 
Throughout the summer and autumn of 1992 HAMAS leaders protested 
against the peace process. The election of Labour government headed by 
Yitzhak Rabin, apparently committed to peace, did .not auger well for the 
organization. While Rabin courted the PLO and pushed his agenda for 
negotiations with the Palestinians, HAMAS continued its attacks on Israeli 
soldiers and civilians. HAMAS action (through its brigade-lzzedin Qassem) 
was aimed at two targets: Israel; soldiers and settlers and Palestinians; 
collaborators. As one leader of an Izzedin Qassem remarked: "Since our 
enemies are trying with all their might to obliterate our nation, cooperation with 
them is clearly a terrible crime. So our most important objective must be to put 
an end to the plague of collaboration"^^. 
In December 1992, after two armed attacks on Israeli soldiers and the 
kidnapping and murder of an Israeli border policeman, an Israeli crackdown 
on HAMAS activists severely weakened the organization. 
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On 17 December, hundreds of HAMAS leaders, members and supporters 
together with the remaining islami Jihad activists were arrested or removed 
from jail and put on buses heading for the Lebanese border. Altogether 408 
individuals were expelled to Marj al-Zahour in Israeli occupied south Lebanon. 
The expulsions breached the Fourth Geneva Convention and an international 
controversy was sparked. Within the Palestinian community there were real 
fears that the expulsions were part of a wider policy of transfer directed 
against the entire population and that if Israel was-allowed to get away with 
this particular action a precedent would be set. Rabin's justification for the 
measure was made clear in a statement to the Knesset: 
This government will fight any manifestation of violence and 
terror, and will not permit, and will not allow either HAMAS or the 
Islamic Jihad (Palestinian) to harm citizens of the State of Israel 
and it will take all legal steps at its disposal, to battle murderous 
terrorist organizations^^. 
In the occupied territories news of the expulsions was greeted with 
wholesale condemnation of Israel and a mini-Intifada erupted in Gaza as 
thousands took to the streets in protest. The entire future of the peace 
process looked bleak. The expulsions also provoked an intense debate within 
the Palestinian community about the place of the Islamists in the political 
fabric of society. Their implications ran deep and led many to question the 
motives of the Israeli peace partners. The PLO, in particular was forced to 
take a stand on the issue as its chief opponents, now subject to fierce 
repression, were demanding a response from the nationalist movement. The 
PLO could no longer ignore HAMAS or the popular support the movement 
enjoyed among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip. If the PLO 
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were to act truly as representatives of the Palestinians then the HAMAS case 
would have to be championed. 
In fact, the expulsions left the Israeli security apparatus vulnerable, 
exposing its inability, to capture the Izzedin Qassem guerrillas. By the end of 
January 1993 the Brigade was in action, killing two Israeli soldiers in Gaza. 
Throughout the early spring HAMAS' arnned brigade and individual supporters 
increased their attacks on Israeli targets, including the killing of soldiers, 
settlers and civilians^^. In a two-month period, for example, from December 
1992 to mid-February 1993, fifty Palestinians were killed by Israeli troops and 
ten Israelis died at Palestinians hands. During March 1993, twelve Israelis 
were stabbed to death. Some of the killers belonged to groups such as UP 
but others were apparently individuals acting spontaneously; conversely, at 
least twenty-three Palestinians were killed (by Israeli retaliations) during the 
same month^®. 
The stalling of the Madrid Peace Process, due to the expulsions, 
combined with the spiraling violence inside and outside the occupied 
territories, soon resulted in Rabin's decision to close the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip in March 1993, preventing Palestinians from' either entering Israel or 
Jerusalem. Pressure mounted on the Palestinians delegation to return to the 
peace talks by April. The Palestinians eventually capitulated, returning to the 
talks, while the 408 expellees remained stuck in Lebanon's no-man's land. 
The expulsion of HAMAS and UP leaders had backfired on the Israeli 
government, leading to a serious deterioration in the situation in the occupied 
territories and exposing the Israeli government to a barrage of international 
criticism and hostile press attention. Rabin and his political associates had 
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miscalculated the effects of the expulsion. The Israeli public was alarmed, 
rather than reassured, by the expulsions and their implications while the 
international community condemned Israel. 
By summer of 1993, the Madrid Process was in 5erious trouble and the 
momentum for peace appeared to have been lost. Tensions had increased 
between Arafat and his Palestinian negotiators from the territories. At the 
same time the prestige of the PLO's Islamic opponents had risen sharply. 
Political violence against Israeli targets continued in the name of the Izzedin 
Qassem Brigade, most Israelis started actively to fear for their lives as acts of 
political violence multiplied and the Israeli authorities seemed powerless to 
prevent them. In the eyes of many Palestinians, the Islamists were confronting 
Israel on the ground while the PLO had agreed to nonparticipation in talks on 
their lands that had no defined goals beyond the concept of interim stages. 
Furthermore, popular support and sympathy for HAMAS continued to grow, 
while the PLO endured its worse crisis for thirty years. The financial strain on 
the organization, since losing its Gulf funds was having drastic effects in the 
occupied territories and consequently on popular confidence in the leadership, 
particularly in Yasir Arafat. By early August pressure on him was so great that 
there were unprecedented public calls for him to resign as chairperson of the 
PLO. But unknown to the Palestinians population at this time, Yasir Arafat had 
already authorized one of his closest aides, Ahmad Qrei, to attend series of 
fourteen secret meetings in Oslo, Norway with Israeli government 
representatives. The meeting, which had been taking place since January 
1993 would prove decisive in brokering a peace process between Israel and 
the Palestinians. 
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Oslo Peace Process: Defective Diplomacy 
The Oslo Peace Process refers to the last nine years of diplonriatic and 
political efforts to bring Israelis and Palestinians closer, which commenced 
soon after the end of the Gulf War. This involved several different agreements 
and various international economic and political summits centered around the 
resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, initially satisfying the demands of 
both sides. 
It should be noted that since the start of the Oslo Peace Process in 
1993, political and diplomatic developments and campaigns with regard to its 
application have been very difficult and complicated understand. The choice 
seems most reliable here is to state or list every agreement in the process 
with their provisions chronologically, and this discuss and analyse their 
application, defective aspects and impasse. 
Following are all agreements in the Oslo Process: 
The Palestinian -Israeli Agreement (Oslo I) 
There were two aspects to what can be termed the Palestinian -Israeli 
agreement: the declaration of principles (DOP) ^^ , and the letters of mutual 
recognition. The DOP was initialed in OSLO on 20 August 1993, the official 
singing occurred at the White House on 13 September. It had been 
conditional on the exchange of three-letters of mutual recognition.'*°. 
The first letter was from PLO Chairman Arafat to Israeli Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Robin. In this letter, Arafat related the PLO's recognition of the right of 
the State of Israel to exist in peace and security, its acceptance of UN 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and its commitment to the West 
Asian peace process and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the 
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two sides, as well as to the settlement of all outstanding issues relating to 
permanent status through negotiations. Moreover, he declared the PLCs 
renunciation of the use of resistance operations and other acts of violence, 
and its commitment to assume the responsibility over all PLO elements and 
personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and 
discipline violators. Furthermore, Arafat promised to submit to the Palestinian 
National Council (PNC) for formal approval the necessary changes in regard 
to the National Covenant, namely to annul the provisions of the Palestinian 
Covenant which were inconsistent with the commitments stipulated in the 
letter; in the meantime he defined these provisions as inoperative and no 
longer valid''^ 
The second letter was from Arafat to Norwegian Foreign Minister 
Johan Jorgen Hoist. In this letter, he embraced the' PLC's declaration which 
encouraged and called upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip to take part in the steps leading to the normalization of life, 
rejecting violence and terrorism, contributing to peace and stability and 
participating actively in shaping reconstruction, economic development and 
cooperation'*^. 
The third letter was from Prime Minister Rabin to Arafat. In this letter, 
Rabin maintained that in light of the PLO commitments (included in Arafat's 
letter of 9 September 1993) the Government of Israel has decided to 
recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and 
commence negotiations with the PLO within the West Asian process'*^. 
Finally, the DOP defied the principles of. Palestinian interim self-
government in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It required Israeli 
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recognition of the PLO, withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho, and 
additional unspecified withdrawals over an interim five-year period. In 
exchange, the PLO would recognize Israel and promise to suppress 
"terrorism". The central issues of Jerusalem, water, borders, settlements, 
refugees, and the future Palestinian entity were reserved for "final status" 
talks. 
The Paris Protocol on Economic Relations 
It provided for economic relations between Israel and the Palestinians. 
It formed annex IV of Gaza-Jericho Agreement signed in Paris on 24 April, 
1994. 
The Cairo Agreement 
The May 1994 Cairo Agreement"*"* limited Israeli withdrawal to Jericho 
and about 60 percent of Gaza and gave Israel overall security responsibility 
for internal and external crossings, allowing for the establishment of 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA) "self-rule" over the evacuated territories. 
The agreement also called for completion of final status talks by May 1999. 
The Erez Agreement 
It is the agreement on preparatory transfer of powers and 
responsibilities signed at Erez on 29 August, 1994. 
The Taba Agreement (Oslo 11) 
The Taba Agreement of September 1995"*^  divided the West Bank into 
three areas: A, B, and C. Areas A are those under Palestinian security and 
civilian control. Areas B are those where the PNA has civilian authority and 
Israel exercises security control, while areas C are under full Israeli military 
and civilian control. 
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The Hebron Agreement 
Meanwhile, the Hebron Protocol of January 1997"*^  clarified the details 
of Israeli redeployment in Hebron. By this time, the functional autonomy that 
Israel had long desired for the Palestinians, whereby the Palestinians run their 
own social and municipal services, was now in place. Most Palestinians in 
crowded cities and refugee camps, generally in areas making up less than a 
few percent of the total occupied territories, were now under their own local 
authority, leaving the majority of occupied land in Israel's hands. From then 
on, tough bargaining over the land ensued, turning the Peace Process into 
real estate bickering. 
The Wye Agreement 
After a lengthy delay, the Wye River Memorandum of October 1998'*^, 
signed by the new Israeli Prime Minster Binyamin Netanyahu, was intended to 
complete the series of interim arrangements between Israel and the 
Palestinians prior to the final status negotiations. Its key components included 
redeployment of Israeli troops from an additional 13.1 percent of the West 
Bank and an additional Palestinian commitment to Israeli security. 
The Sharm al-Sheikh Agreement 
Ehud Barak's Sharm al-Sheikh Agreement in 1999 renegotiated 
clauses in the Wye River agreements, and further toughened security 
arrangements. It divided the redeployment process into further broken-up 
stages, but left most other issues untouched. No maps were provided, no 
figures were released for freeing prisoners, not deadlines were set for the 
third redeployment which would hand over the rest of the territories to the 
Palestinians - with the exception of the settlements and military bases. 
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Instead, Barak blocked the Implementation of all the records and insisted that 
further redeployment be connected to the final status negotiations. 
Unfortunately, by force of habit, the Clinton administration went along with it, 
coercing the Palestinians to come along as well. 
Camp David - U 
Finally, Camp David II of July 2000, a summit without preparation, 
meant to resolve a century-old conflict in a few days at a faraway US 
presidential retreat. Failure was written all over its walls, and yet neither 
Clinton nor Barak cared to see beyond the strategic void that such failure 
could create. Israel's proposition of "all or nothing" meant that if the 
Palestinians said no to all of Barak's proposals, they would have to remain in 
the same dire circumstances with no hope of progress and no further 
redeployment as stipulated in the Oslo Agreement. Any such ultimatum was 
destined to lead either to a breakthrough or an explosion. 
In summary, all the aforementioned agreements have transferred some 
powers and authority to the PNA, the governing body set up on account of the 
Oslo Process to administer Palestinian civic and military affairs. It was initially 
envisioned that the whole process, including a final agreement ending the 
conflict, would span a period of five years. Furthermore, the so-called 
substantive issues, that is settlements, refugees and Jerusalem, would be left 
to the final status talks. This in essence means that the key aspects of the 
Palestinian right to self-determination enshrined in UN Resolution 3236 of 22 
November, 1974 is open to negotiation. On account of the concluded 
agreements, the West Bank has been divided into various areas, A, B, and C. 
the PNA has full control in Area A which consists of the major urban centres 
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totalling in the West Bank just 3 percent of the territory and around 60 percent 
in the Gaza Strip. Area B in the West Bank which is jointly controlled, consists 
of 27 percent of the territory and Area C again in the West Bank totals 70 
percent. Israel maintains sole control of Area C. similarly, East Jerusalem, 
which is a continuous part of the West Bank, has been left to the final status 
negotiations and like much of the West Bank, remains under Israeli 
occoupation'*^. 
To understand the inherited weaknesses and the subsequent hurdles 
in the Peace Process from the beginning, two brief readings are needed for 
the DOP accords. One textual and the other political, view in the accords in 
their regional and historical context, the accords reveal less than they hide. 
They are vague and wide open to interpretation. But the arrangement 
markedly stipulated that all disputes must be resolved through a Joint Liaison 
Committee where Israel has a veto power and, hence, the capacity to 
maintain the status quo, the occupation. Strangly enough, the word 
"occupation", the only legitimate and accurate word to describe Israel's 
illegitimate presence in the Palestinian territories for some twenty seven 
years, was missing from the entire text. 
Although UN Security Council Resolution 242 is mentioned as the 
basis of the negotiations, nowhere is there an admission of occupation. There 
is also no discussion of the illegal settlements which, along with other 
sensitive and central issues of the conflict-such as the occupation of 
Jerusalem, the right of Return of the refugees, and the right of the 
Palestinians to self-determination - were all postponed and eventually 
rejected by Israel seven years later. 
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A political reading of the document shows even bigger problems, 
notably the continuation of overall Israeli control of the territories, and Israel's 
ability to manipulate the entire process in connection with its application 
according to its wishes and needs, especially as the process was doomed to 
negotiations in stages and implementation in phases. In this case, the 
powerful party with all the cards, Israel, was able to dictate the peace, spirit, 
nature, and conclusion of this open-ended process. Moreover, and in the 
absence of an international legal or institutional authority such as the UN, 
Israeli violations of the Oslo Process took place with impunity, lacking an 
enforceable arbitration mechanism. 
The US, the only guarantor of the peace process, who could have 
objected each time Israel violated the agreements, preferred to remain silent. 
It continued to underline its alliance with Israel, all the while claiming to be an 
honest broker. Israel began, from the first day, to violate the accords by 
undermining the "territorial integrity and continuity of the territories" by planting 
more settlements, more settlers, and more by-pass roads connecting them, 
hence compromising the entire peace process. The same took place in 
occupied East Jerusalem, but the dishonest broker, the US covered for its ally 
Israel. 
Since the signing of the Oslo DOP, 6ach Israeli government 
consecutively attempted to de-politicize the accords. Israel was able to exploit 
the fact that the accords were an empty frame work, in which each item 
required another agreement and was open to interpretation, even 
contradictory ones. The Israeli army, headed by Chief of Staff Barak and 
General Uzi Dayan, began the process of militarizing the forthcoming interim 
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accords in order to ensure maximum control. This was the underlying principle 
of the interim Taba agreement, which among other dangerous elements, 
divided the West Bank and Gaza into three areas - A, B, and C, instead of 
only two. Hence the accords were rendered hostage to any minor incident that 
could be used as a pretext to stop their implementation, while also delaying 
and complicating the transfer of territories to the Palestinians. It also gave 
Israel a veto power over all economic and political arrangements. By the 
beginning of the year 2000, any major Palestinian move, from the number of 
Legislative Council members to determining sales tax, was subject to Israeli 
approval. The appointment of the infamous American Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) as an arbitrator between the two parties further emphasized the 
importance of security over the political and short-term arrangements in lieu of 
long-term stability. In the process, sixty-two new military bases were erected 
in the territories, using American funds, and rendering geographical continuity 
and, hence, freedom of movements impossible'*^. 
In three years after the inception of the Oslo Peace Process, Israel 
redeployed from less than 3 (fractured) percent of land. This represented 
seven islands of overpopulated towns along with their poverty-stricken 
refugee camps, deprived of their hinteriand, but surrounded by Israel-
controlled areas. The PNA, elected by the Palestinians of the territories, had 
to "govern" within the constrained cluster of Palestinian enclaves. Israel 
continued its occupation of the remaining 97 percent of the West Bank and 40 
percent of Gaza, facilitating the expansion of its settlement drive and the 
Judaization of Jerusalem, which continued uninterrupted during Rabin-Peres 
tenure. 
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For that purpose, all participants agreed upon items where what Israel 
was to deliver remained vague and undefined in all the accords, especially in 
Wye River memorandum and Sharm al-Sheik. But when it came to 
Palestinian obligations, the agreements were detailed to the last pithy item. 
The Wye River memorandum is almost two-thirds security details, while the 
central issues of redeployment, final status issues, etc., are only generally 
dealt with in the remaining one-thirds, leaving Israel- the opportunity to fill the 
gaps. At the insistence of the Netanyahu government and with America's 
complicity, such issues as release of prisoners or-the missing maps of the 
specific areas from which Israel should redeploy were fudged. This allowed 
Israel to decide unilaterally what areas to redeploy from, and how many 
criminal prisoners instead of political prisoners to release. In the latest Sharm 
al-Sheik agreement, Barak's government reckoned that even Netanyahu's 
exigency of two-thirds security fell short on certain security requirements and 
details. Hence, the "moderate" Barak revised the security arrangements with 
America's blessing and praise. 
Thereafter, and despite the excitement each time a summit convened 
and an accord was reached, the situation continued to deteriorate as 
agreements were violated and more agreements were needed to implement 
defunct accords. The so-called "success" of the diplomatic track was not 
reflective of the socio-economic or political reality on the ground. For seven 
years, the diplomatic-intensive peace process had overcome ambiguities by 
merely substituting others. Meanwhile, the implementation of clauses in 
favour of Israel had negative economic and political effects on conditions in 
the occupied/autonomous territories and, in fact, led to the deterioration of the 
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standard and quality of living. If the diplomatic theatrics of Oslo succeeded in 
giving a positive impression in the international media, it was a deceiving lie. 
Finally, as it ran out of excuses and justifications, the mask fell off and the 
ugly Oslo Process made itself rudely visible to the disappointment of its 
proponents. No longer was uncle same capable of pulling more doves from 
his hat, or magically loosening the knots of Oslo. The magic behind the 
process faded away as pictures of Israeli tanks, snipers and dead Palestinian 
children crowded the streets and filled the screens. 
Constructive Ambiguity Becomes Deliberate Deception 
The impasse in the peace process was predictable for those who 
viewed it with no illusions. It was a dead-end process because it failed to offer 
fundamental and legitimate national rights to the Palestinians. But the process 
survived for three reasons. 
First, it rested on the thin line where minimum Palestinian and 
maximum Israeli demands met. One must recall that when the process began, 
soon after the end of the Gulf War and the demise of the Eastern bloc, the 
PLO was bankrupt and on the verge of collapse, while Israel was reaching a 
dead end in its negotiations with a weak Palestinian delegation in 
Washington. In order for it to be allowed into the process and recognized as a 
legitimate player, the PLO recognized Israel with no specified borders, 
ignored Israel's settlement drive, gave up the PLO covenant, its armed 
struggle, and, even if temporarily, abandoned the refugee question - all in 
exchange for the promise of Gaza and parts of the West Bank. Once the 
process took off, the Palestinians leadership held its breath while Israel 
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prospered. Since than it has been hard to detect any overlap between the 
two. 
Second, and at a later stage, the process's survival became more 
artificial, less responsive, and more dependent on outside coercion and 
pressure rather than on local satisfaction and progress. "Thanks" to America's 
diplomatic clouts and international aid, the process continued indefinitely, 
failing spectacularly. The Palestinians were forced to negotiate new 
agreements before the old ones were implemented. Hence they had to sign 
Hebron, and later Wye River, before interim agreements were implemented. 
Later they had to renegotiate Wye River with Ehud Barak before Netanyahu 
would implement it. This bizarre process of negotiating, renegotiating, and 
hardly implementing the same aspects of interim agreements, under wizard 
diplomacy of Washington, turned the process into a system of population 
control and Israeli territorial expansion. Meanwhile, the Palestinians who grew 
fatally dependent on the American role, were fed false promises and fake 
guarantees by the Clinton administration. 
Third, and most recently, the process survived on the hope that the 
final phase would make up for the interim failure. What was referred to in 
diplomatic lingo as "constructive ambiguity" in the intehm, proved to be 
"deceptive ambiguity". The Palestinians were manipulated into believing that 
they should take whatever was offered and build on it until the final status 
negotiations arrived, when they could ask for all their rights. The process that 
has been mistakenly characterized as "give and take" meant robbing the 
Palestinians of their territory with their own "assent", while on the other hand, 
promising to give them "generously" from what is ultimately theirs. As time 
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passed, the final status requirements seemed to fade away on the Oslo 
horizon as Jerusalem was encircled, and the West Bank divided by 
settlements and bypass roads. 
Israeli Leadership Crisis Undermines Diplomacy 
The change in Israel's political leadership,- from Yitzhak Rabin to 
Shimon Peres to Binyamin Netanyahu to Edud Barak, to Ariel Sharon over the 
last nine years has added to diplomatic instability and the weakening of the 
accords. But, as Barak's resignation and Sharon's victory have shown once 
more, the crisis of leadership is embedded in the political system and culture 
of the State of Israel. The hawkish approach to compromise during periods of 
calm and the hawkish attitude towards negotiations during turbulent times, 
make it unlikely that peace will be made without an Israeli de Gaulia or de 
Klerk, capable of taking a historic decision to make peace with the 
Palestinians and stand up, it necessary, to domestic criticism and opposition. 
From the beginning, Peres's enthusiasm for Oslo was indispensable in 
bringing Rabin into the process. But Rabin's assassination by a young, 
fundamentalist, Sephardim Jew diminished Peries's enthusiasm as he 
hardened his political position. The murder of Rabin on November 4, 1995^° 
and the background behind his assassination opened a Pandora's box in 
Israel. Paradoxically, the same camp that had incited his murder won the 
elections a year later. Rabin's murder was by no means an individual act; it 
reflected a real crisis in the system and a deep and dangerous polarization in 
the street. In addition to the atmosphere of hatred and incitement that swept 
through Israel between 1993 and 1995, it became clear that the radicalization 
of the Israeli army in the two previous decades played a role in torpedoing the 
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process. The Israeli Intelligence agent who incited Yigal Amir to assassinate 
Rabin was, it seems, an agent working on behalf of the fundamentalist 
movement in the security services. Since 1967, Israel's army had been 
radicalized by the extreme elements that flourished in Israeli society. It is not 
clear how deep the "conspiracy" against Rabin went, but it is certainly far from 
a coincidental act by a lone extremist. 
Instead of exploiting the popular anguish towards the assassination 
and taking the necessary and final steps to push forward a deal with his 
"partner", Arafat, Peres resorted to his usual opportunism. He became 
hawkish towards the Palestinians and appeased the National Religious Party 
(NRP), with whom he conducted coalition negotiations - even though the 
NRP had organized the street marches against Rabin, depicting him as a 
traitor. On the other hand, the new Prime Minister Peres, who extended 
invitations to Jordan's King Hussein and Egyptian President Mubarak to 
attend Rabin's' funeral, did not invite the Palestinians leader, despite the fact 
that Rabin had died as a result of his handshake with Chairman Arafat. This 
negative gesture, not Rabin's death, is to a reasonable mind the step that 
ushered in the beginning of the end of the peace process. From then on, it 
was free fall. 
Peres soon opted for violence both in Palestine and in Lebanon, 
leading to the Qana massacre in Lebanon. Under pressure from the military, 
he also issued the order to assassinate a Palestinians radical Islamist who 
was under Palestinian security control even though at the time HAMAS' 
operations had diminished. Peres's escalation of violence and his bad timing, 
all under the pretext of fighting terrorism, were met with an escalation of 
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activities by the Islamist movement HAMAS. This led to a new circle of 
violence: a round of suicide operations leading to the deaths of Israeli 
civilians, further Israeli closures, violence, and other forms of mass 
punishment against Palestinian civilians. There is certainly no moral 
equivalence between the piecemeal terrorism of radical groups under 
occupation, and the wholesale state-sponsored "terrorism" of Israel in south 
Lebanon and Palestine. 
Naturally, feeling insecure about the entire process, the Israelis elected 
the radical and populist Netanyahu. Constrained by the Israeli public's new 
demands for security, he delayed the implementation of the agreements 
signed by his predecessors with the aim of eventually extinguishing the entire 
process. Meanwhile, Washington, to keep the process alive, coerced 
Netanyahu into signing the Wye River agreement which called for additional 
redeployment from 13 percent of the territories. This, among other reasons, 
led to his eventually downfall in 1999. the Palestinians, who were coerced into 
adopting extra measures of oppression and violating the human rights of the 
Palestinians opposition during the Netanyahu era, once against found 
themselves short-changed by his successor. Ehud Barak came to power only 
to demand even greater security guarantees. Worse still, Barak claimed that 
although the peace process had been conducted on the basis of UN Security 
Council Resolution 242, the implementation of 242 did not oblige Israel to 
withdraw to the lines of June 4, 1967, as the Palestinians insist and as the 
resolution stipulates, because there was never an agreed international 
boundary between Israel and the West Bank. He also refused to effect any 
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new withdrawals until final status framework agreement was reached. And 
that was not all. 
As Barak finished his first year, his country's conditions were 
worsening and his coalition was falling apart. Seventy-seven percent of 
Israelis said their situation had not improved since Barak took office. 
Meanwhile, the coalition, based on Barak's decisive electoral victory, soon 
perished. 
But non of Barak's political acrobatics worked. Israel's crisis was 
deeply rooted in its approach to the peace process. The paralysis in this 
process seemed to cripple the country politically. Meanwhile, in the absence 
of progress, the Palestinians intended to declare and realize their state in the 
occupied territories. Israel threatened to retaliate, in the case of a unilateral 
state declaration, with annexation and violence. Barak refused to move 
forward with further implementation of agreements, while Clinton, along with 
his colleagues, were all anxious to have another diplomatic victory in the West 
Asia. These developments eventually led to the convening of the Camp David 
II summit in July 2000. 
When the moment of truth came at Camp David II, Israel handed down 
its four red lines: no return to the 1967 borders, no dismantling the 
settlements, no giving back Jerusalem, and no Palestinian sovereignty . it was 
Barak who spelled out Israel's "nos", but he reflected the thinking of the 
Jewish State's political spectrum. There proved to be a national consensus on 
maintaining control, and on allowing Palestinian independence only within the 
framework of interdependence, or a Palestinian dependency relationship, vis-
a-vis Israel. 
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Obviously, this was the most tragical phase of the entire peace 
process. Barak went to Camp David in order to make the Palestinians accept 
his ultimatum, an agreement favorable to Israel, or show Israelis and 
international public opinion that the Palestinians leadership was not ready for 
peace. At Camp David Barak had the full support of Clinton and his advisors, 
almost all of whom were both Jewish and Zionists. There were no 
international or legal grounds on which to negotiate. All the Palestinians had 
was America's "goodwill", which in real terms, translated into one 
manipulation after another, and one deceptive move on behalf of Israel 
followed by another. The Palestinians was cornered into accepting unfair 
"American bridging proposals", the same ones the Israelis themselves had 
proposed in the back corridors, but which had been turned down by the 
Palestinian leadership. Each time they refused them, the US repackaged 
them, but their substance remained the same. The Palestinians were 
expected to accept only some parts, but not all, of the West Bank 
(representing only 22 percent of historical Palestine)', while Israel would retain 
security control over all cross-border movement. This meant Palestinians 
would not be able to leave or enter their own state without Israel's permission. 
Palestinians would also have to accept Israel's proposals regarding the 3.7 
million refugees, including compensation, residency in the countries in which 
they took refuge, and immigration to the West, but no Right of Returns except 
for a few thousand, generally the elderly. Finally, the Palestinians were 
offered a merely nominal authority over Arab-East Jerusalem, and control of 
the Al-Aqsa Mosque area^^ 
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During The two-week prolonged Camp David II, the PLO leadership 
was in a dilemma, between saying "Yes" and "No". If "Yes", then they would 
be given a mini-Palestinian State accommodating Israel's security 
requirements and demographic realities. This would, in fact, split the putative 
Palestinian State into three Bantustans in the West Bank, with Israel's 
militarily reinforced settlements in between. And if they said "No", the PLO 
had to risk the US-sponsored diplomatic isolation. So they opted for a strictly 
conditional acceptance while waiting for the US-and Israeli new elections due 
to take place in the later months. In the undecided situation, the PLO 
preferred the unpredictable future to the present impasse. 
Sharon' s Victory 
Ariel Sharon's victory over Barak in Israel's leadership election on 
February 6, 2001,^^ meant that any meaningful initiative to bridge the gap 
between Palestinians and Israelis ceased. In the months following his election 
all attempts to reach a compromise with Palestinians were blocked . in May, 
after five month's investigation and in an attempt to facilitate the return to the 
negotiating table, the international American-led commission recommended 
that both parties cease hostilities and that Israel impose a complete freeze on 
the settlements, including on any so-called "natural growth". 
The recommendation was also underlined in the Egyptian-Jordanian 
peace initiative launched a few weeks earlier to facilitate a return to the 
negotiations. Arafat accepted both sets of recommendations. So did the 
majority of Israelis, according to Israel's daily Yediot Ahronot. But not their 
general/premier, Sharon. He rejected any halt to settlement activity, proposing 
instead an additional $ 400 million for further expansion. 
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Sharon's answer to the second Intifada has been to order the use of 
more Israeli fire-power and a tightening of the closures. Since the ongoing 
siege of Palestinian areas began there has been no reduction in the number 
of violent incidents-quite the contrary, the violence had become more spread 
and more serious. In fact, "collective punishment lacks even a pretense of 
having a security purpose". 
Israel's premier missed the basic lesson in Palestine, that war is not 
diplomacy by other means. Incapable of or rather unwilling to reach a historic 
compromise with the Palestinians along the lines of the 1967 borders, the 
Sharon government continued the same logic violence that has so far yielded 
little to Israel and done much damaged to the chance of coexistence and 
peace. 
Fifty-three years after its independence, Israel has missed its chance of 
being accepted as a member of the community of states in the West Asia. 
Instead of finally taking the opportunity for recognition on some 78 percent of 
historical Palestine by all its Arab neighbours, Sharon claimed that his country 
was still fighting its war of independence. A complete triumph of Zionisim 
would have been possible though a reconciliation process with Palestinian 
"neighbors". And so, an unrelenting Israel took the region into another circle of 
instability and violence. 
The second Intifada 
Seven years of the Oslo Process also failed to legitimize Israel's 
Domination of the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians upheaval, 
triggered by the visit of Israeli Rightist leader Ariel Sharon to the Al-Aqsa 
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Mosque on September 28, 2000, speaks volumes about the failure of the last 
seven transitional agreements to ameliorate living conditions in Palestine. 
For seven long years the PNA did the security work for Israel. It was 
pressured to work with labor and Likud governments to fight Palestinians' 
guerrilla actions, and any form of resistance to occupation, in order to 
maintain calm during the initial five-year transitional period mandated by the 
Oslo agreement. The PNA launched a campaign of oppression against 
Islamic figures and activists, permitted the torture of opposition leaders and 
journalists, and allowed the humiliation and arrest of political opponents of the 
Oslo. Process, including Legislative Council members. The PNA also became 
hostile towards non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which were 
demanding accountability and respect for human rights. The Palestinian 
leadership had to accept Israel's humiliating security conditions in order to 
earn its diplomatic "generosity", but Israel's political stinginess and continuous 
blackmail put the PNA in a bind. As popular resistance to its rule mounted, 
the PNA was forced to choose between doing the "master's bidding" or 
attending to the needs and wishes of its own people. For a long time, it 
defended its actions as the means to a justified end, but as the first five years 
passed, the promised happy ending never came. Two extra years brought 
more of the same. 
Inevitably, the light at the end of the tunnel dimmed after Camp David 
ll's failure, forcing the PNA to step aside and to allow the people to express 
themselves freely. 
Oslo Process had come to be the problem, not the solution. The official 
goal of a "just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement" was 
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transformed into "unjust, temporary, and partial agreements" leading to 
complete Palestinian dissatisfaction and frustration. 
The diplomatic impasse and excessive use of force following Sharon's 
provocative visit to Al-Aqsa Mosque paved the way for the new rupture in the 
occupied territories. But it is Barak, not Sharon, who is to blame for the 
outbreak of the Second Intifada. Barak commanded the army and headed the 
government, not Sharon. It came as no surprise that Israeli Prime Minister 
repeatedly asked Sharon to be his partner in a "national unity" or, later, in an 
"emergency government". In other words, a war government. Were it not for 
opposition from Likud activists loyal to his rival Netanyahu, Barak would have 
succeeded. Eighteen months after taking office, he ended up with a majority 
government commanding no more than thirty seats in the Knesset. 
Once Barak failed in his promises as prime minister, he immediately 
turned to the means most familiar to him, the military. 
Israel's war against the Palestinians during the Second Intifada was 
influenced by two consideration. Internal pressure which brought about the 
launch of the military campaign, and the media's reporting which played a 
large role in the international reaction. Hence, Israfel fought the Palestinians 
on two fronts, with the military and in the media. Within Israel, rightist 
populism, threats from settlers, and blackmail by the IDF win, Milosevic- style 
if necessary. Barak was told by settlement leaders either to use more force or 
risk escalation, including the intervention of settlers, in the confrontation and 
his own eventual downfall. The prime minister needed no encouragement 
when it came to force. As a general, he always approached political problems 
with military solutions. Externally, however, Barak could not afford to appear 
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like the Serb leader Milosevic in the eyes of his western counterparts, 
ultimately destroying every thing America had worked towards. 
As a result, Barak pursued a two-faced policy. Using the air force and 
tanks to bombard Palestinian towns, he led an "asymmetric war" against the 
Palestinians in an effort to appease the radicals. But externally, the policy was 
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defined as one of "restraint" in order to avoid international condemnation or 
action. The government used a special emergency media campaign, a sort of 
rapid-development media campaign, a sort of rapid-development media force, 
to discredit Palestinian claims and to vindicate Israeli violence. Pursuing a fine 
line, Barak slammed the door hard on the Palestinians' hands, while making 
sure the they were still able to sign an agreement with Israel. This was not a 
policy of "breaking bones", as pursued by Yitzhak Rabin during the First 
Intifada, but one of breaking the national will of the Palestinian people. 
Further, in order to insure maximum control and avoid Israeli 
casualties, especially the military, Barak took the following steps: 
1. Deployment of a special unit of snipers able to target field leaders 
(agitators, including children). They were responsible for most of the 
deaths. 
2. Allowing the military to use M-24s and other new weapons instead of 
M-16, insuring maximum casualties. 
3. Use of formidable force, including tanks and aircraft, similar to that 
used in Lebanon over the course of eighteen years of occupation. This 
included assassination and kidnapping to intimidate and frighten both 
civilians and political leaders. 
260 
4. The selective imposition of closures and, at times, the complete closure 
of the West Bank, but without leading to large-scale starvation and 
without cutting off electricity or water, which could incite the entire 
population and bring about international intervention. 
5. Assassination of political leaders charged with organizing the Intifada, 
especially those political leaders who organized the activists of the 
mainstream al-Fatah party in the West Bank and Gaza. This was done 
either through the special forces or through the air force's surgical 
strikes. 
6. Clearing the way for the takeover of certain strategic locations and, 
perhaps, preparing for the annexation to Israel of large areas of the 
West Bank. 
As a result of Israel's suppression campaign, there was no doubt that the 
Palestinians suffered dearly on the ground because they were no match for 
Israel. But the longer the Intifada lasted, the more Israel seemed to lose 
overall, as instability became a factor in its own political and economic life. 
This resolution was passed within two weeks of UN Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1322 (October 7) and an October 20 General Assembly 
Resolution, both of which condemned the "excessive use of force" by Israel. 
The UNSCR resolution called for the establishment of a "human rights inquiry 
commission" and asked UN High Commissioner.for Human rights Mary 
Robinson to investigate further the severe human rights violations committed 
by Israel. 
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Sharon Government and the Second Intifada 
The Second Intifada, as has been seen, was originally created by 
Prime Minister Barak's inability to adjust to all recent efforts made for the 
survival of the Oslo Process lying in a coma and his adoption of brutal 
suppressive policy in the occupied territories to appease hardliners in Israeli 
politics. Sharon's provocative visit to Ai-Aqsa Mosque immediately helped 
catalyze the more intense breakout of the Second Uprising. Although the 
rupture was the result of impasse in the latest of the long-standing Oslo 
Process during Barak's tenure,, clearly, Sharon, after coming to power, added 
the most cruel color to the Intifada. Thus he, undoubtedly, preserved and 
perpetuated the culture of military suppression, annihilation and tyranny 
incorporated in Israel's policy and starkly shown in the situation of "no life, no 
death" suffered by the occupied Palestinians on the occupied land. Sharon 
may have achieved promotion to the post of Prime Minister, but the crafty 
duplicity he adopted in the 1950s as the head of his notorious"!01" 
commando unit continues to serve him and his military commanders." 
The Second Uprising is similar to the First. But the difference in 
intensity between the two started immediately after Sharon became prime 
minister. This is because he has never been really interested in peace and 
quiet, only in gradually breaking the Palestinians, the PA and its leader, 
Arafat.^'' In other words, "Sharon has always kept and nourished the idea of 
gradually, but entirely disintegrating Palestinian people's ideological and 
physical existence". Given this chauvinistic vision rooted in Sharon's mind, 
some pro-Israeli columnists like Danny Rubinstein of Ha'arez, showed no 
hesitation in apportioning serious blame to Sharon, for "blood thirst". "Israeli 
262 
liquidation actions", he castigated, "cause harms several times worse than the 
benefit they are supposed to bring —."^^. As long as the Palestinians have no 
civil and political sovereignty and the IDF sits among them, Israel is an 
aggressor and occupier. 
The Uprising has so far witnessed hundreds of incidents whose 
circumstances suggest blatant wrongdoing by IDF soldiers—illegal killing or 
injury of unarmed civilians, including young children, wonton vandalism of 
private property, routine bullying of innocent passersby - but complaints go 
astray or end up shelved, or else a half-hearted investigation is dragged out 
for months to end in nothing. In the few cases of legal or disciplinary 
action-most prompted because the incident was recorded on film-the culprits 
get off with ludicrously light sentences^^ 
Since beginning of Sharon's era, Israel has employed Israeli jets, 
helicopter gunships and gunboats to crush the will of Palestinians, the PA 
headquarters in Ramallah, Gaza as well as Bethlehm '^^ . On 10 January 2002, 
Israeli commandos took out PA police and naval positions along Gaza's 
northern coast and, for the second time in two months, tore up the runway of 
Gaza International Airport^^. Later on 17 January, Israeli F-16s dropped 
rockets on the PA's police headquarters in Tulkarm, leaving one policeman 
dead and 40 Palestinians wounded, including civilians. The IDF also 
dynamited the building of the PA's Palestine Broadcasting Corporation, in 
order to silence Palestinian "incitement".^^ 
Assassination of Palestinians leaders and activists affiliated with the 
PLO, HAMAS and UP has been more frequently adopted in this Intifada than 
in the previous one. An exemplary case took place on 14 January, while Raed 
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Karmi, leader of al-Aqsa Brigades in Tulkarm was visiting his wife and 
daughter during a furlough from the protective custody of a PA Jail. A bomb 
had been lodged in a cemetery wall near his home. Israel neither claimed nor 
denied responsibility. It did not need to^°. 
Earlier on 10 January, the Israeli army destroyed 59 shelters in Rafah 
Rafugee Camp, rendering 619 Palestinians homeless in a three-hour 
incursions. These brought the total of homes razed in Gaza during the Intifada 
to 330, leaving some 3,000 people displaced, most of them refugees, nearly 
half of them from Rafah^V Later on 10 February, the IDF tanks swept through 
Gaza completing their reoccupation^^. 
On 28 February, Israeli troops backed by tanks and helicopters, 
entered both Balata Refugee Camp outside Nablus and Jenin Refugee Camp 
in the far north of the West Bank. The purpose, said the army, was to "strike 
the terrorist infrastructure and arrest wanted terrorists". But the armed men 
fled as soon as the army entered. Thirty Palestinians were killed and over 200 
wounded, many seriously, most of them civilians. In Balata five buildings were 
razed to the ground^^. On 4 March, IDF tanks again invaded Jenin and Rafah 
Refugee Camps, leaving ten Palestinians dead, including a Palestinian Red 
Crescent doctor in an ambulance as he tried to tend the wounded in Jenin^"*. 
Israel's onslaught came on 9-10 March in which 56 Palestinians and 14 
Israelis had been Killed. The IDF had swept into villages and refugee camps 
in Gaza, Tulkarm and Bethlehem to eviscerate "the Core" of the intifada. 
Sharon ordered 20,000 soldiers to go after the Palestinians, head and limb: 
the head was Ramallah, the temporary capital of the PA; the Limb, Jabaliya, 
the largest and most militant refugee camp in the occupied territories. 
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Jabaliya was hit hard first. At around midnight on 12 March, Soldiers, 
armour and helicopters penetrated the camp's three outskirts in a hunt for arm 
caches and fugitives. Seventeen Palestinians were killed^^. 
It must be emphasized here that from the start of the Second Intifada, 
the Palestinians, civilian and militant, have been protesting the Israeli forces 
both in peaceful and violent manifestations. But their reactions were of no 
avail before Israel's war potentiality. The Islamist groups like HAMAS and UP 
no sooner re-emerged than were cornered and pounded by the IDF as well as 
the PA police forces themselves. Worst of all is that the Israeli army took 
control over the PLO leadership headquarter in Ramallah more than 7 times 
since beginning of the Intifada. This implied that most of the time the 
Palestinians lived without head. The brutality of the occupier is to such an 
extent that breaks most records of torture and destruction in the human 
history. Given the US conspiracy of silence in support of Sharon's chauvinism 
and pessimism and the vast Israeli public support in favour of his military 
policy, the trauma of Palestinian people in body and soul is an undeniable 
truth beyond doubt. 
In fact, there have been many attempts on the part of regional and 
international organizations to solve the crisis. But diplomatic and political 
efforts-from European Javier Solana's peace initiative to Saudi Prince 
Abdullah's to Mubarak-cum-Abdullah's to even UN resolutions - could not do 
anything to stop Israel or push the Israelis and the Palestinians to return to 
negotiations. Three years of the Second Intifada destroyed everything the 
Oslo Process had ever achieved. 
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The PA Decline and the Islamist Rising 
More than two years into the Intifada, HAMAS is now a dominant 
power in the occupied territories, and nowhere more so than in the 
impoverished, sealed and abandoned Gaza Strip. 
It owns its rise not only to the armed resistance it has put up against 
Israel's tidal military offensives, the collapse of the PA and many of its 
institutions and the fractures in al-Fatah. As important has been its social 
agenda: HAMAS' impressive array of charitable and welfare services stand in 
stark contrast to the inefficiency and corruption of the PA's ministries. 
It has also become increasingly independent in policy, driven less by 
codes of national unity than by the imperatives of factional advancement. In 
August 2002, PA police forces tried to put in palace a cease-fire along the 
lines of the Israeli-Palestinian truce that has more or held in Bethlehem. It was 
flouted by HAMAS, which responded to Israeli amiy incursions with mortar 
attacks on Israeli settlements. 
In August, too, the Palestinian factions tried to agree a common policy 
for the Uprising. Al-Fatah wanted a clear declaration that the aim of the 
national struggle was the establishment of a Palestinians State in Gaza and 
the West Bank and that resistance, more popular than armed, should be 
confined to these territories. It also wanted a national unity government bound 
by the principles of collective decision-making. 
HAMAS demurred on all three counts. It insisted on the right of the 
"resistance" to act through "the Palestinian lands", including Israel. Nor was it 
enticed by the prospect of governments^. 
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"A national unity government can be formed "on the basis of support in 
the Intifada and resistance", says Aziz Rantisi, HAMAS' political leader in 
Gaza. "But if al-Fatah wants us to adhere to a common political programme, it 
will fail. Rather, we seek a national unity government like that in Israel. Each 
party there has its policies but unites on striking us. We should do the 
same 
But the crucial divide was on goals. HAMAS agreed that the aim of the 
Intifada was to end the occupation but refused to renounce national and 
religious claims to Palestine as a whole. "No Palestinian can say to future 
generations of Palestinians that Palestine is not their land", says Rantisi^^. 
The result is a force that is less a political opposition to the PA than a 
movement increasingly bent on becoming its replacement. Al-Fatah and 
secular leaders in Gaza are convinced that many in HAMAS have now taken 
a decision that the PA is no longer "a national achievement that needs to be 
defended", with main advocates of this line being the military wing in the 
occupied territories and the "out side" leadership abrpad. 
In its stead they are looking to a new national movement rekindled from 
the ashes of the old, forged out of the Intifada militias of HAMAS' Qassam 
Brigades, al-Fatah's al-Aqsa Brigades, the Popular Resistance Committees, 
the al-Quds Brigade of UP and the PFLP, according to Ranlisi's inventory^^. 
From above, it seems that the only way HAMAS can be domesticated 
into becoming g a loyal opposition, rather than a mutinous one, is through an 
"inclusive" process of the national reconstruction combined with tangible steps 
towards ending the occupation. Without this the PA's drift to collapse will 
continue, no matter have many international "roadmaps" are charted for its 
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"reform". And the conflict will be fought out between HAMAS in Gaza, UP in 
northern Israel and Ariel Sharon and the settlers in the West Bank. 
Consequences of the Second Intifada 
In Israel, the overall picture is very stable, and there is the 
unambiguous shift of Israeli public opinion against Oslo and its aftermath. The 
convincing majority in favour of the peace process has vanished since the 
Intifada began, to be replaced by the hardened political views. Sixty-seven 
percent opined that the Oslo Process harmed Israel, and only a meager 21 
percent considered them beneficial or helpful. The same applies to the 
required "concessions". Fifty-four percent said they "no longer" support 
concessions to the Palestinians^^. 
Strategically, the policies pursued by Sharon and the nationalist Right 
have added a dangerously destabilizing factor. His deliberate dismantling of 
the political, institutional and security frame work established by the Oslo 
Accords of 1993 has encouraged the Israeli Right's hopes of preventing 
Palestinian statehood altogether, greatly complicating the task of resuming 
the peace process within the foreseeable future. No less significant has been 
his insistence on keeping total physical control over the West Bank and Gaza, 
and expanding Jewish settlements. This has revived the Right's rhetoric of the 
"Land of Greater Israel" and its hopes expelling all the Palestinians out of their 
land. 
Economically, Israel is estimated to have lost NIS 32.8-35 billions ($ 
6.8-7.3 billions) in the first two years of the Intifada, leading to an expected 
negative GDP growth rate of 1.5% and a two-point rise in unemployment to 
10. 7% in 2002. It is predicted that the cost of confronting the Palestinian 
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security threat will continue at $ 2.5 - 2.9 billions annually. Economic decline 
has been compounded by the global slowdown, leading to a moderate 
downgrading of Israel's international credit rating .^V The domestic political 
ramifications of dealing with the Intifada are no less troubling. There are 
increasing internal challenges not only to the civil and political rights of Israel's 
own 1.2 million Palestinian citizens, but also to the independence of the Israeli 
judiciary and thus to the nature of democracy for the Jewish majority. 
Similarly, the PA and the Palestinian civilian population and economy 
are currently in a precarious state. The Israeli imposition, since the beginning 
of 2002, of extensive siege and isolation measures throughout the West Bank 
and much of Gaza, combined with nightly curfews within West Bank cities, 
amount to a collective "lockdown" that has pushed unemployment to 
approximately 50% and the number of people living below poverty lien ($2 
daily) to between 55-60% (West Bank) and 70-80% (Gaza). Social solidarity 
and civility have withstood the grinding, arbitrary and often brutal siege 
conditions remarkably well so far, but there have been sharp rises in crime 
(especially, burglary), begging, drug use and reportedly prostitution. A 
substantial increase in domestic violence and trauma are additional 
manifestations of the transformation of a productive society into one 
dependent to an unprecedented degree on humanitarian aid to survive. 
These conditions have drastically curtailed the functioning of the PA 
civil service and police since February, and crippled delivery of the two main 
public services - health and education - that had been maintained despite 
hostilities since autumn 2000. Only emergency budgetary support-principally 
from the Arab states ($ 45 million per month in 2001, now down to some $ 12-
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15 million) and the UE ($ 9 million per month since 2001) - has allowed the 
PA to maintain reduced salaries for 130,000 - 145,000 public sector 
employees. So long as Israel refuses to release more than a small fraction of 
roughly $ 680 million in customs duties and other revenues it has collected on 
behalf of the PA but withheld since autumn 2000, international budgetary 
assistance is all that holds off an unemployment rate of 80% and total 
economic meltdown and social collapse^^. 
Finally, Sharon's second-term electoral victory in January 2003, did not 
bring about any change in Israel's policies towards the Palestinians and their 
leadership. Furthermore, the international community is too weak to push 
Israel to comply with principles of universal justice, and make any 
concessions in the face of the US veto in favour of Israel's intransigence. 
Developments of interactions between Israelis and Palestinian in regard to 
any peace initiative or process in future are not easy to be predicted. 
However, It is a matter of certainty that the status quo (Israel's reoccupation) 
in the occupied territories are likely to remain for some time. 
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CHAPTER - VII 
CONCLUSION 
The emergence of the Jewish state is obviously one of the most 
important events in the twentieth century. The Zionist decision made in the 
1897 Pal Conference (in Swiss) to establish a Jewish State in Palestine, the 
1917 Balfour Declaration which promised to establish, this state, and the UN 
Resolution 181 of 1947 which partitioned Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish 
State are considered important milestones in the efforts to crystallize the 
Zionist political project both theoretically and practically. These are the same 
milestones which also formed the landmarks of the Palestinian catastrophe in 
accordance with an integrated Zionist plan and programme supported by what 
is called "international legitimacy" as represented by the UN. 
These historical milestones have transformed the Jews of the twentieth 
century from people who were dispersed all over the world to a people who, 
with the support of the west, established a state on land belonging to others. 
Meanwhile, these historic milestones transformed the Palestinians from 
people living on their land and seeking liberation from colonialism to groups of 
people who are scattered over the earth and have no right to return to their 
homeland. Israel also took non-military measures between and following the 
two was to deport Palestinians. The Palestinian diaspora are now living in at 
least twenty countries. 
The Palestinians would not have left their homeland to live in tents and 
on trifle international assistance had they not suffered the massacres 
perpetrated by the Zionist aggressor. They committed more than 45 different 
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massacres, and destroyed and depopulated more than 420 Arab towns and 
villages which were then populated by Jewish migrants who came from 
Europe and other places. 
The Zionists created this catastrophe through a history of wars and 
bloody terrorism in the form of five main wars against the Arab confrontation 
countries and through thousands of horrendous shelling and air bombings 
against Palestinian refugee camps and Arab towns, villages, and schools, 
using many internationally prohibited weapons like Napalm, cluster bomb, 
causing huge human and material losses in these countries. 
Since Zionism has taken root as an entity and a state recognized by 
the UN and on the land that was usurped with immoral and inhuman means, it 
has formed a real nightmare and an obstacle that deprives the Palestinian 
people from having a natural life. 
Zionist aggression sowed the seed of Palestinian armed resistance in 
the beginning of the 1960s and has formed a real challenge to the Zionist 
entity and its stability in the last quarter of the twentieth century. 
A lot of Palestinian resistance organizations which emerged before and 
after the creation of the State of Israel, and especially the PLO of 1964 and 
some Islamic militant movements later on, are the unintended product of the 
Jewish state whose Zionist ideology is based on the mentality of rebellion and 
disobeying the international community. Palestinian people, unable to depend 
on Arab states, took their cause into their own hands and fought to restore 
their homeland by all means. Their struggle against Israel, although in the 
state of helplessness, still continues and will remain until their justice is done. 
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Due to continuous failure of Arab states'to recover the usurped 
Palestine (1948 and 1967 events), their attitudes tpwards the Palestinian 
resistance changed and were shaped primarily by direct individual interests in 
Palestine. For example, Egypt has perceived the Palestine cause as a pivotal 
elements in its efforts to attain regional leadership. Wishing to be seen as a 
more militant regime in West Asian conflict, Syria founded and supported 
some PRMs but brutally subordinated them to its own political needs. Other 
Arab states more or less pretended to be active in Support of the PLO in late 
1960s, each with its different individual purpose and interest in mind. 
The advent of the PLO was indeed a product of temporary inter-Arab 
de'tente in which the Palestinian problem came to play a growing role. 
Palestinian nationalism was catalyzed enormously by-the 1967 Arab defeat, 
which enhanced the PLO's autonomy in the inter-Arab arena and led to its 
growing military and political impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The combined 
impact of Palestinian armed struggle inside Israel and cross its self-given 
borders, Israeli retaliations, and prolonged military, occupation of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip by Israel underlay a growing process of Palestinization 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It witnessed the adoption of Palestinian 
assumptions and symbols by widening circles among the Palestinians, 
increasingly enhancing specific Palestinian national identity at the expense of 
Pan-Arabism. Nonetheless, the PLO adhered to the principle of Pan-Arabism, 
portraying itself as the "beating heart" and reason de'tre of the Arab nation at 
large, hence claiming the Arab world's full support for its specific nation 
cause. 
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Israel, no doubt felt insecure with the increasingly rising PRM and its 
operations and did not hesitate to adopt retaliatory policies towards the 
guerrillas and Arab countries from which PR raids on Israel were originated. It 
labelled the FLO as "terrorist organization". 
The primary purpose of the vilification of the FLO is obvious: it is to 
disguise the usurpation of Palestine and to give Israel the appearance of a 
lawfully established authority against whom some disorderly elements, 
described as terrorists, are rebelling. One of Israel's objectives in its smear 
campaign against the Palestinian nationalism is the dehumanization of the 
Palestinians with a view to creating psychological conditions conducive to 
their destruction. 
Israel might have been successful in preserving its territorial integrity. 
But it could not wipe out the Palestinian nationalism .represented by the PLO -
source of its permanent anxiety through 1950s, and 1960s. 
The peculiarities of the Palestinian's status and situation and the nature 
of their aspirations have led them to develop their methods and organization 
accordingly. After the decade of 1970 (Jordanian crisis), the PLO worked 
actively to achieve international recognition and support. It established 
relations with radical leftists organizations throughout the world and 
increasingly received material and moral support from the Arab world and the 
USSR. The PLO was now on its way towards achieving international stature. 
As for Israel, it should be emphasized that since the conclusion of the 
1967 war, it has been in control of all parts of the mandated Palestine as well 
as Sinai and the Golan Heights. Immediately after the war, Israel took 
administrative measures to unify the city of Jerusalem pursuant to 
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government administration in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, allowing minimal 
powers of local administration, under Israeli military control, by local Arab 
mayors and town councils. 
Israel also embarked upon a policy of colonial settlement within the 
occupied territories in the wake of the 1967 war to create a fait accompli 
which stand against any future peaceful compromise. 
The settlement and land policy of the Israeli government left the Arab 
Palestinians in the occupied territories bewildered, radicalized and anxious. 
The policy implied that Israel wanted every square inch of land under 
Palestinian feet. 
Economically, the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been forced, 
through post 1967 war Israeli policies, into dependency on the physical 
integration into Israel's economic system. Obviously the occupation has 
helped transform Israel into a state with an imperial economy, relying partly 
for its well being on the captive human and material resources of the occupied 
territories. It held the occupied areas as a captive niarket, and restricted their 
economic independence. 
These policies have been criticized and opposed vehemently by the 
PLO, regional and international level and they have become a great obstacle 
blocking any peace attempts and initiatives since 1967. 
The October war of 1973 created conditions very favourable for the 
Palestinians. It is a positive, turning point, despite some of the negative 
aspects on the military and political fields. For the first time the decision to 
repulse the aggression was an Arab one, and the myth of Israeli superiority 
was shattered forever. The war also proved that Israel as a strategic ally of 
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the US, could not be successful in suppressing the Arab liberation movement. 
With the war, the Palestine question came to the forefront as the central issue 
in the Arab Israeli conflict. 
The PLO gained strength as a political factor after the war and was 
recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and 
as the sole legitimate body with right to negotiate the future of the occupied 
territories. 
In the wake of the October crisis, the PLO realized to its dismay that 
the Egyptian leader had not intended to liberate Palestine, but only to create 
the conditions that would prompt the Israeli government to negotiate with him 
for the return of the Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty. It become clear to the PLO 
that the Arab states were neither unable or unwilling to defeat Israel through 
armed force and that it would have to achieve its objective through the peace 
process itself. 
The Camp David Accords and the Egyptian Israeli peace Treaty in 
1978 and 1979 dealt another blow to the PLO, depriving it of vital Egyptian 
support and breaking the unity of the Arab front in the confrontation with 
Israel. 
Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy after the October war was seen by the 
PLO as "US-Israeli" conspiracy in order to treat Palestinians as refugees and 
thus liquidate the Palestinian problem. 
The autonomy concept proposed by Israel as a part of the Camp David 
Accords in connection with the Palestinian issue, was totally rejected by the 
PLO and all Arab states' except Egypt as contrary to self-determination. Israel 
responded to the PLO and Arab-states attitude by sabotaging the negotiation 
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and continuing to confiscate Arab Palestinian, lands and build new 
settlements. The Israeli behaviours angered the PRMs under the PLO and 
outside and thus caused their reactivated and intensified guerrilla raids on 
Israeli target by the late 1970s. 
In fact, since 1977, the PLO had pursued peace initiatives with the US 
and European countries. Unable to accept Resolution 242 in a manner 
acceptable to the US, Arafat, nevertheless, scored impressive gains. In June 
1980 the nine-member EEC issued the Venice Declaration calling for 
recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination and the PLCs rights 
to be linked with any peace initiatives. It did call for dismantling Israeli 
settlements in the occupied territories since the 1967 war in preparation for 
the return of these territories as a prerequisite for peace. Israel refused any 
peace overture with regard to Palestinian issue. Israel wanted to uproot the 
PLO and Egypt separated peace with Israel enabled it to chase and raid 
against the PLO guerrillas who moved from Jordan in the wage of 1970 
debacle and positioned in southern Lebanon since 1978. This eventually led 
to Israel's Lebanon war in 1982. 
In June 1982, Israel launched a massive land, see and air invasion of 
Lebanon., the operation was not limited one like March 1978 invasion. Israel 
had more fundamental as well as megalomaniac war aims associated with the 
second invasion of Lebanon. These are; (a) crushing and destroying the PLO 
as a military and political force in Lebanon, (b) inflicting a humiliating defeat 
on the Syrian army in Lebanon'so as to effect its total or partial withdrawal, (c) 
installation of Bashir Gumayil as the President of Lebanon, and (d) signing of 
a peace treaty with Lebanon. 
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With regard to the Palestinians, the Israeli incursion was the most 
important part of a general policy which the Likud adopted in the early 1980s, 
in which the main objective was to smash the base of the PLO power both 
military and politically. The essence of this policy said that Israel should 
punish the nationalists and support the Palestinians who think positively, 
meaning people who are willing to collaborate. 
The invasion took its incredible toll in Palestinian and Lebanese lives. 
The massacre of Palestinian civilians in Sabra and Shatila by the Phalagists 
was the cruel consequence of the Israeli campaign of extermination. It also 
reflected the imminent logic of Israeli policies since the Palestinians were first 
expelled from their land."Flee or be massacred" - that is the only choice the 
Zionist movement and the State of Israel gave the Palestinian people. 
The disastrous Lebanese adventure convinced many Israelis that there 
was no military solution to the Arab- Israeli conflict. No less importantly, the 
war destroyed the PLCs military infrastructure in Lebanon and sowed the 
seeds of the Palestinian Uprising (Intifada) in the occupied territories which 
allowed the PLO to shed its commitment to Israel's destruction and to accept 
a "two-state" solution - Israel and a Palestinian State in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. With this regional disillusionment reinforced by the collapse of 
communism and the end of the Cold War in late 1980s, the road to peace was 
open. 
The Palestinian Uprising should not have been a surprise to anyone. A 
particular conjunction of forces is required for mass mobilization to occur in 
any social situation, and for mobilization successfully to culminate in collective 
action. The conjunction of forces was present in the West Bank and Gaza 
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Strip in1987. The population of the occupied territories was disaffected with 
military rule, as were the Dutch under German occupation, the Namibians 
under South African rule, the Afghans under Russian occupation, and the 
Algerians under French colonial rule, to give a few examples from the sorry 
record of the twentieth century. 
In the West Bank and Gaza a peculiar combination of Israeli settler -
colonialism and military rule engendered a process of integration of the 
occupied territories into Israel. The effects of Israeli actions were felt by 
Palestinians in their every day lives, as the economic pinch hurt landowners, 
shopkeepers, wageworkers, high school and university graduates, and 
entrepreneurs across the board. In addition, those who stood up to protest the 
unfolding occupation were silenced by the Israeli military authorities. In that 
kind of situation it is impossible not to have a heightened awareness of one's 
own objective predicament. On the level of consciousness, therefore, 
nationalism found a fertile breeding ground in the population of the occupied 
territories. 
On the structural level, too, nationalism could be a powerful force for 
change, as the economic and political violence perpetrated by the occupier 
affected all sectors of the population regardless of their class base, which 
facilitated the forming of a broad alliance of classes against the occupation. 
In December 1987, Palestinians took to the streets en masse to protest 
the Israeli military occupation, despite the very severe repression to which 
they had been subjected. Popular committees sprang up spontaneously in 
neighborhoods and villages and began to coordinate the local resistance. 
Within a month a national leadership committee was formed, the Unified 
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National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), which issued directives to the 
population through leaflets. Palestinians followed the UNLU's directives to the 
extent that they were able to carry on the Intifada and created a horrible 
disorder and anxiety for the occupier, given the Israeli authorities'attempt at 
counteracting the UNLU'S sway through massive military repression and an 
administrative crackdown. Mass compliance with the UNLU's directives 
underlined the local leadership's legitimacy in the eyes of the population. The 
UNLU made it clear from the beginning that it saw itself as the arm of the PLO 
in the occupied territories, and not as an alternative leadership. 
The type of repression, as well as the particular impact the military 
occupation had on people's everyday lives, helps explain the form the Intifada 
has taken. First, the all encompassing nature of repression and exploitation 
implicated all Palestinians in the struggle. Second, the lack of channels for 
political expression of just grievances, the lack of accountability on the part of 
the Israeli military authorities, and the mass organizations' inability to find 
legal redress for violations committed by the Israeli military forced 
Palestinians to respond to injustice by resorting to a combination of violence 
and withdrawal through nonparticipation in the institutions of the occupier. 
Third, the ongoing process of economic and administrative integration 
prompted a deliberate effort to disengage from the structure of occupation. 
Finally, the Israeli military repression that traditionally targeted the Palestinian 
community's leadership compelled Palestinians to decentralize and spread 
their leadership so that the impact of detentions and deportations would not 
adversely affect the functioning of the movement, and leaders could be 
replaced immediately. 
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The Intifada constituted a watershed in the history of the Palestinian 
movement for national liberation. The world was jolted into the realization that 
a Green Line does exist between the State of Israel and the occupied 
territories, and that a vibrant Palestinian nation exists and strives to set the 
course of its own history. These were momentous achievements in and of 
themselves. For Palestinians a psychological barrier has been broken: they 
are now aware of their own collective strength, and they have seen the 
vulnerabilities in their opponent's armour, previously deemed impenetrable. 
The Intifada was more than an Uprising against an intolerable status 
quo or a movement of defiance. It was also a movement of construction, the 
harbinger of the formation of an independent Palestinians State which has 
existed in the heart of those who stood up against the Israeli occupation. 
It should be noted here that from the start of the First Uprising, some 
Palestinian movements with Islamic militant orientation also began to emerge 
in the occupied territories. But they still did less to hinder Israel's military 
policy than to attempt to de-legitimize the PLO as representative of the 
Palestinian people. This further complicated the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 
the eyes of the international community, especially powerful third parties, like 
the US, which tried to achieve a tangible peace prociess in favour of Israel. 
With regard to Israeli-Palestinian peace prospect, the August 1990-
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait caused many new developments in West Asia. The 
United States seized the opportunity to establish even more firmly its control 
of the oil-producing regions by a show of force. The aftermath of the Gulf 
Crisis provided both a need and an opportunity to revitalize the peace 
process. The need arose from the sordid spectacle in the Gulf: huge 
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destruction and casualties, the human rights catastrophe escalating under the 
effect of sanctions. The opportunity also arose from, the international context. 
Europe had at least fully conceded the West Asia to the US; Europeans would 
henceforth refrain from independent initiative, limiting themselves to 
implementation of US rejectionist doctrine, as Norway indeed did in 1993. The 
Soviet Union was gone, its remnants now loyal clients of Washington. The UN 
had become virtually a US agency. Whatever space the superpower conflict 
offered for independent nonalignment was gone, and the catastrophe of 
capitalism that swept the traditional colonial domains of the West in the 1980s 
left the Third World mired in general despair, disciplined by force of the 
Western-managed "market". With Arab nationalism dealt yet another crushing 
blow by Saddam's aggression and terror and PLO tactics of more than the 
usual ineptitude, the Arab rulers had less need than before to respond to 
popular pressures with pro-Palestinians gestures. The US was therefore in a 
good position to advance its rejectionist programme without interference. 
Europe, having abandoned any independent role, was less of a threat. 
Russia could now be welcomed rather than excluded, being powerless and 
obedient. The PLO approached the same status, for similar reasons, by mid-
1993. 
The "Peace Process" was renewed with great fanfare at Madrid in 
1991. the Palestinian delegation at Madrid called "explicitly for a two-state 
solution". The great achievement of Madrid was "the Palestinian self-
adjustment to the real world", Palestinian acceptance of a "period of 
autonomy under continued Israeli domination", during which Israel can build 
the facts of its permanent domination with US aid, as it proceeded to do after 
Madrid. The Madrid Peace Process which was supervised by the US and 
based on two basic requirements: no meaningful outside interference, and no 
Palestinians rights, eventually failed. 
However, in 1993 there was another chance both for the Israelis and 
the Palestinians to compromise and live in peace when the spectacular OSLO 
peace process was launched. It was reinforced by several interim agreements 
during the period of past nine years. Despite the excitement each time a 
summit convened and an accord was reached, the situation continued to 
deteriorate as agreements were violated and more agreements were needed 
to implement defunct accords. The so-called "success" of the diplomatic track 
was not reflective of the socio-economic or political reality on the ground. For 
seven years, the diplomatic intensive peace process had overcome 
ambiguities by merely substituting others. Meanwhile, the implementation of 
clauses in favour of Israel had negative economic and political effects on 
conditions in the occupied/autonomous territories and, in fact, led to the 
deterioration of the standard and quality of living. If the diplomatic theatrics of 
Oslo process succeeded in giving a positive impression in the international 
media, it was a deceiving lie. Finally, as it ran out of excuses and justifications 
the mask fell off and the ugly face of Oslo made itself rudely visible to the 
disappointments of its proponents. No longer was the US capable of pulling 
more doves from his hat, or magically loosening the knots of Oslo. The magic 
behind the process faded away as pictures of Israeli tanks, snipers and dead 
Palestinian children crowded the streets and filled th^ screens. 
Naturally as it was, the Palestinians opted for a third alternative: 
steadfastness. A new popular Uprising (Second Intifiada) ensued to send a 
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clear message to Ehud Barak, and a reminder to Yasir Arafat, that they would 
no longer accept the curtailment of their freedom, threats to their national and 
religious symbols, or their future held hostage by a stop-go process. If there 
were any doubt that Arafat could still be pressured into signing an unfair final 
accord or that Washington, or any other party with clout, could corner him, 
Palestinian public opinion reflected in the Intifada removed any such illusions. 
If the First Intifada of December 1987 had broken out as a result of 
direct occupation and oppression, the Second Intifada was the natural 
outcome of continued lying, deception, and disappointment over seven long 
years of what was meant to be peace building and good neighbourly relations, 
referred to as the Oslo peace process. The violence in Jerusalem, Palestine, 
and in Israel-proper has underlined once again the urgent need to take a 
critical look at this unfortunate and unjust peace process in order to 
understand the roots of the Uprising, and more particularly, the dynamics 
behind the Palestinians' dissatisfaction. This is necessary to chart a different 
path for historical reconciliation. 
Despite Israel's 1991 involvement in the US peace project of the 
Palestinian and Arab tracks (Mudrid Peace Process), the Israeli society is 
markedly deviating towards the Right more than the deviation noticed in the 
early years of the Jewish State. This deviation can be labelled as a political 
coup. The first three decades saw nearly a complete control of the Middle and 
the Leftist parties while this control shifted during the last two decades to a 
noticeable Right majority. On these conditions, the Madrid Process failed to 
produce a positive result. In fact, since the 1991 Madrid Conference, Israel 
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has changed governments seven times, simply because it cannot live 
peacefully in its colonial reality and yet cannot escape it. 
When Ariel Sharon came to power, whatever little progress that has 
been achieved in the Israeli progress came to. an abrupt halt. His 
government's attitude towards.the peace process is a continuation of the 
Likud's government policy of finding excuse to avoid implementing deals 
reached with Palestinians. Sharon is also the main catalyst of the Second 
Intifada during which he himself worked out the most brutal plan in 
suppressing and crushing the Palestinians, their identity and leadership. 
Out of his last-breath struggle to sustain and live up to the peace 
process and hence please both the Israelis and the US, the PLO leadership 
fell in the pitfall set by Israel and its ally. In the process, after being exhausted, 
having nothing to concede and nowhere to retreat, the Palestinians leadership 
in the form of PNA have gradually become "demolition tool" serving the 
purpose of Israel's security policy while annihilating their own people and 
children, their only fighting resource. This is the present development which, 
no doubt, reflects the physical and mental state of desperation and frustration 
in which the PNA has come to be since the beginning of Sharon's era. 
At present, the most devoted West Asia peace process seems going 
nowhere. All political and diplomatic efforts along vyith promises of economic 
aid or threat of military punishment, turned up fruitless to narrow the gap 
between the two conflicting parties. Therefore, it seems most difficult to find 
an appropriate answer to the current phase of the parley. 
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However, the Palestinian-Israeli discord is still not in a connpletely 
hopeless situation. There are still ways to tackle with the impasse of the 
peace process. 
First, the process of settlement needs much more sacrifice, trustfulness 
and sincerity from both sides. 
Second, given to political elements of both conflicting parties, there 
have always been some dovish politicians who support resolution of the 
conflict in a peaceful and reconciliatory manner. As for Israel, there are a pro-
Oslo Labour faction led by Yossi Beilin, Meretz faction, peace Bloc of Uri 
Aunery, peace coalition of peace now, left of Israeli politics and Yesh Gvul 
(Thee is a limit). These peace camps and left constitute the basis for the 
Israeli orientation towards the Palestinian leadership. Regarding the 
Palestinians, there are also a great number of optimistic political elements 
who are pragmatists like Hanan al-Ashrawi and those Palestinians who 
formed the local administrative council such as majors etc. in the occupied 
areas and Palestinian intelligentsia operating in Jerusalem, the West Bank 
and Gaza, and diaspora. In the long run, there is hope that these peace-
ohentated camps of both Israeli and Palestinian sides will emerge, converge 
and help resuscitate, realize and revitalize the dying Oslo process. 
Third, as far Israel, the main domestic problem is how to legitimize the 
peace-policy when the regular constitutional and legal stipulations regarding 
the formulation and implementation of this policy, such as Knesset approval, a 
national referendum, and probably elections, are not regarded as sufficiently 
legitimate by many opponents of this policy. Extra-parliamentary groups, and 
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probably a some political parties, will not acquiesce in the peace policies even 
if they are legitimized by the legal forums and processes. 
Fourth, regarding the Palestinians leadership, to realize the peace with 
Israel, they have to adopt a unified approach to the peace process, get ride of 
partisanship, let democracy live its own life and create a stable political, legal 
and economic structure in order to make sure that they can survive on their 
own if they are given the chance to establish their independent state in the 
future. By wiping out corruption, the PLO is sure to attract more material or 
financial aids from the Arab world, the US, Europe etc. the PLO also must 
bring all extremist and radical groups within Palestinians society under its 
control by means of compromise so that they will not create hurdles in the 
way of peaceful coexistence with Israel in case final agreement can be 
reached in the expected future. 
Fifth, there must be campaign on both sides, Israeli and Palestinian in 
order to indoctrinate the public the benefits of political, economic and strategic 
coexistence. 
There is reason to fear that if negotiations do not get under way in the 
near future. There will be a general hardening of Arab positions. The 
inclination within the PLO to reach an agreement will wane. Today Arafat and 
his circle are restraining radical tendencies, but when these older leaders 
disappear and the young leadership inherits their place, the Palestinian 
leadership will become more extreme. 
Continuation of the conflict will lead to an escalation and hardening of 
the Israeli stand as well. Terrorism will get worse, and consequently so will the 
repressive measures against Palestinians in Israel and Palestinian areas. 
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Extremist Jewish religious nationalism, with its hostility towards non-Jews, will 
also intensify. World criticism of Israel will become harsher. Such 
developments will also affect how Jewish people everywhere regard Israel. 
In addition, the significant gap between the positions of both sides and 
the fierce differences within each camp make it very difficult to reach a modus 
Vivendi. The extremists on both sides who oppose the concessions that will be 
required are likely to torpedo the negotiations, and to resort to violence - even 
war - in order to accomplish this. The success of negotiations could be a 
great accomplishment in view of the painful decisions that both sides would 
be asked to make. But this miracle will be hastened if both sides keep ever 
before their eyes the image of the inferno that awaits them in the absence of 
an agreement, especially the final one. 
JLCBPE^OIX 
APPENDIX- I 
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESIOLUTION ON THE FUTURE 
GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE (PARTITION RESOLUTION 29 
NOVEMBER 1947 {181(!l)} 
The General Assembly, 
Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to 
constitute and instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration of 
the question of the future government of Palestine at the second regular 
session; 
Having constituted Special Committee and instructed it to investigate 
all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare 
proposals for the solution of the problem, and 
Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee 
(document A/364) including a number of unanimous recommendations and a 
plan of partition with economic union approved by the" majority of the Special 
Committee, 
Considers that the present situation in Palestine in one, which is likely 
to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations; 
Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to 
complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948; 
Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the Mandatory Power for 
Palestine, and to all other members of the United Nations the adoption and 
implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan 
of Partition with economic union set out beiow; 
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Request that: 
a. The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in 
the plan for its implementation; 
b. The Security Council Consider, if circumstances during the transitional 
period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine 
constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, 
and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security 
Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly 
by taking measures, under articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to 
empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this 
resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to 
it by this resolution; 
c. The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the 
Charter, any attempt to alter by the settlement envisaged by this 
resolution; 
d. The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged 
for it in this plan; 
Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be 
necessary on their part to put this plan into effect; 
Appeals to all government and all peoples to refrain from taking any action 
which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations — . 
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Source: The Middle East and North Africa (1998) (London: Europa 
Publication Ltd., 1998), end. 44, pp. 106-7. 
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